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Abstract 
This thesis examines the spoken and written discourse of uniformed British 
police officers. Utilising a rhetorical and discursive analysis, the study considers 
firstly how officers use their considerable powers of discretion to deal informally 
with crime and criminal incidents. Focusing on a form of discretion that the police 
refer to as cuffing, two specific discursive practices were identified as being used 
by police to informally resolve crime: these were the giving of suitable advice and 
the that's civil device. The second part of the study was concerned with the 
formal prosecution process and how officers construct prosecution case files. 
Specifically, how they reformulate and precis evidence in 'domestic' violence 
cases to assist a Crown prosecutor in making a charging decision. In this 
normally confidential and non-public discourse, officers rely upon a very narrow 
range of linguistic devices and speech genres; these are combined with an 
equally limited array of gendered stereotypes and legal myths, with the result that 
prosecution cases can be 'subverted' (Sacks 1995) and thus discontinued. In 
both studies, the doing of policing was consistent with two occupational 
ideologies that are influential within police operational subcultures: the ideology 
of pragmatism and the ideology of self-preservation. The findings raise concerns 
about some of the working practices of the police. 
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If you simplify your English, you are freed from the worst follies of orthodoxy 
George Orwell, 1946 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"if it please your honour, I am the poor Duke's constable, and my name is 
Elbow. I do not lean upon justice, sir; and do bring in here before your 
good honour two notorious benefactors. " 
Measure for Measure, Act 2: 1 
This thesis is concerned with the rhetorical and argumentative skills of police 
officers. Its purpose is not to examine what the police do, but to understand how 
the police do policing. Admittedly, success with the latter, involves paying 
attention to the former. However, it does not follow that one is the logical 
consequence of the other: doing policing involves a great deal more than simply 
carrying out the activities that the police are expected to perform. The unique 
window that police work offers on the social world, and the daily experiences of 
dealing with the seedy and ignoble aspects of human activity, fosters the myth 
that their understanding of human behaviour and psychology is nonpareil 
(Skolnick 1966; Rubinstein 1973; Van Maanen 1978; Holdaway 1983; Punch 
1983; Chatterton 1983; Waddington 1999). This, in turn, perpetuates another 
myth 
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... the mysteries of the occupation are so profound that one not immersed repeatedly in police operations could not possibly understand 
the constraints as well as the possibilities of particular circumstances... 
(Bayley & Bittner 1984: 35) 
This 'you can't possibly understand it because you are not involved in it' notion 
underlies the sense of 'mission' (Waddington 1999; Reiner 2000) that is said to 
be a defining characteristic of the police; it alludes to a 'we know best' ethic that 
engenders resistance to change, provokes hostility to the ideas and influences of 
outsiders (Brown 1996; Ainsworth 2002), and reaffirms the unerring belief of 
police officers that they are indispensable in keeping anarchy and lawlessness at 
bay (Skolnick 1966; McConville et al., 1991; Reiner 2000). 
Attractive though it may be to suggest that policing is esoteric and accessible 
only to others skilled in understanding the criminal wiles of human activity, such 
an approach imbues policing with a mystique that it does not possess: this is not 
to denigrate exponents of the police officer's craft, or to infer that the police have 
no expertise or insight into matters of social psychological importance. It is, 
instead, to acknowledge, as Van Maanen (1973) does that 
... the police, like other stigmatized groupings, have invented 
sophisticated coping mechanisms designed to present a certain front to 
the non-police world (Van Maanen 1973: 4) 
One purpose of this thesis is to demystify policing and go beyond the 'front' that 
the police present. Whilst there is nothing revelatory in observing that the police 
are inclined to obfuscation or that social scientists have worked hard to pierce 
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and unscramble this sophisticated police facade, two factors are advanced to 
support the claim that this research project offers a genuinely fresh and original 
view on policing. 
Firstly, a radically different, non-cognitive, social psychological approach is 
employed that is quite distinct from the traditional and predominantly sociological 
research that has gone before. Secondly, this alternate epistemological approach 
is bolstered by my "insider status" as a serving police officer (Taylor 2001: 321). 
Historically, researchers or observers have struggled to overcome the suspicion 
and, at times, hostility of police officers to 'outsiders' (Brown 1996). Academics in 
particular, often find the police organisation 'closed' to them (Ainsworth 2002): by 
comparison, no such barriers or prejudices were encountered during my 
research. But, to suggest that the impetus for this thesis resides only in a desire 
to demystify and debunk the police is simplistic and inaccurate. The seeds of my 
argument and the genesis of this project may be traced to a number of serious 
dilemmas of ideology (Billig et al., 1988). 
This opening chapter examines those dilemmas and how they were the 
provocation for this thesis. The chapter itself, which is intended to be reflexive 
and to make explicit my identity as a researcher, begins by examining the 
background to the project. Throughout, considerable attention will be paid to the 
researcher - to me. In many respects, I am as much a topic of this research as 
the stated topic itself. Consideration will be given to my relationship with the 
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wider police organisation and to the organisational and sub-cultural ideologies 
that exist within it. A consideration of these matters moves me on neatly to 
explore some of the dilemmas these ideologies posed, and still pose for me. 
Some of these are necessarily intertwined with the folk psychology and the 
operational or working methodology of police. Unpicking these issues allows me 
to set out the rationale for the study, which in turn invites further discussion about 
the general aims of the research. Finally, I will conclude with an outline of the 
chapters. 
1.1. Irony and disquiet 
It is with a certain irony and some measure of hypocrisy that I confess I am 
uneasy about the institution that employs me. My disquiet stems less from the 
role that the police have in society [although this is not without its difficulties], and 
more from the practices that the police employ in carrying out that role. By 
practices I refer to the formal and informal rules and procedures that police 
officers adhere to as they go about their daily business. Some, such as the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 [hereafter sometimes referred to as 
PACE] and the associated Codes of Practice, are the product of jurisprudence 
and the process of law which enshrines these practices and 'guidelines' in legal 
statutes and the formal policy documents of police organisations. Of greater 
interest to this research project, are the larger numbers of informal practices or 
so-called 'working rules' (Waddington 1999; Reiner 2000). These are the 
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operational axioms of police sub-cultures and underwrite police 'occupational 
ideology' (Van Maanen 1973: 34); furthermore, they contribute to the common or 
shared knowledge of the police that has been accumulated over a long period of 
time. Such informal practices vary in their legitimacy and use. As some fall from 
favour so others gain greater currency; they nevertheless reflect the prevailing 
sensus communis of the police as much as they constitute it (McNulty 1994). 
To the uninitiated, the commonplaces of the police can appear confusing and 
often obtuse: like all common sense it is contradictory and, as we shall see later, 
it is frequently at odds with the common sense of everyday life (McNulty 1994). 
Understanding why this might be requires us to breech the crusty and often 
brusque conservative exterior of the police organisation (Skolnick 1966) and 
access the clandestine and occasionally seething sub-cultures of the 'federated' 
or lower ranks of the police (Reiner 2000). Senior officers may have their own 
sub-cultural cliques and associated practices; but, while the ability to formulate 
policy and the authority to issue orders and edicts is theirs (Walklate 2001), the 
implementation or subversion of both the law and police organisational policy 
ultimately lies with police officers of the lowest ranks (Westley 1970). To put it 
another way 
... the police organisation 
is directed not by legal and administrative rules 
to which police actions approximate but by a series of interpretations by 
lower ranks which vie with legalistic and other rules. (Holdaway 1983: 17 
my emphasis) 
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Hence it is important to acquaint ourselves with the knowledge and the 'logic' that 
informs their thinking; to recognize the practices through which this knowledge 
and logic is enacted; and to understand and analyse their interpretations. There 
is nothing esoteric about these things, the problem lies. in gaining access to some 
of them. 
Academics and researchers have traditionally found it difficult to penetrate the 
police occupational environment (Brown 1996; Ainsworth 2002). 'Reality' 
television's passion for real-life police drama may have lowered the police 
organisation's resistance somewhat; but, the camera's intrusive gaze, like the 
attention span of its audiences is limited. The more subtle [and often less visual] 
day to day craft aspects of policing remain closed to the 'outsider' - those that are 
illegitimate even more so (Van Maanen 1973; Ainsworth 2002). As self 
proclaimed experts in their field, the police resist knowledge or expertise from 
without (Skolnick 1966; Sacks 1972; Ainsworth 2002). The strong esprit de corps 
that exists amongst police officers both sustains and is sustained by these 
enduring and occasionally coercive occupational sub-cultures (Skolnick 1966; 
Bittner 1970; Van Maanen 1973). To those initiated into it at an early age, or who 
have little or no occupational experience elsewhere, the police world is 
compelling. Even those of us with eclectic life experience -I trained as a visual 
artist and sculptor before running away to sea for a few years - and who have 
developed an irreverent approach to orthodox thought, and a recurring tendency 
to insubordination, still find the police culture difficult to resist. Whether we like it 
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or not, these subcultures remain intrinsic to the police officer's craft (Skolnick 
1966) and to the doing of policing (Reiner 1992; Waddington 1999; Wilson et al 
2001). Chessyre offers a not altogether inaccurate analogy when he describes 
the police organisation as being like 
... a giant school with too many pupils 
in the D stream. The bright kids do 
okay, but they are rapidly removed to the sixth form, from where their 
impact on the school culture is minimal. Out on the playground it is easy 
for those left behind to lapse into an uncritical acceptance of some pretty 
negative attitudes. (Chessyre 1989: 150-1) 
Predictably perhaps, 'insiders' who remain in the 'playground' and take the path 
that I now tread, also encounter resistance and hostility when daring to offer a 
critical view (Holdaway 1983). Given the police organisation's traditional inability 
to deal well with criticism (Brown 1996), coupled with the strong tribal bond that 
the police sub-cultural milieu promotes, it is no surprise that officers who are 
seen to 'break ranks' are regarded [by some at least] as disloyal or 
unprofessional and not to be trusted. That certain irony and hypocrisy that I 
referred to earlier, now becomes apparent. 
Eleven years ago the police provided me with the opportunity [and the funding] to 
return to academic life: were it not for the police organisation that I now appear to 
slight, this research project would probably never have come about. The 
consequences of my academic enlightenment are that my understanding of the 
social world, and the police perspective on it, was irrevocably changed. 
Subsequent advancements in my intellectual prowess are reflected in the 
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increasingly incisive gaze that I now cast. Such a gaze provokes a number of 
dilemmas. Some are profound and all are ideological in nature (Billig et al, 1988). 
Indeed, for someone in my position, even the question of how to resolve those 
dilemmas is dilemmatic: my response is this thesis. From a personal perspective, 
the cathartic and 'self enlightening' (Fuhrman & Oehler 1986) value of this 
enterprise is no less important than the academic one. What then, are the 
dilemmas that led me to embark on this project? 
1.2. Dilemmas? What dilemmas? 
Firstly, it must be conceded that what I consider to be dilemmas may not be 
regarded as such by other police officers. Indeed, there are a great number of 
police officers who are entirely comfortable with the office of constable and who 
carry out their duties with integrity and professionalism: the ideological 
quandaries that beset me rarely trouble or constrain them. On the street they go 
about their daily duties confident in the knowledge that their socio-legal authority 
is enshrined in legal statutes such as PACE or vested in the common law. This 
authority is made manifest through the practices and procedures of the police 
organisation and the guidelines set out in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984, as well as by the police sub-cultural groups in which they operate. Officers 
go about their business on the understanding that they operate according to a 
'communal will' or for a 'greater good' (Mark 1977: 12) and that they are 
somehow neutral or impartial in their approach to the legal, social and moral 
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obligations they discharge (McConville 1991). For many, the ethos of policing is 
simple 
... We are here to enforce the law. We are not wardens. We are not here to sort out arguments between girlfriends. We are not here to be sworn at 
and we do not warn people - we arrest people, we put them in jail and 
then we come out again for the rest of you. (Copperfield 2006: 173 
emphasis in the original) 
PC 'Copperfield' (2006) is a serving police officer who has gained celebrity and 
some notoriety through his online blog http: //copr)ersblog. blogsi)ot. com/ and 
subsequent book. His observations and anecdotes have an enthusiastic 
audience, and he provides them with tales of what police officers 'really' think 
and do. The approach to policing that Copperfield articulates is one that is widely 
held in the police. For many police officers their work is dichotomous: the social 
world, the people in it, and their behaviour are reducible to either'this' or'that'. 
Dealing with the bits in between, as police officers will often tell you, is a job for 
'social workers' (Graef 1989; Stephens & Becker 1994). In many instances, this 
dualist approach to the world and to policing is amplified by the removal of police 
discretion in certain circumstances. 'Domestic' assault for example was 
traditionally regarded by the police as not their business. It is a crime that is 
replete with moral and cultural contradictions, and discretion was regularly used 
to avoid arresting perpetrators. Subsequently, police policy has been amended to 
ensure that 'positive action' [which is not defined] must now be taken at all 
domestic incidents. By removing discretion in specific instances, legislators and 
Chief Officers acknowledge the dilemmatic nature of police work or of particular 
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events and they have tried to alleviate those dilemmas through the creation of a 
"just following orders" (Copperfield 2006: 246) ethos. In this way, dilemmas of 
ideology and conscience are externalised (Edwards & Potter 1992) with the 
result that for some officers their dilemmas are minimised, for others they may 
even be resolved. 
Yet, even before my academic epiphany, it was apparent to me that 'just 
following orders' was a widespread and pragmatic device that was useful in 
absolving officers of personal responsibility; I was aware too, that its use 
extended beyond those instances where police discretion had been removed or 
was limited. For me, rather than easing or minimising my ideological and moral 
dilemmas, its use became an added dilemma. The quasi-military "punishment 
centred bureaucracy" (Waddington 1999a: 301) of the police compounds this 
dilemma all the more because it ensures that objections or dissent amongst 
officers is stifled (Stephens & Becker 1994: 221). A police officer interviewed by 
Roger Graef nearly twenty years ago summed up the difficulties 
There's been lots of times I wanted to complain about things that are 
wrong in the police ... But I've reached 
for my pen, and I've thought about 
the wife and kiddies and the mortgage. I can't risk anything happening to 
my career. So I swallow my frustration. It's a shame, but that's the way 
things are in the police. Sorry if I sound paranoid, but everyone watches 
their backs in the office and their fronts on the street. (Graef 1989: 148-9) 
This is why PC Copperfield, and other career officers like him, must resort to 
using a pen-name and a web log to voice dissent. But if unquestioning 
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adherence to organisational and procedural rules proved to be a dilemma for me, 
the same is also true [as domestic assaults have shown] for the use of unfettered 
discretion that is still available to police officers in much of their work. 
Few who join the police, will be prepared for the degree of autonomy that the 
activity of policing and the office of constable permits. It certainly surprised me. 
From the outside, the police organisation presents a stern image of a "classical 
bureaucracy overlain by the rituals and insignia of military practice" (Punch 1983: 
228). Senior officers have the authority to issue orders and the lowest tiers of the 
police, so one would presume, carry them out. However, from the inside, 
although a quasi-military discipline is evident, and officers are controlled or 
constrained in many ways, I find, like Maurice Punch (1983) that the police are 
prone to be "casual, lackadaisical, offhand, ad hoc, and lowly motivated .. ." 
(Punch et al., 1983: xii). With hindsight, and the benefit of academic experience, I 
realise that if I had read any of the research on the police before joining, I would 
not have been so surprised (see Banton 1964; Skolnick 1966; Bittner 1970; Cain 
1973; Rubinstein 1973; van Maanen 1973; Manning 1977; Holdaway 1983; 
Punch et al., 1983; Reiner 2000). But if I was taken aback by the degree of 
autonomy that police officers have, and the contradictions and contrasts that 
characterise policing, I was equally unprepared for the way in which the police go 
about their work. 
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1.3. Folk Psychology and policing 
Psychology is intrinsic to the business of policing and to the criminal law 
(Shapland 1981; Allen 1991; Ainsworth 1992; Harrower 1998). For more than 
150 years the police have plied their trade and are the self-proclaimed experts in 
all matters criminal (Skolnick 1966; van Maanen 1973; Manning 1977; Holdaway 
1983). Police officers may know little of established psychological or sociological 
theory [although of course some do], but as criminal justice practitioners required 
to intervene in the lives of other people on a daily basis, they have developed a 
practical understanding and awareness of human behaviour and psychology, and 
a corpus of knowledge and experience to match. 
Naively perhaps, when I joined the police I had presumed their operational 
methodology would be reasonably systematic, and perhaps even analytically 
fairly rigorous. Instead, I and my fellow novices found that we were tutored in a 
farrago of lay socio-psychological 'techniques' or strategies (McNulty 1994). This 
'folk psychology' has a strong pseudo-Lombrosian and behaviourist bent and, 
like many folk psychologies "is generally conceived cognitively as people's 
mental models and representations of human life... " (Edwards 1997: 250). 
McConville et al put it well when they write that policing on the street "continues 
to operate with nineteenth-century methodologies" (McConville et al., 1991: 206). 
The folk psychology of the uniformed police officer and the plain clothed 
detective relies upon gross categorisations and particularisations, labelling, 
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stereotyping, intuitive hunches, confessions, and a fair slice of luck. In this 
method, being "known to the police" (McConville et al., 1991: 23), acting in a 
furtive or 'unusual' manner (McNulty 1994), delivering a'seven-second stare' or 
making direct and prolonged eye contact, being disrespectful, lacking deference, 
recalcitrance, swearing, drunkenness and generally failing the 'attitude test' as 
police officers call it, are all forms of incongruity that guarantee close attention 
from the police. I may not have known it back then, but what Sacks (1972) called 
the 'incongruity procedure' was an essential if unaccredited element of my police 
apprenticeship and that of every other officer before or since. Having spent ten 
weeks at police training college prior to my first period of tutorship out on the 
streets, and where we were instructed on how to enforce the law according to the 
guidelines in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act [which expressly forbid a 
reliance on stereotypes and categorisations]; it was unsettling to find that this 
was how operational police officers worked - more so, how I was expected to 
work. 
Unfortunately, any scepticism or apprehension about the effectiveness or legality 
of this 'method' must be put to one side if the student officer is to progress his or 
her apprenticeship. As novice constables we quickly came to understand that 
successfully completing your tutorship requires you to make this method work. 
Our dilemma, for it was not just I who had a problem with this, was made only 
slightly more manageable through the apparent effectiveness of this method 
which, superficially at least, appears to 'work'. Bending the formal legal rules, so 
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we learned, is part of the informal working culture of the police. Often known as 
the 'Ways and Means Act' (Reiner 2000: 87), the ends are used as justification 
for the means because they get the job done. PACE may be the theoretical ideal, 
but the Ways and Means Act is about pragmatism: this is what Skolnick (1966) 
referred to as the 'working personality' of the police. Thus, every stop and search 
carried out according to these procedures, and which yields a controlled drug or 
an offensive weapon is held up as 'proof of the procedure's validity: those 
encounters that yield nothing are not discounted either, as they are still taken as 
evidence of what is called a 'proactive' policing approach - all of which 
'generates' the common-sense on which they rely (McNulty 1994). It became 
obvious during the early part of my tutorship that I, and my fellow novices, were 
being encouraged to understand policing as little more than a target or 
performance-led game: the wider human consequences of our actions, which 
were not so easily quantified, were frequently overlooked and almost always 
subordinate to the police imperative of detecting crime and prosecuting offenders 
(McConville et al., 1991). 
Similarly, the folk psychology of the police that persuades novice constables to 
be suspicious of anyone and everyone also encourages them to regard the 
general public as unreliable and 'disorderly' (Holdaway 1983). The public, it 
seems, cannot report events 'accurately': either they have a tendency to 
'overstate' or'exaggerate' reports of crime [this is why police officers invariably 
take statements from witnesses] or, conversely, they are inclined to 'invent' 
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crimes where none exist. This observation, so my tutor constable assured me, 
was sufficient justification for making sure that we, as police officers, learn how to 
define, re-define and interpret [or re-interpret] incidents and events - often in 
quite arbitrary ways. Police perceptions of the seriousness of events might vary 
from those of the public at large (Jones et al., 1986; McConville et al., 1991); but 
there is certainly a sub-cultural view of the general public that some officers 
actively adopt which can only be described as patronising (Holdaway 1983). 
These are the commonplaces of the police occupational environment. 
Of course, the folk psychology that the police use is not exclusive to them alone. 
The criminal law and adversarial advocates rely upon many of the same 
cognitivist, pseudo-Lombrosian and behaviourist presumptions (Williamson 
1996); but there are some additional caveats 
The criminal law does not seek to punish people for their evil thoughts; an 
accused must be proved to be responsible for conduct or the existence of 
a state of affairs prohibited by the criminal law before liability may arise ... 
A Latin maxim encapsulates this principle - actus non facit reum, nisi 
mens sit rea - the act itself does not constitute guilt unless done with a 
guilty mind. (Allen 1991: 15) 
Criminal law thus assumes a number of mental components and other de facto 
elements. Not only is the dualism of mind and body accepted, the concept of 
'mind' is central to it. For the criminal lawyer and the police officer, a number of 
other presumptions follow on from this. Firstly, that access to a persons 'mind' is 
possible. Secondly that language is the "conduit for transporting thoughts 
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between minds" (Potter 2005: 741), and thirdly, that adversarial advocacy is 
conducive to that task. Before I undertook my academic journey none of this was 
particularly problematic: but since my turn to language, the belief that mental 
predicates such as 'intent' and 'motive' occur "in my head" (Ryle 2000: 38) and 
are assessable through the referential and representational qualities of language, 
is one that is no longer acceptable. As Ryle puts it 
... to follow what another person says or does is to make inferences 
somewhat like those made by a water-diviner from the perceived twitching 
of the twig to the subterranean flow of water ... (Ryle 2000: 52) 
The belief that "psychological divining" (Ryle 2000: 52) or "mind reading" (Antaki 
2004: 680) as others have described it is entirely possible, is at the heart of law 
and legal presumptions: given that psychological divining is central to the 
doctrine of orthodox psychology, its ubiquity in social and academic life is hardly 
surprising (Antaki 2004; Watson & Coulter 2008). As my ideological dilemmas 
increased, and the possibility of a doctoral thesis became a realistic possibility, it 
began to occur to me how different any study of the police or the law might be if 
an alternate psychological approach were taken. 
1.4. The rationale 
Good critical research into the police has, in the past, prompted hostility from the 
police organisation. The consequence of this has been that there is "no natural 
sympathy towards research" within the police (Brown 1996: 178). Traditionally, 
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access to the police for research purposes has always been difficult (Ainsworth 
2002) and the frosty relationship that has developed with academics means that 
access for them is tougher still. The distrust that the police exhibit to anyone 
other than police officers, and the professional and social isolation this 
engenders, ensures that much of the police officers craft remains inaccessible to 
academic scrutiny. Those facets that are obscured from view are inclined to be 
those which are at odds with public expectations of policing. The concept of a 
'Ways and Means Act' for example, is not intended to be public knowledge; its 
power and effectiveness depend upon its relative invisibility, as does its 
continued use - if it were common knowledge, its dubious status would soon 
attract adverse comment. The success that the police have had in keeping facets 
of their craft away from the public or academic gaze prompts Rubinstein's 
observation that 
Despite the attention of countless writers, reporters, and scholars, our 
understanding of what policemen do and what police work is remains 
murky. (Rubinstein 1973: ix) 
Ten years later, Holdaway (1983) lamented that things had still not changed. 
Unacceptable though this may be, it occurred to me that an opportunity to 
address this situation now presented itself; although the police would be less 
than enthusiastic about it. The police, as we know, are not particularly good at 
accepting criticism from 'outsiders' (Brown 1996; Ainsworth 2002). However, their 
response to the 'insider who adopts a critical gaze or a challenging stance 
attracts an even greater level of vitriol (Holdaway 1983; Young 1991): the "inside 
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outsider" (Brown 1996: 183) may have some advantages in avoiding 
predetermined hostility or suspicion as 'outsiders' do, but when any whiff of 
dissent toward the received wisdom of the occupational police milieu is detected, 
at least some, if not all of those 'insider' privileges are likely to be surrendered. 
The binary structure of the police world means that anyone who is not seen to be 
'with' them is against them (Waddington 1999; Reiner 2000). Or, to put it another 
way the vitriolic police response comes from the belief that 
To publish accounts for police conduct is to break the solidarity and 
secrecy of a culture which seeks to keep the washing of dirty laundry 
private. (Brown 1996: 182) 
Whilst many organisations and institutions are reticent about their internal affairs 
being made public, few have an organisational ethos [supported by a rigid 
discipline code] that is as proscriptive as the police. In addressing the ideological 
and ethical dilemmas of my everyday working life I, like PC Copperfield and the 
disgruntled officer in Graefs research, accept that most cannot be alleviated from 
within the police organisation or with the blessing of many of its members. But, 
while dirty laundry remains hidden from view, there is no incentive to wash it. If 
policing is to progress, we need to understand how and why it is that the laundry 
remains unwashed. Given the circumstances, that can only be done by applying 
pressure from without, and a focused, well researched, comprehensively 
evidenced, and analytically rigorous exposition from a researcher with 'insider 
knowledge' (Brown 1996) would seem to be the appropriate vehicle for doing just 
that. 
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I. S. The aims of the study 
Policing, as the reader will see, is an occupation that is rife with contradictions 
and competing aims (Banton 1964; Cain 1973; Holdaway 1983), hence the 
profusion of dilemmas that exist for the police officer (Brown 1988). Sociologists, 
ethnographers and the occasional journalist have recorded and speculated upon 
many of the informal practices that the police use; but, simply identifying and 
enumerating these less visible and often esoteric practices (Suchman 1987), and 
moving them into the analytical foreground is one thing: knowing how police 
officers go about accomplishing them is quite another task. A principal aim of this 
study is the knowing how; for it is here, I will suggest, that we gain our greatest 
insights into the doing of policing. 
The epistemology of this endeavour also encourages two other equally ambitious 
aims. The first is to re-establish a strong and dynamic social psychological 
presence in police research which for too long has been monopolised by the 
sociologist. There may be many overlaps between the disciplines, but the fact 
remains that the social psychologist, especially a discursive or rhetorical one, 
asks different questions, looks and searches in different places and enquires of 
other things. The relevance of psychology to the business of policing and to the 
criminal law extends beyond the occultist divinations of cognitive and 'forensic' 
psychologists as they are applied to individuals, to a truly social psychology that 
occurs outside of people's heads, in their dialogue with each other and in their 
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social practices (Bakhtin 1981; Volosinov 1986,1987): these things are as much 
psychological as they are sociological. 
Secondly, applying a non cognitive, discursive psychological approach to a study 
of the police, promises to reshape the current academic landscape of police 
research - to what degree, will remain to be seen. And whether the police care to 
admit it or not, if that occurs it will filter back to them. The influence of previous 
academic research has been considerable, even if it has also been tortuously 
slow. Much of the pioneering work from thirty or forty years ago is now 
percolating into the police organisation (Banton 1964; Bittner 1967,1970,1974; 
Cicourel 1968; Cain 1973). On a formal level at least, these and other academics 
have re-shaped a great deal of what the police do and how they do it; but, on an 
informal and sub-cultural level, their influence has been less successful and it is 
with the practitioner that I hope to provoke debate. 
1.6. A brief outline of the chapters 
My thesis consists of six chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 sets out 
my framework for analysis and explores, in detail, the three closely aligned but 
theoretically distinct approaches that inform my research. Having made my 
theoretical approach explicit, Chapter 3 provides an opportunity to consider some 
of the existing literature. In doing so, the reader is offered some contextual 
background to the police and the business of policing, and some comparison with 
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the different approaches that other writers and theorists have adopted. Three 
specific areas of police research are considered and the chapter begins by 
examining and comparing the two competing genres that are a distinct feature of 
police histories. Historical accounts inevitably raise questions about policing and 
the function of the police and so it is appropriate that this is the second area of 
police research to be explored. Finally, the business of policing is inseparably 
linked to the informal organisational sub-cultures of police officers. The 
ideologies of these sub-cultures exercise a powerful influence on officers and the 
way in which they work, and it is with a detailed examination of this literature that 
the chapter concludes. 
Chapter 4 is the first of two analysis chapters. The first analysis concentrates on 
spoken police discourse. Here the data consists of the 'naturally occurring talk' 
(Edwards & Potter 1992: 28) of police officers as they interact with members of 
the public. The chapter includes a detailed section on the method employed to 
gather the data. And, as the chapter unfolds, a number of distinct and informal 
discursive practices and sub-cultural ideologies are examined and discussed. 
From these, the notion of 'subversion' (Sacks 1995) emerges, as does the 
importance of the occupational philosophy of 'covering your arse' (Chan et al., 
2003; Chan 2007). 
Chapter 5 is the second analysis. Where the previous analysis concentrated on 
the informal resolution of crime and the use of subversion, here my interest is in 
29 
whether subversion is feature of the formal prosecution process. The data from 
which this analysis derives consists of written texts taken from an assortment of 
police prosecution files. Specifically, attention focuses on the short report form 
that police officers must use when submitting a prosecution file to a Crown 
Prosecutor for a decision on whether a prosecution case will go ahead or be 
discontinued. Three genres of police discourse, 'impartiality', 'credibility' and the 
'real victim' feature in this analysis. As with the previous analysis, the chapter 
includes a detailed section on method. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 both analyses are considered together and conclusions 
drawn. Comparisons are made with other police research and I assess the 
fruitfulness of employing a discursive approach, and the implications of my 
findings for the police and the criminal justice system as a whole. The thesis 
concludes by offering some suggestions for further discursive and rhetorical 
research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
GOING BACK TO THE FUTURE: RHETORIC, DISCOURSE AND DIALOGISM 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
"One word, sir. Our watch, sir, have indeed comprehended two auspicious 
persons, and we would have them this morning examined before your 
worship. " 
Much Ado about Nothing, Act 3: 5 
2.1. Introduction 
The 'crisis in social psychology' (Elms 1975) that occupied the pages of 
important journals and provoked debate amongst traditionalist and 'dissident' 
(Kristeva 1986; Gergen 2007) academics, has long since passed. Almost forty 
years on, the 'official doctrine' (Ryle 2000) of the cognitive psychologist continues 
as the dominant paradigm in psychology and social psychology: yet, the 
epistemological dilemmas that prompted the 'crisis' remain unresolved 
(Henriques et al., 1998). For the traditionalist "the crisis is settled" (Gergen 2007: 
52), and the "intellectual snobbery" (Billig 1996: 6) that was itself part of the 
'crisis', and which alienated and antagonised many of those who would become 
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dissident, still exists. If the 'crisis' is to be regarded as the first serious 
argumentative skirmish in a scientific and social psychological revolution, then 
we should expect to see 
... an increasing shift in the distribution of professional allegiances ... if the paradigm is one destined to win its fight, the number and strength of 
the persuasive arguments in its favour will increase. (Kuhn 1996: 158-9) 
Indeed, that is exactly what has occurred; far from quietly conceding defeat, the 
dissidents have been busy. Unlike forty years ago, the epistemological ideas 
which the dissidents used to berate their cognitive peers have grown in stature: 
more importantly, new and equally persuasive arguments are being made (Potter 
2003). Moreover, the ranks of the dissidents have swelled and a flourishing 
disciplinary heritage now exists, the success of which is evident in the trappings. 
The dissident or'critical' paradigm now has its own journals and research grants 
and its own elite of senior academics. What is more, "... for an increasing 
number of young academics the critical paradigm is the major paradigm in their 
academic world" (Billig 2000: 292). Within this academic landscape, the rules of 
argumentative engagement are shifting. 
One consequence of this altered environment is that the 'dissident' researcher no 
longer feels obliged to offer apologies for not adhering to psychology's `official 
doctrine' (Ryle 2000); or for employing its methodologies or analytical 
frameworks which are invariably orientated to laboratory experiments, statistical 
analysis, or de-contextualised [re]testable modelling (Billig 1996). But, success in 
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challenging the traditionalists and ensuring that the issues that led to the 'crisis' 
are not ignored are not without difficulties. The dissident or'critical' researcher 
must still contend with some practical and theoretical dilemmas. When it comes 
to published work for example, or as in this case, the production of a thesis, the 
point is made that 
Critical academics use entirely conventional formats for citing previous 
work and situating their own studies. Thus, the critical paradigm takes on 
the style of the established paradigms, as it establishes itself in the 
academic marketplace ... It needs ... young academics, especially those 
without established positions, to criticise the language and rhetoric of the 
established critical writers - even to expose the self-interest and political 
economy of the sign 'critical'. (Billig 2000: 292) 
The observation that dissident researchers "adopt a mode of writing that has a 
fairly standard academic character ... ° is also reiterated by Hammersley (2003). 
Tamely, I must concede that a conventional format is all too evident here: 
however, resistance to orthodox conventions is not entirely absent. In particular, 
the traditionalist will find no general exploration of orthodox social psychology, as 
might have been expected. Justifying my analytical approach is one thing; but 
justifying it by reference to the 'official' doctrine infers that that remains some sort 
of benchmark or standard from which all else deviates, and that, in turn, would 
only perpetuate the intellectual and methodological snobbery of the traditionalist. 
Thus, other than that which is required to set a rhetorical and discursive 
approach into context, or where a contrast or comparison with the 'official 
doctrine' is necessary, my analytical framework will concern itself primarily with 
the debates that exist within the dissident or critical paradigms. 
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It is from these dissident paradigms that the three major theoretical perspectives 
that inform my thesis are taken. The purpose of this chapter is to consider each 
in turn and to explicate my analytical framework. 
2.2. Rhetoric, Discourse and dialoqism 
Central to my framework of analysis is the rhetorical psychology of Michael Billig 
(1996). Like other discursive approaches, rhetorical psychology seeks to 
"elucidate social psychological processes through an understanding of discourse" 
(Billig et al., 1988: 4). Rhetorical psychologists understand the 'ideological' nature 
of thinking: "our thought, its content and processes, are provided by wider, 
socially shared concepts and issues". (Burr 1995: 84). The rhetorical psychologist 
also views thought and thinking as 'dilemmatic', a two-sided 'rhetoric of 
disagreement' (Shotter & Billig 1998). For every view there is a counter-view and 
so on (Billig et al., 1988). Unlike more modern discursive disciplines, some of 
which inform this thesis, a rhetorical approach does not always concern itself with 
the "ums and ahs of talk. . ." (Antaki 1994: 161); for 
in accepting the ideological 
significance of talk or text, the rhetorician is aware that it is often necessary to go 
"... beyond the texts themselves" (Billig et al., 1988: 38). Thus, "fine-grain 
methods" of analysis are not an essential requirement of a rhetorical psychology. 
However, this absence of micro-conversational detail prompts Billig (1996) to 
highlight a potential analytical stumbling block concerning the thoroughness of a 
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rhetorical approach. Critical scholars, he argues might suggest that on its own, a 
rhetorical analysis risks being seen only as a "preliminary study in discursive 
psychology" (Billig 1996: 21-2). For the conversation analyst and some discourse 
psychologists, the absence of close analytical detail is certainly a valid criticism 
(Myers 1989). Yet, the attentive rhetorical psychologist is well aware that there 
will be occasions when a close analysis is required. Such methodological 
flexibility is entirely in keeping with Billig's analytical philosophy 
... rhetorical meaning must be constructed by the analyst. This 
construction does not require a specific methodology, or a defined set of 
procedures... The reliance upon a single methodology would inevitably 
dull the critical edge. (Billig 1991: 22) 
This point is reaffirmed by Wetherell (1998: 388) who espouses an "eclectic 
approach". This thesis echoes both sentiments and is therefore replete with close 
and detailed analysis, for in addition to being a rhetorical psychological 
enterprise, it is also a discursive analysis. 
Any reference to 'discourse analysis' must, of course, be qualified as the term 
describes several different methods of analysing discourse (Potter et al., 2002). 
'Discourse analysis' more accurately refers to a "field of research rather than a 
single practice .. ." (Taylor 2001: 5). The particular form of discourse analysis 
that is used in this analytical framework, and which will be explored in greater 
detail throughout this chapter, is of the 'bottom-up' variety: specifically the 'micro' 
35 
analytical form advocated by Potter & Wetherell (1987)1 and which continues to 
be developed in the ongoing discursive project of Edwards & Potter (1992) and 
others. Such analysis now increasingly falls under the banner of 'discursive 
psychology' (Hepburn & Wiggins 2005). The practical value of this discursive 
approach is that it provides the analyst with ". .. both the theoretical apparatus 
and the methodological tools" (Billig 1996: 21). 
Wide ranging though the rhetorical and discursive approaches are, one more 
theoretical perspective is required to complete the triad of approaches. Once 
again rhetorical psychology overlaps with this third approach, for in addition to 
the emphasis on the ideological nature of thought, rhetorical psychology also 
acknowledges the "dialogical nature of thinking" (Billig 1996: 22 my emphasis). A 
dialogical approach to the social world and to a social psychology is one that has 
been extensively developed by Mikhail Bakhtin (1981,1986) and Valentin 
Volosinov (1986,1987). Shotter (1992) explains the basic model from which they 
work 
They introduced a very different metaphor into our discussions: They 
asked us to imagine people in dialogue ... Primarily they are 
in dialogue 
with others, speaking from within a certain speech genre, in a certain type 
of "voice, " continually responding to each other's utterances. (Shotter 
1992: 10-11) 
Dialogical psychology emphasises the uniqueness of each and every dialogical 
moment; it also reaffirms the overwhelmingly social nature of thought and 
11 am aware that Wetherell has developed her view. 
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dialogue (Bender 1998). 'Voice' (Shotter 1992) and Otherness are tacit elements 
of dialogism. As far as Bakhtin and Volosinov are concerned, there is nothing 
ghostly or unseen about psychological processes (Shotter & Billig 1998). 
Volosinov explains 
Every utterance is the product of the interaction between speakers and the 
product of the broader context of the whole complex social situation in 
which the utterance emerges... Inner speech is the same kind of product 
and expression of social intercourse as is outward speech. (Volosinov 
1987: 79) 
This 'out of the head' psychological stance mirrors that pursued by rhetorical and 
discursive psychologies. But, whilst there are many overlaps and areas of 
agreement, dialogical psychology offers much in the way of difference. Multi- 
layered and complex, those aspects of Bahktin and Volosinov's philosophical and 
psychological thinking that are incorporated into this analytical framework are 
what will require some detailed discussion. 
Finally, credit must be given to three other influential and original thinkers whose 
ideas have found their way into this thesis. All three: Harvey Sacks, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, and Gilbert Ryle occupy `cameo' roles by comparison with the 
principle theorists previously mentioned, but the fact remains that elements of 
their thought are present in my research project and I acknowledge that here. 
With the preamble complete, it is appropriate to consider Michael Billig's 
rhetorical approach to psychology and why it is appropriate for this research 
thesis. 
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2.3. Ancient Greece and Sophistic: Back to the Future 
The revival of rhetoric in the human sciences once again re-establishes a 
discursive tradition that was originally crafted 2,500 years in ancient Greece. 
Rhetoric's most recent incarnation differs from its previous guise in that it 
rediscovers aspects of the discipline that have been disregarded or marginalised. 
The 'new' rhetoric is an "argumentative rhetoric, rather than a rhetoric of 
adornment" (Billig 1996: 64). The pedantic obsession with style at the expense of 
content is redressed and the spirit of invention and contradiction is restored 
(Booth 1974; Billig et al., 1988; Nelson et al., 1987; Simons 1989; Billig 1996; 
McCloskey 1998; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 2000). Not confined to any 
specific geographic location or academic discipline (Nelson, Megill & McCloskey 
1987; Billig 1996; Shotter 2002) the rhetorical revival 
... has emerged, not as a single perspective, but as a way of re- 
conceiving the debates - linking them, for example, to Greco-Roman 
conceptions of rhetorical invention, or to neosophistic conceptions of style 
and impression management. (Simons 1989: 5) 
Within psychology, the rhetorical return is most persuasively advanced by 
Michael Billig (1987,1991,1996). His'rhetorical approach' to social psychology 
is eclectic and specific. Critics suggest that "he is interested only in argument" 
(Myers 1989: 230) and whilst this view is contestable, it is clear that a focus on 
argument is the dominant theme in his approach. His spirited return to antiquity 
cuts through centuries of Platonic prejudice (Vickers 1988) by going back to the 
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teaching and philosophy of that unfairly denigrated group of intellectuals and 
practitioners of rhetoric known as the Sophists (Havelock 1957). In particular, he 
directs us to the genius of Protagoras of Abdera: the rhetoric of argumentation is 
the rhetoric of Protagoras. The 'new' rhetoric might better be described as 
Sophistic rhetoric (Leff 1987). Aside from the remarkable and prolific insights that 
Protagorian rhetoric provides, by returning to the philosophy of the Sophists 
Billig, more than any of the contemporary dissidents, offers a pragmatic and 
moral precedent for a truly social, social psychology. Argumentative rhetoric 
brings with it particular implications and inferences for a social psychology, and 
these flow almost seamlessly from the ubiquitous activity of engaging in dialogue 
(Nelson et al., 1987; Billig 1991). 
A distinctive feature of Protagorian and Sophistic rhetoric as opposed to Socratic 
dialectic is dialegesthai - that is "to render and to receive discourse" (Havelock 
1957: 213). Havelock goes on 
Sophistic 'rhetoric' so-called should really be translated as the technique 
of linguistic expression. Sophistic argued that as this was studied and 
clarified and made more effective the norms of justice and social order 
became clearer. Moreover, discourse is social or it is nothing; its topics 
and problems are by definition common ones, group notions; the words of 
men act on other men and vice versa. There is an exchange of opinion, 
alteration of opinion, discovery of opinion, consensus and decision. It is 
not a discourse carried on in the private soul. (Havelock 1957: 193) 
This emphasis on dialogue and on the social is overwhelmingly pragmatic. 
Protagoras was concerned with the everyday business and politics of living: there 
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was nothing metaphysical about his philosophy. He was a professional orator, 
and his "discourses could 'bowl over' an opponent" (Havelock 1957: 214). Words 
and language were the tools of Protagoras' trade; as now, words construct the 
social world (Nelson, Megill & McCloskey 1987; Shotter, 1992; 2002). This world- 
view acquires additional social significance when we consider an ideological and 
contextual caveat on Sophistic thought that Havelock has already alluded to. 
Bakhtin explains 
For the classical Greek, every aspect of existence could be seen and 
heard. In principle (in essence) he did not know an invisible and mute 
reality. This applied to existence as a whole, but pre-eminently to human 
existence. A mute internal life, a mute grief, mute thought, were 
completely foreign to the Greek. All this - that is, his entire internal life - 
could exist only if manifested externally in audible or visible form. (Bakhtin 
1981: 134) 
Descartes' Myth (Ryle 2000), the division between 'mind' and body, had not, of 
course, been proposed. Sophistic rhetoric therefore was never constructed to 
discuss or debate unseen, individual, and ghostly machinations of 'the mind': it 
was concerned with the pragmatics of disputation in a shared social, as opposed 
to individual world (Billig et al., 1988). Even so, the Sophist [like the 
contemporary rhetorical psychologist], is not disbarred from seeking 
"psychological insight" (Billig 1996: 83). Such insight comes from an 
understanding of the way in which we think. Social psychology, as Volosinov 
informs us "... is not located anywhere within ... but entirely and completely 
without - in the word, the gesture, the act" (Volosinov 1986: 19). Arguing is 
thinking and our private discourse replicates public debate (Billig 1996). 
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Protagoras understood that the process of thinking is rhetorical in that it is 
argumentative, and that it has ideological content or form 
The very contents of everyday thinking - the maxims, values and opinions 
which are commonly held, etc. - are themselves cultural products. In 
ordinary thinking, people use a 'common sense', which they do not 
themselves invent but which has a history. As critical theorists from Marx 
onwards have stressed, common sense is a form of ideology. 
(Billig 1991: 1) 
Common sense however, is a particular form of ideology - it is 'lived ideology' 
(Edley 2001). As useful a resource as common sense is it is also provocative: 
rather than having a unifying quality, common sense is recognised as being 
contradictory. This, it is suggested, allows for the "possibility not just of social 
dilemmas but of social thinking itself (Billig et al., 1988: 17). 
2.4. Arguing and thinking: contrary views and dilemmas of ideology 
Of all Protagoras' ideas, those which relate to and spring from his 
acknowledgement of the "two-sidedness of human thinking" (Billig 1996: 71) are 
what concern Billig most of all. A feature of Protagorian rhetoric is that it is 
"committed to there being at least two sides to every question, and being able to 
speak for either" (Vickers 1998: 210): the process of thinking comprises contrary 
and contradictory thoughts. Disputation is potentially open-ended as 'facts' and 
opinions become contestable. There is always a counter view, which in turn may 
be contested by another and another - logos opposed to anti-logos ad infinitum 
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(Billig 1996; Dillon & Gergel 2003). Consequently, there can be no absolute 
proof. In contrast, the "Cartesian method of doubt" (Shotter 2002: 166) upon 
which the Western intellectual tradition has rested for over three hundred years 
(Derrida 1974; Nelson et at., 1987; Burr 1995; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 
2000) is quite different. Cartesian inquiry holds that when two people reach 
opposing decisions over the same matter, then one of them must be wrong. For 
the Cartesian, the "self evident" is judged the "mark of reason" (Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 2000: 1-2). Protagoras meanwhile, ". .. would not, of course, 
accept that anyone has a 'wrong' opinion - simply that people have contradictory 
opinions, some of which are more useful than others" (Dillon & Gergel 2003: 18). 
For the latter day rhetorical psychologist or other rhetorical inquirer, this means 
that 
The domain of argumentation is that of the credible, the plausible, the 
probable, to the degree that the latter eludes the certainty of calculations. 
(Perelmen & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1970: 1 my emphasis) 
The implications of this are that the legitimate grounds upon which argumentation 
and persuasion may be based are much wider than Cartesian and modern 
thought would have us believe (Feyerabend 1987; McCloskey 1998). For the 
Cartesian, the sceptical and relativist nature of Protagorian rhetoric is a source of 
irritation because it implies, quite mistakenly, that 'anything goes' (Feyerabend 
1975). It also encourages a nagging unease amongst traditionalists that the 
foundations on which 'official doctrines' rest are not so secure (Pollner 1973; 
Nelson, Megill & McCloskey 1987). Relativism and what has been described as 
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"vicious" scepticism are predictably put forward as barriers to rhetorical inquiry 
being truly critical (Keith & Cherwitz 1989: 195). Relativist critiques, by their 
nature, are philosophically complex (Burr 1995), and any meaningful exposition 
is beyond the scope of the present work. But, at the risk of being accused of a 
gross oversimplification, Billig, who has provided a thorough account of at least 
some relativist critiques (see Ideology and Opinions 1991,22-26), offers a 
succinct rebuttal 
The argumentative act itself constitutes a denial of the sort of strict 
relativism, which precludes moral and critical stances. In arguing, one is 
criticizing the counter-position, claiming the argumentative superiority of 
one's own position. Thus, argumentation is a practical denial of this strict 
scepticism (Billig 1991: 25) 
Protagorian rhetoric may originate in antiquity, but it is distinctly post or'anti' 
modern in its outlook (Nelson et al., 1987; Billig 1996; Shotter 2002). 
If the two-sided and contrary nature of thinking is important in allowing scholars 
and analysts to look beyond the received method, it also provides alternative 
insights into the ideological aspects of thought. Bakhtin (1981), in his analysis of 
discourse, as it is found in the genre of the novel, argues the "impossibility of 
representing a character's 'ideological world' without representing his or her 
discourse" (Vice 1997: 25). Burr (1995) elaborates 
The concepts, values and beliefs of the society into which we are born 
shapes what we will think about, but it also shapes what we see as two 
sides of an argument or issue... it takes the form of a dilemma, a two- 
sided question to which there is no easy answer (Burr 1995: 84) 
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Billig et al., (1988) suggest that as thinkers, we are, on a daily basis, presented 
with dilemmas of every kind, including dilemmas of ideology. The analytical gaze 
of the rhetorical psychologist is not concerned with decision-making itself, but 
with the "social preconditions" that precipitate dilemmas and which shape our 
social lives (Billig et at., 1988: 9). In teasing out and inquiring into the ways in 
which people manage and produce arguments in the course of their general 
everyday conversation or dialogue (Wetherell et al., 2001) - their use of 'witcraft' 
(Billig 1996) - the rhetorician's focus must, at times, go beyond the text 
... to understand the meaning of a sentence or whole discourse in an 
argumentative context, one should not examine merely the words within 
that discourse or the images in the speakers mind at the moment of 
utterance. One should also consider the positions which are being 
criticized, or against which a justification is being mounted. 
(Billig 1996: 121) 
To do this, the analyst "should not be afraid to engage in hermeneutics in order 
to read these implicit meanings (Billig et al., 1988: 23). Any mention of 
hermeneutics, or more specifically, the "interpretive procedures and devices" 
(Potter et al., 2002) employed by discursive disciplines, predictably encourages 
the traditionalist to run for the methodological high ground. A similar tendency is 
also to be found among some of the exponents of various latter-day discursive 
disciplines, although they, of course, do not rely upon the "spectator" theory of 
the received view of science (Nelson, Megill & McCloskey 1987: 4). 
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Greg Myers has argued that Billig's particular style of rhetorical analysis "never 
has anything to say about the linguistic details of a text ... " (Myers 
1989: 231). 
There may, at first sight, be some substance to this claim as much of Billig's 
work, does not scrutinise text at a 'micro' level - timed pauses and inhalations of 
breath are not part of his analytical style; however, the insights Billig seeks lie 
beyond this level of detail. Myers, more generally, also takes issue with those 
who use rhetoric as a "general methodology" (Myers 1989: 236). But, like many 
other rhetorical inquirers, Billig is not wedded to a single methodology, he is 
aware that utterances have form as well as content (Billig 1996) and that a 
rhetorical approach forms only a part of any thorough discursive analysis. Thus, 
the important analytical insights to be gained from a close analysis of talk or text 
which conversation analysts and discursive psychologists employ are not lost on 
the rhetorician. Billig (1991,1996) himself argues that there will be occasions 
when micro-analytical techniques of the conversation analyst or the discursive 
psychologist are needed where it is appropriate for the rhetorical inquiry; 
however, he cautions too that a total or over reliance upon the "sociological 
microscope" that conversation analysts favour, is restrictive 
To continue the metaphor: the tissues of a biological sample might be 
enlarged in wondrous detail by a microscope, but still a story needs to be 
told about the evolutionary history which has produced the specimens on 
the slide. (Billig 1991: 17-18) 
In understanding the rhetoric of the police, this analysis seeks to cut a balance 
between the microscopic and the macroscopic. As insightful as the rhetoric of 
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argument and inquiry is to any analysis, it is not enough to uncover all of the 
"unnoticed habits of life" (Billig 1999: 548) including the workings of power (Myers 
1989). Other analytical tools are required. To that end, this thesis is not only a 
rhetorical analysis it is also a discourse analysis; the latter being an approach 
that is "embedded in a web of theoretical and metatheoretical assumptions" 
(Potter 2003: 784-5). 
2.5. Discourse: Whose discourse? 
Whilst Billig's academic philosophy of not adhering to a single methodology is 
one that is embraced in this research project, Jonathan Potter (2003) rightly 
cautions against ill-considered "methodological eclecticism"; by that, he means 
attempting to combine methods that make "different assumptions about 
discourse" (Potter 2003: 787). To do so, he suggests, is a "recipe for 
incoherence" (Potter 2003: 785). Since discourse analysis has many variants, 
some of which are less well suited to being allied to a rhetorical approach, it is 
important to be clear about the form of discourse analysis used in this thesis. 
Potter et al., (2002) suggest there are at least four different sorts of research 
work that have been described or may be termed discourse analysis. These 
range from sociolinguistic and speech act work to a sociological concern with the 
discourse of science. The particular form of discourse analysis employed in this 
thesis is that favoured by Potter & Wetherell (1987). This explicitly non cognitive 
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approach to discourse draws heavily on conversation analysis, 
ethnomethodology, post-structuralism, semiology, the sociology of science and 
many of Wittgenstein's philosophical insights (Edwards 1997; Potter et al., 2002; 
Edwards & Potter 2005). This particular discursive approach has subsequently 
been evolved through the work of Edwards & Potter (1992) and others [including 
Billig] into what is now increasingly referred to as 'discursive psychology' - see 
also Potter & Edwards (2001) or Hepburn & Wiggins (2005) for a more recent 
overview. 
Discursive psychology applies itself to all the topics of traditional social 
psychology (Hepburn & Wiggins 2005); although Edwards & Potter make no 
secret of the stake they have in attempting to 
... counter and invert what mainstream psychology has done with discourse, which is to treat it as the expression of thoughts, intentions and 
cognitive structures (Edwards & Potter 2005: 242). 
Discursive psychologists therefore reject the dogma of cognitive psychology. 
Instead, the analyst is offered a means by which psychology can be 're-specified' 
and, where appropriate, critiqued (Edwards & Potter 2005): it becomes an "object 
in and for interaction" (Potter 2005: 739 emphasis in the original). 
Discursive psychology is 'constructionist' rather than 'constructivist' in its 
approach: the latter doctrine is that of developmental psychologies where 
concepts such as 'minds' are assumed to be actual entities with mental 
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structures (Colman 2003; Edwards & Potter 2005). The constructionist, on the 
other hand, is concerned with "... the constructive nature of descriptions, rather 
than of the entities that (according to descriptions) exist beyond them" (Edwards 
1997: 48). The difference is one of ontology (Hammersley 2003). This 
constructionist orientation is a constituent part of discursive psychology unlike 
some ethnomethodological and conversation analytic work which argue "against 
constructionist positions" (Potter 2005: 743). 
A central concern of the discursive psychologist is that psychology is 
... bound up with people's practices. Descriptions (of psychological, 
material or social objects) can be studied for the way they are invoked in 
activities such as blaming, complementing, inviting and so on. (Potter 
2005: 740) 
This is achieved by recognising "talk-as-action" (Edwards 1997: 84) and eschews 
the "factors-and-outcomes model" (Potter & Edwards 2001: 107) of much social 
cognition work. Discourse is constitutive in that it "creates what it refers to" 
(Taylor 2001: 8). It is also understood as being occasioned and rhetorical 
(Edwards & Potter 1992; Potter & Edwards 2001). Discursive psychologists, like 
the rhetorician, the conversation analyst, and the ethnomethodologist, treat 
discourse as a topic of analysis not as a resource (Wetherell et al., 2001). 
Unlike those discursive analysts who operate from a 'top down' or macro 
perspective (Parker 1992; Fairclough 1992; Parker & Burman 1993; Van dijk 
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1993; Howarth et al., 2000), discursive psychology operates from the 'bottom-up' 
(Gough & McFadden 2001): there is no attempt to make ". .. an equation of 
'discourse analysis' with the 'analysis of discourses' as Parker does. . ." (Potter 
et al., 2002: 164 emphasis in the original). Discursive psychology therefore 
stresses the importance and the value of carrying out close and detailed 
analyses of talk and text (Billig 1999). In keeping with the conversation analytic 
view upon which it draws, the discursive psychologist uses the language and the 
concepts of the participant as opposed to that of the spectator (Hammersley 
2003), thereby encouraging an analytical approach that is 'emic' rather than 'etic' 
(Edwards & Potter 1992; Wetherell et al., 2001; Potter et al., 2002; Potter 2005). 
A valuable, and until recently, well used analytical feature of discursive 
psychology is the 'interpretive repertoire' (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984; Potter & 
Wetherell 1987). Potter et al., (2002) explain 
By interpretive repertoire we mean broadly discernible clusters of terms, 
descriptions, common-places ... and figures of speech often clustered 
around metaphors or vivid images and often using distinct grammatical 
constructions and styles. (Potter et al., 2002: 168) 
They draw a useful analogy with the "repertoire of moves of a ballet dancer" 
(Potter et al., 2002: 169). Repertoires, whether interpretative or choreographic, 
are situated in the moment, in the process of interaction: thus they allude to 
spontaneity and flexibility of use. Useful though interpretive repertoires are, there 
is a sense in which they are also restrictive. To return to the dance analogy, 
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ballet is, after all, more than just an array or inventory of distinct moves - those 
are observable facets of the artistic and performing philosophy - ballet is also a 
genre of dance and artistic expression within which those repertoires are 
situated. Ballet has its own ideology that is distinct, but at the same time 
intertwined with other ideologies of dance and performance. As we move shortly 
to consider the work of Bakhtin and Volosinov, the notion of the 'speech genre' 
(Bakhtin 1986) will be introduced and explored. Speech genres, it will be 
suggested, provide the discursive psychologist with an additional, wider-ranging, 
and nuanced analytical tool. Variations or different "registers" of speech or 'voice' 
become discernible (Wertsch 1991: 111); discursive or interpretative repertoires 
exist within them as "... speech genres are typical models for constructing a 
speech whole" (Bakhtin 1986: 127). The current re-assessment of the interpretive 
repertoire goes beyond this thesis, as confirmed by Potter in a personal 
communication with Hammersley (2003): Potter suggests the concept "has been 
dropped by many discourse analysts, especially those involved in discursive 
psychology" (Hammersley 2003: 776 #27). Aside from the additional analytical 
caveat on 'interpretive repertoires'; the present research makes use of the other 
analytical tools available to the discursive psychologist. 
2.6. Reflexivity and analysis: knowing who is doing the talking? 
Clearly, the critical challenge that the discursive psychologist throws out to 
cognitive psychologists, orthodox analysts, and other dissident researchers is a 
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provocative one. Discursive psychology provides the observer [and the critic] with 
the analytical equipment by which to scrutinise not just the analytical project in 
question, but the discursive psychological project itself. In doing so, the 
discursive psychologist makes a stout rod for his or her own back. Deficiencies of 
analytical rigour can no longer be excused or obfuscated as happens in orthodox 
scientific discourse (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984; Woolgar 1988). Perhaps it is also the 
case that this sort of provocation and transparency prompts misunderstandings 
and apprehension too. 
Hammersley (2003), in his detailed 'collegial' exchange with Potter (2003) for 
example, takes issue with some of the constructionist aspects of the discursive 
project 
The central message of DA [discourse analysis] is that phenomena could 
always be constructed differently: and that how they are constructed has 
consequences, or fulfils certain social functions. But this raises questions 
about the appeal to data, and to consistency of argument, which discourse 
analysts make in supporting their own analyses. Why is their analysis itself 
not to be treated as a series of rhetorical moves designed to have 
particular affects on readers? (Hammersley 2003: 765) 
Without attempting to put any 'scientific' or academic pretensions on the point, 
the simple answer to his question is that it should be - just as it should be for any 
other 'scientific' or academic enterprise (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984; Woolgar 1988). 
The discourse of the discursive psychologist is as much a topic of analysis as 
any other phenomena and the discursive psychologist should be as attentive to 
their own discourse as to others (Edwards 1997). People [including the 
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researcher or analyst] as "users of rhetoric" are themselves understood to be 
"objects of rhetorical argument" (Billig 1996: 285). The point is made elsewhere 
that even "reflexive moments are themselves constructed to perform actions" 
(Potter et al., 2002: 166). The discursive psychologist, like the rhetorician and the 
dialogical psychologist is always interested to know just who is doing the talking 
(Wertsch 1991). The work of those who have studied the sociology of science 
(Barnes 1974; Gilbert & Mulkay 1984; Woolgar 1988; Latour & Woolgar 1986) 
has been influential in shaping the ethos of discursive psychology and is 
embedded in the analytical machinery. 
As we saw with rhetorical inquiry, the spectre of relativism [and the implied 
'threat' it poses to the foundational status of the academic discipline] is once 
again invoked as a disincentive 
In short, constructionism seems logically to imply the reflexive application 
of DA to itself: having documented the discursive production of some 
phenomenon, it apparently then requires a reflexive analysis of how that 
documentation was itself discursively constructed; and so on, ad infinitum. 
.. this endless reflexivity undermines any claim for research as an activity distinct from fictional writing (Hammersley 2003: 765) 
Hammersley's invocation of the relativist argument betrays a lingering 
traditionalist and intellectual snobbery. To paraphrase Latour and Woolgar (1986: 
277) relativism is not only the "bogey" of radicalism "... there is a tendency to 
use it indiscriminately. .. ." 
Whilst Hammersley's objections may not necessarily 
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be a prelude to "ontological gerrymandering" (Woolgar 1988: 99), a charge 
ironically, that he levels at discursive psychology, they do overlook the fact that 
The relativist argument highlights the susceptibility to relativism of one set 
of claims and assumptions while simultaneously backgrounding the fact 
that the very assumptions of relativism are themselves equally 
susceptible. (Woolgar 1988: 99) 
Hammersley concedes in a footnote (2003: 776,30) that for some researchers, 
this is not necessarily a problem; after all, the demarcation between science and 
art is not a given. What is more, the move "toward an aesthetic rather than an 
epistemic criteria .. ." (Potter 2003: 790) is, for some of us, not a bad thing either, 
as it has the potential to open up "new academic frontiers" (Lynn & Lea 2005). 
Practically speaking, such close attention to reflexivity has been long overdue in 
both the social and the natural sciences. Lynn & Lea (2005) in their examination 
of visual methodology, found that when working with and creating visual data 
such as photographs, the presence of the researcher in the data collection and 
construction process is more obviously apparent than when working with 
orthodox or lexically-bound projects 
When the visual researcher looks through the lens of a digital camera, or 
contemplates a sheet of blank paper prior to drawing or constructing an 
image or graph, the finite space of the paper or viewfinder is clear... 
Where we position that image in relation to the picture edge, what size it 
will be, what orientation it will take are our decisions. These are 
determined by our own preferences, tastes and mood; the dictates of the 
conference, journal or art gallery for which it is intended; and a host of 
other factors internal and external to us. The subjectivity of the 
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researcher(s) must be acknowledged within the research process (Lynn & 
Lea 2005: 221 emphasis in the original) 
The ethnographer's field notes and narratives by comparison evade the scrutiny 
of their construction, even though the process is no different - how do we know 
where one written vignette ends and another begins? What other details and 
descriptions were excluded and so on? The fact is, in most instances, we don't. 
Even discursive psychologists have yet to fully explore and resolve these issues 
satisfactorily. Is, for example, the 'contextual' information that frequently 
precedes extracts of text in the bulk of discursive analyses, a case of discourse 
being used as a resource rather than a topic, as (Hammersley 2003: 769) 
claims? Certainly, this is a consideration that will be acknowledged [though not 
necessarily rectified] during the course of my analyses. The problems of narrative 
form and the limitations inherent in presenting radical and reflexive data in 
relatively conventional formats, remain as 'work-in-progress'. 
What discursive psychologists assert in response to their critics is that the 
analytical practices that discursive psychology employs are "strongly empirical" 
(Potter & Edwards 2001: 106) and actively encourage reflexivity to an extent that 
has been noticeably absent in other areas of social psychology (Edwards & 
Potter 1992; Edwards 1997). Indeed, this strict attention to reflexive practice will 
ensure that any 'aesthetic' leanings which develop retain an academic edge or 
distinctiveness. Of course, attending to one's own methodology, is a radically 
different enterprise (Latour & Woolgar 1986). 
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Meanwhile, where matters of interpretation are concerned, the discursive 
psychologist suggests these are more rigorously facilitated, in that the analytical 
process is systematic. As with the artist, blinding flashes of inspiration and 
intuition are not denied or ignored: indeed, they are an important aspect of 
discursive work (Potter & Wetherell 1987); the difference is that the processes, 
through which they may be made to occur, are not, for the most part, 
unfathomable or riddled with taken-for-granted assumptions. In other words 
... analysis is made accountable to the detail of empirical materials, and these are presented in a form that allows readers to make their own 
checks and judgements (Potter & Edwards 2001: 108 emphasis in the 
original). 
Discursive psychology, like conversation analysis, seeks to "retrieve some of the 
craft character of scientific activity" (Latour & Woolgar 1986: 29) and make it 
explicit. 
Thorough though the discursive psychological project may be, there are some 
discourse analysts who argue that the 'bottom-up' approach to talk or text is not 
well suited to understanding the wider social, political and ideological orientations 
of discourse (Fairclough 1992; van dijk 1993a; Fairclough & Wodak 1997). 
Rhetorical psychology, as discussed earlier, does consider wider matters of 
ideology - but only to a degree. A more detailed and meta-theoretical philosophy 
that knits rhetorical and discursive psychological endeavours together is 
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required. Such a philosophy is to be found in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and his 
fellow dissident Valentin Volosinov (Shotter & Billig 1998). 
Debate continues as to whether Volosinov was actually Bakhtin writing under a 
pen name (Wertsch 1991); however, I do not propose to speculate on that here. 
Suffice to say that there is much about their philosophical and dialogical outlook 
to align them closely with one another. So panoramic and fully-formed is the 
philosophy of Bakhtin and Volosinov, that I can only explore a very few specific 
issues in what remains of this chapter. This philosophy is necessarily 
accompanied by Bakhtin's own thesaurus of terms. In gaining a feel for the 
sublime and intricate nature of Bakhtin's work, it is vital to first understand the 
importance and the concept of the word and the utterance before moving on to 
consider three other concepts that are of particular relevance to this research: 
addressivity, the speech genre and the extraverbal. 
2.7. Words and voices everywhere 
The dialogical philosophy of Bakhtin and Volosinov is, as Shatter reflects, 
grounded in the ubiquitous 
They introduced a very different metaphor into our discussions: they 
asked us to imagine people in dialogue. For them, speakers do not 
primarily speak with a certain "view" in mind; they do not always speak 
about something ... Primarily, 
they are in dialogue with others, speaking 
from within a certain speech genre, in a certain type of "voice, " continually 
responding to each other's utterances. (Shotter 1992: 10-11) 
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As a psychology, it is entirely social. There is nothing 'inner' about it, the 
psychology occurs in the space between speakers "in the word, the gesture, the 
act" (Volosinov 1986: 19). From this seemingly simple model, a host of complex 
and subtle ideas flow and develop. Speech, as opposed to language, is always ". 
.. cast in the form of an utterance belonging to a particular speaking subject, and 
outside this form it cannot exist" (Bakhtin 1986: 71). The utterance is the "social 
phenomenon" (Volosinov 1986: 82) upon which all Bakhtinian philosophy rests 
(Bakhtin 1981; 1986). It may consist of one word or many 
... utterances are constructed from language units: words, phrases, and 
sentences. And an utterance can be constructed both from one sentence 
and from one word ... (Bakhtin 1986: 75) 
The "microworid of the word" (Bakhtin 1986: 127) is deceptive in its import, and 
the word is an important constituent part of the utterance: indeed, an utterance 
may consist of one word alone. Volosinov gives us some idea of just how 
pervasive and significant it is 
The word is implicated in literally each and every act or contact between 
the public - in collaboration on the job, in ideological exchanges, in the 
chance contacts of ordinary life, in political relationships, and so on. 
Countless ideological threads running through all areas of social 
intercourse register effect in the word ... it is the most sensitive index of 
social changes ... (Volosinov 1986: 19) 
We get some idea too, of the sense of interdependence and 'intertexuality' 
(Kristeva 1986) that defines Bakhtin's philosophy. The more we learn of the 
dialogical approach, the more we realise how the dialogical world may be 
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understood as an incredibly fine discursive lattice or matrix of words, utterances, 
voices, ideologies and signs. The 'micro' and the 'macro' components of the word 
and the utterance are intertwined. Wertsch reiterates that for Bakhtin "there is no 
such thing as a voice that exists in total isolation from other voices" (Wertsch 
1991: 51-52) - voice, in the dialogical world, is synonymous with word and 
utterance. For Bakhtin, the notion of voice 
... cannot be reduced to an account of vocal-auditory signals ... It applies to written as well as spoken communication, and it is concerned 
with the broader issues of a speaking subject's perspective, conceptual 
horizon, intention, and world view. (Wertsch 1991: 51) 
Voice is integral to the notion of dialogism or the "constant interaction between 
meanings ... " (Emerson & Holquist 1981: 426). Dialogism, which means 
"double-voicedness" refers to the "presence of [at least] two distinct voices in one 
utterance" (Vice 1997: 45). Each utterance is itself understood to be a link in a 
"chain" of utterances and words (Bakhtin 1986: 84). The implications of this are 
that a temporal element permeates both the word and the utterance. Like the 
ethnomethodologist and discursive psychologist, the dialogical psychologist 
acknowledges the indexical qualities of the utterance 
The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular 
historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush 
up against thousands of living dialogic threads ... (Bakhtin 1981: 276 my 
emphasis) 
But, Bakhtin also understands that 
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The word in language is half someone else's ... the word 
does not exist 
in a neutral and impersonal language (it is not, after all, out of a dictionary 
that the speaker gets his words! ), but rather it exists in other people's 
mouths, in other people's contexts, serving other people's intentions: it is 
from there that one must take the word, and make it one's own. And not all 
words for just anyone submit equally easily to this appropriation (Bakhtin 
1981: 294) 
Speakers may exist and talk in the 'conversational' moment, unfolding as it does, 
through the spontaneous and dialogical ebb and flow of the turn-taking 
procedure. But, at the same time, our use of words that are partly someone 
else's introduces other voices, sometimes with different 'accents'. How many of 
Bakhtin's words have I used directly or indirectly in this text thus far? In turn, the 
words of others recall different contexts from past or present, they introduce 
other ideologies, for "each and every word is ideological" (Volosinov 1987: 94). 
All these are then appropriated and recast in the moment, for that moment, but 
also with a future moment in mind. Each utterance is always constructed in 
anticipation of a response (Bakhtin 1986). Tacit in this process is the notion of 
addressivity. As with everything else in the dialogical world, addressivity is 
interwoven with other concepts. In the context of this research project, a concept 
that is of particular interest and which is intrinsic to the utterance itself is that of 
the speech genre. 
2.8. You, me and the superaddressee 
If, as Volosinov suggests ". .. every verbal performance has its theme" 
(Volosinov 1986: 22), it also right to say that such performances are always 
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addressed to someone - this is true whether or not the performance occurs in 
conversation with or in the presence of others, or whether it takes place as part 
of a silent soliloquy. Bakhtin elaborates 
Any utterance always has an addressee ... whose responsive 
understanding the author of the speech work seeks and surpasses ... 
But 
in addition to this addressee (the second party), the author of the 
utterance, with a greater or lesser awareness, presupposes a higher 
superaddressee (third), whose absolutely just responsive understanding is 
presumed either in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time 
... Each dialogue takes place as if against the background of the 
responsive understanding of an invisibly present third party who stands 
above all the participants in the dialogue... (Bakhtin 1986: 126) 
The idea of a superaddressee is an inherent and "constitutive" (Bakhtin 1986: 
126) aspect of the utterance. McGee draws a religious or spiritual analogy for the 
presence of superaddressee when he suggests that "without faith that we will be 
understood somehow, sometime, by somebody, we would not speak at all" 
(McGee 1986: xviii emphasis in the original). Volosinov, captures the concept 
better when he describes the superaddressee as 
... merely some 
inanimate thing, some occurrence or circumstance in life. 
How often we shake our fist at "someone" in a fit of temper or simply scowl 
at empty space, and there is literally nothing we cannot smile at - the sun, 
trees, thoughts. (Volosinov 1986: 103) 
For those police officers, whose discourse is the topic of this research, the 
rhetoric of justice, of law and order, the 'public interest', the adversarial court 
process, or the concerns of the 'reasonable man' are rarely, if ever, absent from 
his or her thinking. The practical upshot of addressivity is that the utterance is 
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shaped and styled and conceived by taking account of all those to whom it is 
addressed as much as by the theme and the context in which it occurs. The form 
the utterance takes is always generic 
We speak only in definite speech genres, that is, all out utterances have 
definite and relatively stable typical forms of construction of the whole. Our 
repertoire of oral (and written) speech genres is rich. We use them 
confidently and skilfully in practice, and it is quite possible for us not even 
to suspect their existence in theory ... we speak in diverse genres without 
suspecting they exist. (Bakhtin 1986: 78) 
By speaking, listening and participating in dialogue and by being exposed to 
written texts of assorted kinds in the course of our everyday experiences of social 
and cultural life, we are exposed to and assimilate different genres of speech. 
This is how we learn to be conversationalists (Shotter 2002). Genres organise 
our speech and when we speak 
... we are always aware of the whole of our utterance: both in form of a 
particular generic plan and in the form of an individual speech plan. 
(Bakhtin 1986: 86) 
We gain experience of when and where to use what genres or not, as the case 
may be. The diversity and extent of human activity ensures that speech genres 
are almost limitless in number 
... each sphere [of human activity] has and applies its own genres 
that 
correspond to its own specific conditions. There are also particular styles 
that correspond to these genres. A particular function (scientific, technical, 
commentarial, business, everyday) and the particular conditions of speech 
communication specific for each sphere give rise to particular genres... 
(Bakhtin 1986: 64) 
61 
Genres may be discerned from the 'thematic content', from 'style' and from the 
'compositional structure'. But, he stresses that in determining genres, the 
utterance must also be considered in its entirety not just its component parts. As 
we become accustomed to genres of speech our experiences of conversation 
and of the social world allow us to distinguish the discourse of the police officer 
from that of the soldier or the medical practitioner or the artist. Earlier, I 
discussed the concept of the interpretive repertoire, and there are many overlaps 
between the two. The speech genres of the police officer will be characterised 
and organised around specific metaphors and figures of speech and involve the 
use of expressive intonations and tone of voice. But, in comparison with the 
interpretive repertoire, the speech genre is wider 
We learn to cast our speech in generic forms ... when hearing others' 
speech we guess its genre from the very first words; we predict a certain 
length (that is the approximate length of the speech whole and a certain 
compositional structure; we foresee the end ... (Bakhtin 1986: 79) 
Speech genres allow for greater conversational [and analytical] subtlety and 
greater creativity - although speech, no matter how creative, will always be 
shaped within specific generic forms (Wertsch 1991). Genres can be "mixed" or 
"re-accentuated" - they are not all of a standard form - however, this sort of use 
requires that they be "fully mastered" (Bakhtin 1986: 79-80). Our choice of genre 
is determined by where we are, who we are addressing, what we are doing 
combined with the "expressive" aspects that the speaker imbues the utterance 
with. The nuances of speech genre permit 'accents' or 'dialects' [beyond the 
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audible and regional] to be discerned (Wertsch 1991: 111) - the ex World War 
two fighter pilot may still retain the twang of the military, and specifically the RAF, 
in his discourse even after sixty years. 
Bakhtin offers us an insightful explanation of what occurs when we are not well 
versed in a particular genre of speech 
... genres must be fully mastered in order to be manipulated freely ... Frequently a person who has an excellent command of speech in some 
areas of cultural communication, who is able to read a scholarly paper or 
engage in a scholarly discussion, who speaks very well on social 
questions, is silent or very awkward in social conversation. Here it is not a 
matter of an impoverished vocabulary or of style, taken abstractly: this is 
entirely a matter of the inability to command a repertoire of genres of 
social conversation ... (Bakhtin 1986: 80) 
In all, there is something less formulaic and more fluid about the concept of the 
speech genre which offers exciting analytical possibilities and considerable 
explanatory power. The use of the speech genre within a discourse analysis is, of 
course, still novel and exploratory. Developing and refining its use will be part of 
the post doctoral research to come. 
Meanwhile, if the notion of addressivity is useful in assisting our understanding of 
speech genres, it is equally useful in understanding another concept that has 
been touched upon from slightly different directions in our earlier exploration of 
rhetorical and discursive psychology. Bakhtin and Volosinov's focus on dialogue, 
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and the unique and unrepeatable contexts in which it occurs, also led them to 
consider what they term the 'extraverbal' (Volosinov 1986,1987; Bakhtin 1986). 
2.9. WeIll The said and the unsaid 
The point has already been made more than once, that to be insightful in our 
discursive and dialogical endeavours it is important to know "who precisely is 
speaking, and under what concrete circumstances? " (Bakhtin 1981: 340). 
Discursive psychology's constructionist outlook, as we saw from Hammersley's 
critique, poses some difficult philosophical and methodological dilemmas for the 
dissident analyst. As constructionists we understand that our discourse 
constructs what it refers to: it is both "constructed and constructive" (Potter & 
Wetherell 1987: 35): not surprisingly, the question of whether there is anything 
'beyond' discourse or text is a question that has been posed and debated many 
times. Such a debate could, of course, occupy an entire thesis and my purpose 
In raising the issue is not to become deeply embroiled in arguments about 'ships 
in bottles' (Collins 1985) or the world that exists 'out-there' (Potter & Wetherell 
1987; Woolgar 1988). Neither is it my aim to return to the methodological and 
relativist arguments from earlier; although the circularity of these arguments is 
such that this is where we will end up. Rather, my interest is in an analytical and 
methodological dilemma posed by Volosinov (1987) who suggests that verbal 
discourse, as a topic on its own is insufficient for the purposes of analysis. 
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In a remarkable piece of social psychological text, Volosinov puts his case for the 
"extraverbal situation of the utterance" (Volosinov 1987: 98 original emphasis); 
this, he claims is just as important for the analyst as the speech itself 
Two people are sitting in a room. They are both silent. Then one of them 
says, "Well! " The other does not respond. For us, as outsiders, this entire 
"conversation" is utterly incomprehensible. Taken in isolation, the 
utterance "Well! " is empty and unintelligible. Nevertheless, this peculiar 
colloquy of two persons, consisting of only one - although to be sure, one 
expressively intonated - word, does make perfect sense, is fully 
meaningful and complete. (Volosinov 1987: 99) 
Volosinov rightly notes that any analysis of the discourse itself would be difficult. 
Our inability to carry out any meaningful or detailed analysis, he suggests, is due 
less to the paucity of text [although clearly this does not help] and more to the 
fact that we have not been made party to the 'extraverbal' context. It is this that 
gives the exclamatory remark meaning. He goes on 
We lack the "extraverbal context" that made the word well a meaningful 
locution for the listener. This extraverbal context of the utterance is 
comprised of three factors: (1) the common spatial purview of the 
interlocutors (the unity of the visible- in this case, the room, the window, 
and so on), (2) the interlocutors' common-knowledge and understanding 
of the situation, and (3) their common evaluation of that situation. 
At the time the colloquy took place, both interlocutors looked up at the 
window and saw that it had begun to snow; both knew that it was already 
May and that it was high time for spring to come; finally both were sick and 
tired of the protracted winter - they both were looking forward to spring 
and both were bitterly disappointed by the late snowfall... (Volosinov 
1987: 99 original emphasis) 
Volosinov's point, as he goes on to make explicit, is that the extraverbal situation 
"does not operate on the utterance from the outside" instead, it "enters into the 
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utterance as an essential constitutive part of the structure of its import" 
(Volosinov 1987: 100 original emphasis). Thus, in Volosinov's example, the 
snowflakes outside the cabin, the time and the date of the utterance, the 
calendar itself, the ambient temperature, the emotional disposition of the 
participants and much more are, as he puts it, "assumed in the word weir' 
(Volosinov 1987: 99). Once we are made aware of these extra-linguistic 
'assumed' aspects, a meaning becomes apparent. Putting aside, for the moment, 
any reflexive arguments about Volosinov choosing and constructing this vignette 
to suit his argument; or about the use of discourse [extraverbal or otherwise] as a 
resource rather than a topic, as we did when discussing Hammersley's (2003) 
critique of Wetherell (1998); there is a genuine analytical point to be made about 
such texts. 
Is it the case that a discourse analyst can only ever examine conversational 
fragments where there are sufficient words and metaphors and figures of speech 
to elicit meaning? Certainly, conversation analysts like Sacks (1995) have shown 
that a great deal of analytical insight can be gained from analysing relatively 
short fragments of text - "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up" (Sacks 1995: 
236) being a good example. Likewise, Heritage (1984) and Hutchby (2001) have 
focused their attention on the uses of the exclamation 'Oh' in conversation; 
although this 'marker' has always been analysed as part of larger fragments of 
text and not in isolation as in Volosinov's example. 
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But if one or two word utterances are considered to be beyond the discursive and 
rhetorical analyst's gaze, then there will be areas of social life and discourse that 
evade scrutiny. If this is not the case, then it would seem to require some 
acknowledgment, on the part of the discursive psychologist, of an extra-verbal 
context that is itself realised in a textual form as any part of an analysis; and 
which shapes utterances from within. This, in turn, returns us to those earlier 
methodological and reflexive criticisms made by Hammersley (2003) about 
discourse as a topic not a resource and which are, for the discursive and 
rhetorical psychologist still 'work-in-progress'. One word utterances do not 
feature in this research, but even so, the analytical conundrum remains. What a 
dialogical inquiry does is require us to [re] consider the concept of context in light 
of the extra-verbal. Such inquiry is, of course, double-edged 
... Bakhtin offers new windows on our work - but at a price. The new 
possibilities inevitably entail new doubts (Dickerson 1997: 530) 
Insofar as the extra-verbal is concerned, this research project can, for now, do 
little more than highlight the analytical difficulties it raises: tackling them must be 
the task for me and for other analysts in the months and years to come. 
2.10. Summary 
This brief exploration of Bakhtin and Volosinov's dialogical psychology neatly, 
and provocatively, ties together the analytical framework of this thesis. My 
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tripartite analytical approach began with the Sophistic rhetoric of Billig's rhetorical 
approach to social psychology. Lively, idiosyncratic, and often irreverent, Billig's 
dissident approach is attuned to the argumentative and ideological aspects of 
discourse as it unfolds through the use of 'witcraft' (Billig 1996). His is the rhetoric 
of invention, not adornment: the intricacies of form are no longer privileged over 
content, and a sense of balance is restored to the antiquarian discipline. But form 
is not disregarded entirely. In studying witcraft, the analyst must not only listen to 
what is being said to understand the positions that are being challenged or 
defended, they must also look at how the arguments are constructed (Billig 
1996). 
For the rhetorical psychologist, the processes of thinking are modelled on the 
"cut and thrust" (Myers 1989: 231) of public argument. Arguing and thinking are 
overwhelmingly social processes, for it is through dialogue and discourse that we 
conduct our daily lives. This is a psychology that is social, existing outside of the 
head. Thought, like argument is, at the very least, two-sided - to espouse a view 
is to counter or acknowledge [either implicitly or explicitly] an opposing view in a 
potentially infinite process (Billig 1991). On a daily basis, we always have choices 
to make and dilemmas of ideology to deal with (Billig et al., 1988). The task of the 
rhetorical psychologist is to seek out these dilemmas in the "unnoticed habits of 
life" (Billig 1999: 548). 
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There is nothing stuffy or dull or obscure about the rhetorical psychology that 
Billig advocates. Like his or her discursive counterpart, the rhetorician is also 
engaged in a vigorous process of 'respecifying' social psychology (Edwards & 
Potter 2005). But, true to the spirit of argumentation, the rhetorical analyst must 
also concede that on its own, a rhetorical approach goes only so far (Leff 1987; 
Myers 1989) and in this thesis, rhetorical psychology is augmented by discursive 
psychology (Edwards & Potter 1992; Potter & Edwards 2001; Potter et al., 2002; 
Edwards & Potter 2005). 
Building on the discourse analytic work of Potter & Wetherell (1987), 'discursive 
psychology' re-specifies and critiques cognition (Potter & Edwards 2001) as it [re] 
engages with many of the subject areas of traditional social psychology. 
Respecification occurs because discursive psychology understands discourse as 
"situated, action-orientated, and constructed" (Potter & Edwards 2001: 104 
emphasis in the original). In contrast to the traditionalist, the discursive 
psychologist accepts that people do things with their talk or their written texts: 
discourse is seen as a topic of inquiry, not a resource. 
Micro-social in its analytical outlook, discursive psychology has developed an 
impressive array of analytical and interpretive procedures (Potter et al., 2002) 
that set it apart from, and make it critical of, other forms of discourse analysis 
(Parker 1992). Proponents of discursive psychology stress the empirical nature 
of their enterprise and the comprehensive meta-theoretical philosophy that 
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accompanies it. Critics, on the other hand, suggest that discursive psychology's 
focus on the micro-social means that it is not well suited to the examination of 
wider social, political and ideological issues (Fairclough 1992). Furthermore, the 
constructionist approach to discourse that discursive psychology takes, coupled 
with the methodologically open and reflexive stance it encourages seems to 
irritate and provoke the traditionalist. Aside from the often cited 'concerns' about 
relativism and the threat this might pose to the status of the academic researcher 
as a purveyor of specialist knowledge (Hammersley 2003); discursive psychology 
has yet to resolve some methodological and analytical issues: in particular, 
whether the notion of discourse as topic is one that can be fully applied to the 
discourse of the researcher. There is, as yet, no ready solution to this dilemma 
and aside from my reflexive acknowledgements this thesis remains susceptible 
to those criticisms. If the combined efforts of the rhetorical and discursive 
psychologist whet the analytical cutting edge, it is honed still more by being allied 
to the dialogical insights of Bakhtin (1981; 1986) and Volosinov (1986,1987). 
Dialogical psychology envelops both the rhetorical and discursive psychological 
endeavours. Bakthin's dialogism has much in common with the Sophistic rhetoric 
of Billig's approach. Sophistic privileges the social, the ideological and the two- 
sided ebb and flow of discourse and thought: dialogism does the same, but has a 
much greater theoretical breadth. Where rhetoric is a means of inquiry, dialogism 
is akin to a socio-cultural philosophy. There are many overlaps too with 
discursive psychology, but where the discursive psychologist is said to struggle 
70 
with wider political and ideological matters, the dialogical approach seamlessly 
encompasses the macro with the micro in a most unique and insightful way. 
Bakhtinian thought, Dickerson remarks 
... encourages us to recognize that utterances are unavoidably located 
within specific conversational sequences and yet they are fuelled by and 
impact upon wider socio-historical contexts (Dickerson 1997: 528 
emphasis in the original). 
Dialogical psychology takes as its focus the word and more particularly the 
utterance. These two concepts prove fruitful in the ideas they generate. In many 
respects, those ideas are as simple as the basic model on which Bakhtin bases 
his work - that is, two people in dialogue with each other at a particular time and 
place (Emerson & Holquist 1981). 
When we analyse utterances from a dialogical perspective, we begin to hear 
'voices', both past and present: the words of others become our words, though 
they always retain a semblance of the other. As the words, cultures and ideas of 
others enter the utterance so it acquires a temporal and spatial aspect. A 
dialogical approach encourages us to become more attentive to who is doing the 
talking, who is being addressed, and under what circumstances the utterance 
takes place: these become fundamental to our analysis and consequently to our 
understanding of what is said and the meaning[s] we elicit. The world of dialogue 
Is interdependent and intertexual (Kristeva 1986). Verbal performances 
(Volosinov 1986) though generic in form are as diverse as the human activities 
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that inspire and inform them. These verbal performances are also shaped by the 
extra - verbal context (Volosinov 1987) which shapes them from within, not from 
without. 
If Bakhtin's world is complex and subtle, his philosophy is sufficiently developed 
that he is able to offer an extraordinary array of insights that extend across a 
range of disciplines. Such a philosophy compliments discursive and rhetorical 
approaches well. It stimulates creativity and unorthodox thought as by posing a 
different set of questions, we obtain a different set of answers. My tripartite 
approach is, of course, not to be regarded as a finished or fully developed 
analytical model - it remains very much work-in-progress. As we move now to 
consider the existing literature on the police we will have the opportunity to gauge 
how radical or revolutionary this present analysis is likely to be in any study of the 
police. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
OPERATIONAL CULTURES AND POLICE DEVIANCE 
"0 Villain! Thou wilt be condemned into everlasting redemption for this. " 
Much Ado about Nothing, Act 4: 2 
3.1. Introduction 
Over the last 50 years, research into the police and the business of policing 
(Lentz & Chaires 2007) has blossomed and this plethora of interest shows no 
signs of abating. As the police have come under greater scrutiny, there has been 
a distinct change in academic opinion which has shifted from a deferential, often 
celebratory tone, to an overtly critical and, at times, inherently political one. Over 
this same period, the relationship between the general public and the police has 
undergone a similar transformation (Emsley 1996). This change in public opinion 
coincides with the demise of the so-called 'Golden Age' of British policing. This, 
so the legend has it, was a time when society was policed 'by consent'; when 
crime rates were low and police officers, who patrolled their beat on foot, were 
known by all those in their neighbourhood (Reiner 2000). The 'Golden Age' 
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however, has given way to a more "coercive" style (Hall et al., 1978: 218) of 
policing that has distanced police officers from the public they are duty-bound to 
serve and protect. As they struggle to maintain order and enforce the law they 
find that their role, along with their powers, are being increasingly questioned 
(Wilson et al., 2001). Consequently, these are proving to be difficult times. 
The police of course have faced difficult times before and have survived them. 
But, whilst the challenge of 'traditional' crime is undiminished and places 
constant demands on the police, it is now matched by the organised activities of 
'criminal entrepreneurs' from abroad - many of whom never even leave the 
relative safety of their home lands. As if this were not testing enough, the threat 
from Islamic fundamentalists - many of whom have been radicalised here places 
new demands on the police and legislators. For an institution whose activities are 
recognised as "profoundly old fashioned" (Manning 1977: 118) and whose 
outlook and values continue to be politically and morally conservative (Reiner 
2000: 95), the police struggle to deal with the demands of a more 'permissive', 
ethnically diverse, and culturally progressive society. Not only are members of 
society less deferential and more rebellious in their responses to authority 
(Cohen et al., 1982); the police, as the most visible and iconic of all the agents of 
social control, find that they must now conduct their business under the intrusive 
and critical gaze of the media and academe. In an effort to defuse what 
continues to be an ongoing "crisis of hegemony" (Hall et al., 1978: 291) and to 
stave off the accusation that policing is now coercive rather than consensual, the 
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police have doggedly 'reinvented' themselves on a continual basis (Wilson et al., 
2001). Unfortunately, they have been unable to recapture or recreate the policing 
spirit of those halcyon days of 1950's England (Reiner 2000). 
The constant academic and media focus on the police and their activities has 
ensured that we have learned much about the police and the work they do. 
Historians, criminologists and political scientists (Rawlings, 1999; Brogden 1987; 
Emsley 1996; Jones & Newburn 1998; Mawby 2002; Zedner 2007) have widened 
our knowledge of the origins, evolution and political functions of the police. 
Sociologists who, more than any other, have pored over the specific activities of 
police officers as they go about their business, have unravelled much about the 
interactional dynamics of the police/citizen encounter (Skolnick 1966; Bittner 
1970; Sacks 1972; Cain 1973; Manning 1977; Lundman et al., 1980; Sykes & 
Brent 1983; Holdaway 1983; Van Maanen 1983; Brown 1988). Sociologists and 
ethnographers have also been successful in penetrating the previously 
clandestine and informal subcultures of the police (Shearing et al., 1981; Ericson 
1982; Punch et al., 1983; Punch 1985; McNulty 1994; Chan 1996; Chan et al., 
2003; Ford 2005). In addition, organisational theorists, legal scholars, and 
cognitive and forensic psychologists continue to contribute to our overall 
knowledge of the police and the business of policing. Yet, regardless of the 
theoretical window through which they are viewed, it seems that the police and 
their world are characterised by contradiction, paradox (Manning 1977; Brown 
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1988; McNulty 1994; Chan et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2005) and a tendency to 
dualism (Brown 1988). 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore at least some of those contradictions 
and paradoxes, and acquaint ourselves with the 'two-class' (Sacks 1995) thinking 
of the police. I will do this by focusing on three distinct areas of police research. 
Firstly, historical accounts, though they are not obligatory to an understanding of 
the police, can provide a valuable starting point. Police history may be divided 
into two distinct and contrasting genres (Emsley 1996; Reiner 2000). Regardless 
of whether or not we agree with or accept these competing histories as either 
valid or reliable (Hay & Snyder et al., 1989), it is important to have an 
appreciation of them; not only does this material shape the received wisdom 
(Lentz & Chaires 2007) it also makes visible ". .. the assumptions by which 
modern policing is governed" (Manning 1977: 38). 
Exploring the origin and histories of the police invariably raises questions about 
the business of policing itself and in some respects the two seem inseparable. 
However, the police are not alone in carrying out a policing function (Zedner 
2007) - social workers 'police' families and children; customs officers 'police' 
borders; tax inspectors for the exchequer - yet, each remains identifiably distinct. 
The police then cannot be defined simply by what they do; but unravelling the 
relationship between the police and policing is no easy matter and remains the 
subject of much conjecture and debate. This conundrum and the research that 
76 
addresses it will the second area on which I focus. In doing this, our gaze 
unavoidably extends to the occupational and operational subcultures of the 
police. Here, in the minutiae of these less visible police worlds, the craft skills of 
the police officer are learned and sharpened: this is where the ethos of policing is 
shaped (Holdaway 1983) and the 'common sense' that the police rely on is 
"generated" (McNulty 1994: 292). Every aspect of policing is touched upon and 
regulated by the subcultures of the police and these are instrumental in shaping 
how police officers operate (Van Maanen 1983; Ericson & Shearing 1991; 
McNulty 1994; Ford 2005). Although in recent years the influence [and the 
theoretical usefulness] of the police culture has been questioned (Chan 1996; 
Waddington 1999), in drawing together the various elements of the research that 
exist, and with one eye to the analyses to come, the pervasive influence of this 
private police world will be the final area of police research to be examined and 
evaluated. Having set out our plan, let us begin by turning our attention to the two 
distinct histories of the police. 
3.2. Police History: Orthodox or revisionist? 
During the last 30 years, historical accounts of the police have invited much 
debate amongst theorists and scholars (Brodgen 1987; Emsley 1996; Dodsworth 
2007; Lentz & Chaires 2007). Prior to the mid 1960s an "orthodox" (Reiner 2000) 
or "Whig" perspective (Wilson et at., 2001: 11) fashioned the received view. 
Since then, criticism of this older existing literature has been blunt 
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Ethnocentricity, inadequate comparative knowledge of policing, and a- 
historicism are the hallmarks of the Anglo-American sociology of the police 
... Explanations have been bound by context and by an insular historiography. (Brogden 1987: 4) 
Those writing in the orthodox tradition adhered to a deterministic view of policing 
as an inherent feature of human society (Mawby 1990). The Industrial 
Revolution, so this perspective suggests, brought new challenges that the 'old 
police' were ill-equipped to deal with (Emsley 1996). Plagued by ineptitude, 
riddled with corrupt officials, and incapable of dealing with the threat posed by 
"the mob" (Brogden 1987: 5); the move to create a 'new' police was seen as part 
of a 'natural' evolutionary progression with a lineage that can be traced back to 
our early tribal origins. Robert Reiner defines the orthodox perspective well when 
he writes 
In the orthodox account, the social impact of the police was the clearly 
benign one of solving the problem of order and checking the spread of 
lawlessness ... not only did the police benefit society as a whole but, 
contrary to initial fears, their major impact was on the welfare of the 
working class and the poor. They were the guardians of the weak against 
the strong ... While on the one hand the poor and the working class were 
singled out by the orthodox histories as beneficiaries of the police, they 
were also pinpointed as the source of most crime. (Reiner 2000: 20-21) 
Orthodox historians presume the police and the law to be independent of ".. . 
sectarian or class interests" (Bunyan 1976: 58): they also presume a consensus 
for the new police (Emsley 1996). Detailed and extensive (Reith 1938; Critchley 
1978) though many of these orthodox works are, there is an unwillingness to 
admit or acknowledge the extent to which the new police were opposed by 
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politicians and public alike (Reiner 2000; Wilson et at., 2001). Overwhelmingly 
celebratory, the discourse of the orthodox theorists retains an enduring idealist 
[some might say imperialist] appeal for some sections of the establishment which 
is discernable in the rhetoric of politicians and senior police officers today 
(Alderson 1979; Mark 1977). Whilst this is not altogether unexpected, given that 
the police "lie at the root of political order, and authority .. ." (Manning 1977: 5), 
it 
is a discourse that has not fared well in the face of greater analytical scrutiny. 
Academic opinion has taken a different turn. 
The early 1970s saw a more critical 'revisionist' history of the British police 
emerge which regarded the orthodox view as a "serious distortion" (Emsley 1996: 
248) of police history and the policing function 
Revisionist interpretations of the origins and development of the New 
Police probably start with Robert Storch (1975), who, unlike those writing 
within the Whig tradition, began to see the police as an instrument to be 
used by those with power to discipline the growing urban, working class. 
And while this crude oversimplification does not do justice to the far more 
sophisticated arguments of the revisionists, it ably demonstrates that the 
idea of 'consensus' in society - taken for granted in Whig interpretations - 
was instead something which was contested. (Wilson et al., 2001: 11) 
The revisionist perspective is, of course, as much a product of its time as the 
orthodox view. The 'social revolution' of the 1960s had been a time of 
momentous and rapid social change. Increasing civil unrest saw relations 
between the police and the public deteriorate (Emsley 1996) and it was from this 
crucible that the politically inspired and less deferential approach to the police 
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and police history poured. Authority, in all its forms, was challenged by a 
dissenting and discerning populace in what became known as the "crisis of 
hegemony" (Hall et al., 1978: 291). In short, people demanded to know more 
about "the hidden reasoning behind the claims to authority" (Banton 1973: 26) 
that issued from those who were considered to be part of the establishment. 
Academics were no different. Where orthodox historians were celebratory, 
revisionists were critical. The 'science of discipline', the power of 'normalising 
judgements', and the 'mechanisms' of power and punishment (Foucault 1977) 
were all part of this revised view of police history and a political [predominantly 
Marxist] imperative was introduced (Bunyan 1976; Brogden 1987; Sharpe 1988; 
Dodsworth 2007). For the revisionist 
... the motive for the formation of the new police was the maintenance of the order required by the capitalist class, with control of crime, riot, political 
dissidence and public morality being separate subsidiary facets of this 
overall mission (Reiner 2000: 28) 
Some revisionist historians view the later urban disorder of the 1980s as part of 
the same ideological tradition that motivated those who objected to the new 
police during the 1800s (Cohen, 1979). Revisionist history was certainly valuable 
in forcing a radical re-examination of the received view of police history. But, 
revisionists were not immune from the claim that they too might be as guilty of 
'distorting' history as those they railed against, and that their understanding of 
police history was just as "teleological and unilinear" (Reiner 2000: 33). As a 
consequence, revisionist critiques have themselves been subject to revision. 
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Predictably perhaps, a synthesis of the two views has now emerged. The political 
and ideological extremes of orthodox and revisionist histories have been 
tempered through subsequent review. Reiner (2000: 14-46), in his very thorough 
critique of the two approaches works up this "Neo-Reithian/Revisionist synthesis" 
This is a perspective that gives due weight to the success of the police 
reformers and the tradition they created, but also recognizes that policing 
is embedded in a social order riven by structured bases of conflict, not 
fundamental integration. (Reiner 2000: 45) 
Consent for the new police may not have been as unreserved as the orthodox 
historians claimed (Sharpe 1988); but, neither was the hostility and resentment 
as unanimous as the revisionists would have us believe. Somewhat 
unimaginatively perhaps, there is an acknowledgement that the British police 
were [and are] "... both oppressive and benign" (Waddington 1999: 22 emphasis 
in original). The police are certainly an enduring phenomenon. Spawned as they 
were in an atmosphere of resentment and hostility, they have survived some of 
the most testing periods of recent social history that have contributed to the 
ongoing 'crisis of hegemony' (Hall et al., 1978). Indeed, some writers claim that 
survival is their "principal concern" (Manning 1977: 102). The architects of the 
'new' police were well aware that the key to public acceptance, and therefore 
survival, lay in the image they presented (Reiner 1994; Mawby 2002) and this is 
a wisdom the police continue to adhere to. Unfortunately, despite numerous 
'reinventions' and 're-brandings' (Reiner 1994; Wilson et al., 2000) they have not 
been entirely successful in restoring public confidence. Many now feel that, "we 
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lack any clear consensus of what the police role is in a liberal democratic society" 
(Wilson et al., 2001: 30). The debate over consensus remains ongoing. The 
recent amendments to the prevention of terrorism legislation, increasing the 
police's powers to detain suspects without charge to 42 days, demonstrate how 
deep the strength of feeling is. That the police have survived 180 years is 
testament to their durability. How it is that they have survived may well offer clues 
as how they will continue and it is appropriate to consider that next. 
3.3. Old police. New police: from buffoons to Bobbies? 
It is a curious fact that, in Britain at least, many of our most famous and iconic 
police officers are fictional (Reiner 1994). Shakespeare's Dogberry, the bumbling 
master constable with a gift for malapropism, personifies the old English village 
constable (Kent 1981). Where Dogberry's shortcomings and ineptitude are cited 
as symptomatic of all that was wrong with the 'old' police, the attributes and 
abilities of another fictional character, PC George Dixon, are, with monotonous 
regularity, held up as all that is right with the `new' police. Even now, Dixon 
remains the archetype to which all British police officers are encouraged to aspire 
(Reiner 1994; Emsley 1996). Over time, the power of these and other fictional 
stereotypes has captured and diverted our attention: the archetype has become 
a stereotype and our focus on fictional ideals or bumbling caricatures overlooks 
the social context in which flesh and blood officers operate (Emsley 1996). 
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Distracting though these fictional icons have been, they are an important part of 
the social construction of the police. We have already seen how they have been 
incorporated into police history and folklore; but, they are also part of a broader 
historical and social narrative which constructs them as part of a tribal and social 
tradition extending back, in one form or another, to Saxon times (Manning 1977; 
Ascoli 1979). Kent explains 
In origin, the English constable was an officer of the village, tithing, or 
township and known variously as tithingman, headborough, borsholder, or 
even reeve.... (Kent 1981: 30-31) 
Unpaid, time consuming and often unpopular, the role of the village or parish 
constable was not easy. The office of constable, originally held to be one of 
"authority and dignity" (Ascoli 1979: 17), was never considered "a privileged 
position" (Ascoli 1979: 18). Although it became increasingly formalised and 
onerous, this form of policing retained its parochial or local character. Localising 
the law in this way was popular and remains an enduring theme even today. 
Village people, irrespective of their social position, showed a willingness to use it 
(Sharpe 1988) and the constable, when required, had powers "to call upon 
neighbours to keep watch, to pursue hue and cry, and to assist him in making 
arrests" (Kent 1981: 32). In towns and cities, local accountability was also 
attempted though not always accomplished. The 1285 Statute of Winchester 
decreed that in towns and cities the practice of 'watch and ward' (Ascoli 1979) 
should be established and the organisation of this form of policing was quite 
specific - responsibility for the 'watch' fell to the parish constable. According to 
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Ascoli (1979: 17) watch and ward was "preventative policing with a vengeance. " 
Until the introduction of the 'new' police in 1829; policing in England and Wales 
was a "private, non-professional and unspecialized" activity (Mawby 1990: 20). 
With the Industrial revolution a new bourgeoisie of merchants and manufacturers 
(Reiner 2000: 27) challenged the established social -order 
(Hay 1975; Brogden 
1982). Unlike their titled feudal contemporaries, this urban bourgeoisie "... did 
not have the ecological safeguards of large estates and lack of proximity to the 
'dangerous classes' ... nor did they enjoy the services of private retainers and 
guards" (Reiner 2000: 27). The 'ward and watch' system of policing that existed 
in cities, especially London, was the best that was on offer. Often dependent 
upon the active involvement of shop and property owners, many of whom 
actually lived elsewhere; it became common for them to hire others to 'police' 
their shops and properties (Manning 1977). Unfortunately, drunkenness and 
greed affected the competence of many of these hired men. Corruption and 
collusion amongst constables, watchmen [also known as 'Charlies'], and paid 
'thief-takers', though commonplace, was not as extensive a problem as orthodox 
historians insist and had less to do with the "individual character" of those 
involved and more with the "social processes" (Dodsworth 2007: 439) of the time. 
If crime and disorder were a problem, the seriousness of that problem is open to 
debate 
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If the fear of riot and the 'dangerous classes' was as acute as both 
orthodox and revisionist historians suggest, the long delay in police reform 
remains a baffling mystery (Reiner 2000: 35) 
This is not to say that policing, as it existed in all its various guises prior to the 
1829 Metropolitan Police Act, was not ripe for reform. A number of influential' 
figures were already active in considering how the Metropolis might be policed 
more effectively (Lentz & Chaires 2007). Patrick Colquhoun, an Irish 
businessman, stipendiary magistrate and "seminal architect of crime prevention" 
(Zedner 2006: 86) wrote a 'Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis' in 1797. Two 
years later, he established the Thames River Police to combat the growing 
amount of crime that had become endemic amongst the dock workers of London. 
For Colquhoun 'crime' was opportunistic rather than pathological and was, with 
careful consideration, capable of being managed and controlled. 
Henry Fielding, the novelist and magistrate also wrote on the subject of crime, his 
1751 'Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers' defines "the 
problematic of the prevention of crime" Dodsworth (2007: 441). As Fielding 
understood it, crime and disorder did not arise out of poverty, "... but the fact 
that the poor had been emancipated from their condition of dependence 
(Dodsworth 2007: 442). Like Colquhoun, Fielding and later his half brother John, 
believed that prevention was preferable to prosecution (Zedner 2006). As a 
'trading justice' or one who "opted to profit from the fees paid for performing 
judicial tasks" (Emsley 1996: 18), he actively intervened in policing the Borough 
of Westminster in London [for which he had jurisdiction] by employing a group of 
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professional 'thief-takers'. [In] famously known as the 'Bow Street Runners' 
(Manning 1977; Emsley 1996) few, if any had ever worked as constables or 
watchmen. The 'runners' operated as investigators and detectives and with a 
degree of professionalism that separated them from many of their 
contemporaries (Manning 1977). But, policing in this period was not just about 
parish constables, or watchmen or thief-takers 
The eighteenth century market in policing was extensive. It reached well 
beyond the thief-takers and the monied police to include turnpike keepers, 
pawnbrokers and innkeepers in a complex of policing relations that 
anticipated the dispersed 'security networks' that increasingly characterise 
today's provision (Zedner 2006: 84) 
The influence of what Brogden (1987: 8) calls "commercial policework" on the 
new police is, he suggests, mostly omitted from the competing histories of the 
police. Only latterly are these influences now being examined (Zedner 2006). 
It was against this background that the Home Secretary, Robert Peel introduced 
the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act. A skilful politician and administrator (Manning 
1977) there were many who also saw him as lacking originality - regarding him 
as an artful purveyor of other people's ideas (Ascoli 1979). Whilst the 'new' police 
were distinct from those they would replace in many ways, they ware not entirely 
'new'. Emsley (1996) echoing the sentiments of Brogden (1987) points out that 
... the uniform, the discipline, and the organisation of the new 
force 
suggest that Peel had imported into London many of the policing practices 
developed in Ireland to deal with civil disorder (Emsley 1996: 25) 
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Brogden (1987) argues that orthodox histories of the British police are 
inadequate for a number of reasons: one of which is that they do not 
acknowledge the influence of colonial policing, and Britain's position as an 
imperial power. Peel, who was appointed Irish Secretary in 1812, had been 
directly responsible for reforming the Irish Constabulary (Ascoli 1979). He clearly 
learned much from his foray into "colonial policework" and the parallels between 
the colonial model and new police are difficult to ignore (Brogden 1987: 9). 
Such was the social climate of 1820s England that when Charles Rowan and 
Richard Mayne, the first commissioners of the Metropolitan Police devised their 
plans for the new police with Peel, they did so on the premise of preventing 
rather than detecting crime (Wilson et al., 2001). We have already seen how 
prevention, rather than detection was considered to be the most desirable form of 
policing by Colquhoun, Fielding and other thinkers of the time. The decision to 
deploy distinctively attired police constables patrolling in public view was more 
political than pragmatic (Gilling 1996; Reiner 2000) - although it did distinguish 
them visually from their predecessors (Styles 1987). The preventative 
"scarecrow" value of uniformed police is debatable (Gilling 1996: 102) and the 
initial decision to deploy only uniformed constables was primarily to allay the 
suspicions of the general public, who were fearful of a covert, Gallic style police 
(Banton 1973). The formation of a uniformed quasi-military organisation also 
risked arousing the English suspicion of "a standing army quartered at home" 
(Emsley 1996: 26). 
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Attending to these concerns dictated, to some degree, how the new police' would 
look and act. Conscious efforts were made to ensure that the uniform of the new 
police appeared 'non-military', hence the top hats and blue swallow-tail coats 
(Emsley 1996). Rowan and Mayne were also careful to set out the demeanour 
and tone of discourse they expected from their 'new' police constables (Mawby 
2002). 
During the early years of their existence, the new police had to work hard to 
placate a mistrusting and often hostile populace. Initially, they made little impact 
upon levels of crime and were no more efficient than the constables and 
watchmen who they replaced. But, over time, levels of crime were reduced as 
they became effective in dealing with petty street crime. Even allowing for the 
effusiveness of orthodox accounts, it was especially apparent that the new police 
were a marked improvement to their predecessors when dealing with serious 
disorder. As Emsley puts it 
Within 25 years of his first manifestation, the English 'Bobby' was 
becoming, in the perception of the propertied and respectable classes of 
Victorian society, a pillar of the constitutional and legal structure of that 
society ... 
(Emsley 1996). 
Where colonial policing had been seen as "pre-eminently missionary work to 
legitimise external governance" (Brogden 1987: 9), the new police became 
'domestic missionaries' (Storch 1976), "apostles of the Westminster law 
enforcement gospel. . ." (Brogden 
1987: 14). The fictional era of George Dixon 
88 
might still have been some way off, but it was clear that the age of the parish 
constable had passed. 
Exploring early police history invariably raises questions about the business of 
policing - the purpose and functions of the police. As we have seen, the public 
acceptance and legitimacy of the new police was bound, at least in the 
beginning, to allaying the public's fear that they were a "tyrannous agency of the 
Crown (Banton 1973: 18). We have seen how the architects of the new police 
were particular in attending to the visible aspects of policing and were keen to 
reassure the public that the ideology of crime prevention would dictate how the 
new police worked. The police and the policing function were effectively blurred 
into one. But, much time has elapsed since then and many changes have taken 
place in both the social world and the police. Nevertheless, what the police do 
remains important in how they are perceived, for these activities, no matter how 
mundane ". .. communicate images of policing" and it is through these that "the 
social meanings of policing are produced" (Mawby 2002: 1). 
Differences in ideology and interpretation between orthodox and revisionist 
historians provoke different interpretations of the history and origins of the new 
police. But, the orthodox/revisionist polemic is not entirely one of dispute, there 
are areas of consensus. The belief that Peel's new police were, for a variety of 
social and political reasons, committed to an ethos of crime prevention is one 
that is not disputed. However, as with any historical analysis or account, there is 
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a danger that we allow a contemporary view to frame our interpretation of events 
and ideas that occurred nearly two hundred years ago. Lentz & Chaires (2007) 
citing Paley (1989), have revisited the notion of 'preventative' policing. They 
suggest that our understanding of crime prevention may well be different from the 
way in which pre-Victorian police reformers understood it. 
The same authors also challenge the "textbook history" of Robert Peel's 
'principles of policing' and conclude that "as they are generally presented and 
understood today, [Peels principles] are an invention of twentieth century policing 
textbooks" (Lentz & Chaires 2007: 70). Whilst this does not make the principles 
themselves a fiction, it does emphasise the constructed nature of historical 
endeavour and it invites an even more wide-ranging re-assessment of what has 
gone before and the conclusions that have been drawn. For Lentz & Chaires, the 
previously uncritical acceptance of many historical 'facts' [and here they direct 
their criticism primarily, but not exclusively at orthodox histories] results in 
"simplistic generalizations" (Lentz & Chaires 2007: 75). 
Brogden (1987) following Monkkenen (1981) is equally critical of the way in 
which police histories, of whatever genre, have been less than searching in their 
analysis. He objects to many of them on the grounds that 
Like the previous explanations, they contain a causal flaw. They confuse 
what the police ended up actually doing with the reason for their coming 
into existence. Police duties are conflated with police functions ... it is 
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equally plausible to argue that the police were created to look for lost 
children because that was what they ended up doing. (Brogden 1987: 6) 
After 180 years, the social environment in which the police operate has changed 
enormously, so it is no surprise that many of the functions that the police perform 
are also different. Whilst the debate over the original functions of the police is 
interesting, it has only a limited relevance to this thesis which is concerned with 
policing as it is now. If we are to expand our knowledge of contemporary policing, 
it is appropriate that we move away from historical matters and examine the 
business of policing as it takes place in the present day. 
3.4. The business of Policing: Crime prevention to Crime control 
When we start to consider the question of what it is that the police now do, we 
find ourselves confronted, like everything to do with the police, by contradiction 
and dualism. Crime prevention though it remains a 'principle' or, an ideal to which 
the police aspire (Alderson 1971), has, over the last 180 years, been less than 
successful. This is not entirely unexpected, given that the police have not been 
enthusiastic or consistent in their approach to preventing crime (Gilling 1996). 
Not only has there has been "a lack of clarity" about what crime prevention 
means in practical terms (Newburn 2003: 87) and historically (Lentz & Chaires 
2007); there has been a realisation that preventing or even controlling crime, is 
beyond the capability of the police alone (Gilling 1996; Waddington 1999). The 
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best they can do is ". .. give the appearance that things are 
(more or less) under 
control (Ericson 2005: 222 original emphasis). 
Perhaps as a consequence, the operational and ideological focus of the police 
has, like the office of constable itself, changed (Banton 1964). In the process, 
another dualism is constructed. Modern policing has moved from an emphasis on 
crime prevention to one of investigation and detection. Crime 'fighting' is now 
considered [by the police at least] to be the ". .. raison d'etre of policing" 
(Waddington 1999: 23) and police officers of all ranks construct their 
occupational world around this ideology (Cain 1973; Holdaway 1983). As Reiner 
notes "the main substance to which the police are addicted is adrenalin" (Reiner 
2000: 89): unfortunately, the empirical evidence for this `police imperative' 
suggests that it is more fanciful than factual (Cain 1973; Holdaway 1983; Sykes 
& Brent 1983; McConville et al., 1991; Kemp et al., 1994; Stephens & Becker 
1994; Chan et al., 2003) and that to sustain this view, the police must operate 
under a "collective delusion" (Waddington 1999: 117 original emphasis). Worse 
still, as 'crime-fighters', it seems that the police are not particularly good 
(Waddington 1999; Manning 2005), being heavily reliant on the public [and luck] 
to help them identify and apprehend those who perpetrate crime (Holdaway 
1983). If 'fighting' crime and the associated mythology that goes with it - fast 
cars, danger, excitement, and the thrills and violence which surround the 
exercise of power - are the lure that draws many into the police fold; the 'lived 
ideology' (Billig 1991) turns out to be different. 
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Chan et al's research with police recruits found that 
Police work was routine and monotonous rather than diverse and exciting. 
Police spent most of their time doing paperwork and 'covering their arses' 
rather than catching criminals (Chan et al., 2003: 209). 
Such responses are not unusual and reaffirm what other theorists have written 
about the day to day business of policing. Ethnographies abound (Banton 1964; 
Rubinstein 1973; Cain 1973; Manning 1977; Chatterton 1983; Sykes & Brent 
1983). These sociological studies confirm that the everyday activities of the 
police are at odds with the all-action, 'thief-taking' image that they regularly 
portray as being their occupational 'reality'. An additional irony here is that even 
when police are able to focus their efforts upon 'crime-fighting' researchers 
record that "most of the time, discretion is exercised in favour of non- 
enforcement" (Waddington 1999: 5). Senior officers may have the authority to 
issue directives to the rank and file about enforcing laws (Walklate 2001), the two 
may even share some of the same organisational aims; but, the way that the 
"street cop" operates differs from the way in which senior officers expect them to 
operate (Reuss-lanni & lanni 1983: 251). This disparity of purpose is said to 
reflect an "institutional schizophrenia" (Punch 1985: 4; Walker 1994: 33) which is 
present within the police organisation and ensures that the rank and file become 
skilled at subverting the policy doctrines and operational edicts of senior officers 
(Punch 1985; Gelsthorpe & Padfield 2003). Police officers are sufficiently 
autonomous that they are able to accomplish this (Smith et al., 2005), for it is yet 
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another irony that those on the lowest tier of the organisational hierarchy have 
the most influence over policing policy (Punch 1985). 
A review of the literature makes it clear that reducing policing to the activities or 
duty functions of uniformed officers, or viewing what they do as a series of 
"discrete episodes" (Waddington 1999: 18) is too simplistic. The business of 
policing is elusive and appears to exceed the sum of its parts. Sykes & Brent 
(1983: 26), in their symbolic interactionist study, offer what is perhaps the most 
pragmatic notion of the police and their work, when they refer to them as 
"professional interveners". Other individuals and organisations may undertake 
specific policing functions, they may even be entitled to intervene in certain 
situations; but only the police intervene in all spheres of social life. What is more, 
this is understood, even if it is not accepted, by most members of society 
(Rubinstein 1973; Manning 1977). 
Stephens and Becker (1994: 8) add flesh to this idea of the police as professional 
interveners [and so reaffirm another dualism] by seeing these interventions [and 
policing generally] as a "matrix of control and care. " Edwards explains 
Nowhere is the dual function of police as 'carers' of victims and 
'controllers' of offenders more apparent than in areas of police work where 
the police are charged with both the investigation of crime and 
apprehension of the suspect in securing the best possible evidence and in 
providing support necessary to the future protection and wellbeing of 
victims (Edwards 1994: 131) 
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Of course, as we now know, in spite of their addiction to adrenalin (Graef 1989; 
Reiner 2000), investigation, prosecution and law enforcement occupy only a 
relatively small amount of police time; by far the greater share of their working 
day is spent intervening in mundane, non-crime situations: neighbour and 
property disputes, 'sudden' deaths, 'nuisance' children, stray dogs etc. It is here 
that the care or 'service' function of the police, sometimes referred to 
contemptuously as 'social service work' (Kemp et al., 1992) is most in evidence. 
Within the police occupational milieu 'service' functions are generally accorded 
little status (Stephens & Becker 1994). Perhaps in an effort to sustain the 
'collective delusion' (Waddington 1999) under which they operate, police officers 
use the considerable operational autonomy they possess to 'manage' their time 
carefully (Cain 1973; McConville 1991). One way in which they do this is by 
drawing a distinction between the kinds of work they are required to deal with. 
This kind of distinction is known as "a two-set class" (Sacks 1995: 47) and is, as 
Sacks puts it "a method of doing things": thus, a police officer's daily business is 
divided between "quality" jobs (McConville 1991: 99) and "rubbish work" 
(Edwards 1996: 196) and the informal occupational cultures of the police have 
long ago determined what qualifies as what. 
3.5. Quality lobs, rubbish work and the exercise of power 
Quality jobs are 'real' police work and usually involve professional or career 
criminals, serious or fatal violence, and high value thefts or fraud (Chatterton 
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1983; Punch 1985; Kemp et al., 1992; Fielding 1994; Stephens & Becker 1994). 
Police officers manage their time to try and maximise the amount of 'quality' work 
they deal with: after all, 'thief-takers' are the stuff of police mythology and careers 
and reputations are made from such work. 
In contrast, 'rubbish work', extends from non crime matters to include what 
officers regard as 'minor' crime - such as very low value thefts, harassment, 
nuisance children, or those crimes they deem as having little chance of being 
successfully prosecuted such as 'domestic' violence' (Cain 1973; Edwards 1994 
& 1996; Walklate 2001). Such work has no kudos and every effort is made to 
deal with these jobs as quickly as possible and with a minimum of fuss or 
bureaucracy. To do that, the jobs [and the officers themselves] must retain a "low 
visibility" (Ericson 2003). Low visibility is a "resource available to police officers to 
maintain control over their decisions" (Ericson 2003: 223). What is important here 
is not the breadth of work that policing embraces or even the wealth of legislation 
at the officer's disposal; but the way in which the police officer intervenes 
The power officers have here is that their interventions are presumed to 
be authoritative simply because they are the interventions of the police ... 
when the police arrive at an incident the ownership of the dispute passes, 
in a very real sense, from the disputants to the police ... it is a highly 
significant decision whether the police define the incident in which they 
intervene as a dispute or a crime. (Kemp et al., 1992: 17) 
1 As mentioned earlier, 'domestic' violence is now subject to rigorous organisational policies that remove 
police discretion to ensure 'positive action' is always taken at the scene. 
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Given the social and legal status accorded them, officers are aware that they 
have "control over the production of 'facts' .. ." (Ericson 2003: 224); this control 
is 
tacitly reaffirmed by their legitimate recourse to coercive physical force (Bittner 
1970; Shon 2005) should they require it. The power to define or redefine a crime 
to a non crime or vice versa is considerable. For the apprentice police officer, the 
realisation that they have this power [through the exercise of discretion] is always 
a defining moment in their apprenticeship. With it, comes the understanding that 
how the matter is defined, will dictate how it may be dealt with. Kemp et al's., 
(1992) ethnographic study of the way in which police officers handled disputes 
makes exactly this point and it is a process that is central to the way in which 
policing is done. The essence of policing, if indeed there is an essence, would 
seem to lie in the exercise of authority. Waddington explains 
What the police do, as opposed to have the potential to do, is exercise 
authority. They do so not only when they intervene in some incident, but 
also when they wander aimlessly about asserting their right not only to 
pass through public space, but also to command it by watching whoever 
they choose and tacitly granting permission to others to go about their 
business ... it 
is not exercised episodically when police become involved 
in some incident, but imbues everything that the police do. (Waddington 
1999: 20 emphasis in the original) 
The thread that links the modern British police officer to those constables who set 
out on patrol for the Metropolitan police on the 29th September 1829 is the 
exercise of authority. Over time, functions and duties may have changed and 
styles and techniques of policing have evolved: but the ability to exercise 
authority over the civil population remains undiminished and if anything, it has 
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been strengthened (Banton 1964). Although the exercise of authority is a defining 
characteristic of policing, perhaps the defining characteristic (Waddington 1999; 
Shon 2005), how the police exercise that authority is a topic that is less well 
researched. 
Shon's (2005) and Shon & Arrigo's (2006) interactional socio-linguistic and 
conversational analyses of police discourse is useful in this respect as he takes 
as his data the 'naturally occurring talk' (Edwards & Potter 1992) of police officers 
In police/citizen encounters. Among his specific interests are the 'threats' or 
'warnings' issued to motorists by the police. To date, there has been little 
discursive or conversation analytic work on the police and these 'street' 
encounters, although there is slightly more discursive work on police/suspect 
Interviews - see Jönsson & Linell (1991), Auburn et al., (1995), Edwards (2006), 
Komter (2002,2006) Edwards & Stokoe (2007) Stokoe & Edwards (2008). 
Welcome, though Shon's contribution is, a cautionary note about his data must 
be struck. Firstly, the data itself was not obtained by the analyst: a serving police 
officer collected the data for him, and then made it available to Shon for 
secondary analysis. Secondly, the rest of his data set consists of material taken 
from a 'reality' television programme. In both cases, the analyst had no direct 
knowledge of the context or the 'extra-verbal situation' (Volosinov 1986) in which 
the talk occurred, and little or no control over the data obtained. Whilst this does 
not necessarily detract from the insights that his analyses provides, we have no 
way of knowing what determined the police officer's selection of data offered for 
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analysis, nor do we have any details of the editorial policy or decision making 
processes of the programme makers who collected the original data from which 
Shon later worked. 
That said, by adopting a discursive approach we at last gain some insight into 
how police authority is exercised during the interactional process that occurs in 
police/citizen encounters. Shon concluded that police warnings and threats may 
be seen as "fraternal speech acts because they share the essential genetic trait 
of their rhetorical parent: force" (Shon 2005: 829). He goes on 
The central factor that differentiates speech acts that cops make is force 
(coercion). The capacity to exercise coercive force is precisely what 
provides commands, orders, requests, and threats their differential 
infrastructure, and by definition, it is what separates ordinary citizens from 
police officers ... there is no time out from coercion in police work. (Shon 2005: 842) 
Whilst there is nothing particularly revelatory in Shon's conclusions, which 
support the findings of earlier theorists (Skolnick 1966; Bittner 1967; Westley 
1970; Holdaway 1983; Waddington 1994), his work at last addresses the 
"knowing how" aspects and not just the "knowing that" (Ryle 2000: 26). 
By now it should also be apparent that the police exercise of authority is not 
governed or regulated to any great degree by the workings of legislation (McAra 
& McVie 2005). Neither is it regulated by the formal codes of conduct or the 
directives of the police organisation itself (Waddington 1999a; Shon 2005) - the 
modern police officer is "anything but a Weberian bureaucrat whose discretion 
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and authority are checked rigidly" (Van Maanen 2003: 293). From an institutional 
and cultural perspective the police officer may "represent the extreme-end of the 
'carcereal continuum' (Ericson 2003: 219) and the legislative and duty-bound 
expectations that go with it, but she or he, is also an individual; informed by 
social, cultural, biographical and contextual factors, and with at least some 
measure of agency and 'subjectivity' (Henriques et al., 1998; Fielding 1994; 
Shotter 2002). Consequently, as Edwards writes, "the process of applying law. . 
. becomes selective and 
inconsistent" (Edwards 1989: 25). Many theorists 
attribute this 'inconsistency' in applying the law to'personality' or'attitudes' (Muir 
1977; Brown 1988); others to differences in individual officer's belief systems 
about policing (Bittner 1967; Goldstein 1977). 
No matter how these differences are accounted for, it is a clear theme in all of the 
literature that the 'law in action' as opposed to the 'law in books' (McBarnet 1983; 
Luban 1988) works differently. The former is indexical and pragmatic, and unlike 
the law in books, it is enacted on a face-to-face, moment by moment, basis. To 
get a feel for why this might be, and in the process broaden our understanding of 
the police, we must devote some time to exploring the 'common sense' (Billig 
1996; Shotter 2002) that permeates the police milieu (McNulty 1994). Like all 
'common' sense, the sensus communis of the police is contradictory and 
dilemmatic (Billig et at., 1988); nevertheless, it provides the police officer with 
another set of values and norms - the so-called 'working rules' (Waddington 
1999) or the 'cop code' (Chan 1996) - upon which they draw. 
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3.6. Police cultures: The private worlds of the police 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, together with the formal rules and 
regulations of the police organisation provide guidance to officers as to how and 
when 'the law' is to be applied. Organisational directives also offer more general 
directives such as the permissible standards of dress and behaviour and other 
sundry guidance. The police organisation takes pride in its reputation as a 
'disciplined service'. Structured on a quasi-military model, with a clear rank 
structure and a proscriptive discipline code (Stephens & Becker 1994) it is also 
unfortunately renowned as a 
... 'punishment-centred bureaucracy' in which officers are rarely praised for good practice, often because it is invisible to the organization ... [officers] face draconian penalties if they are deemed to have behaved 
improperly. (Waddington 1999a: 301) 
However, in spite of this, it is erroneous to assume that policing is all about rule- 
following (Ericson & Shearing 1991; Chan 1996; McAra & McView 2005) - 
whether it be the organisational directives, the law, or the informal 'working rules' 
otherwise known as the 'cop code' (Chan 1996). Psychologically, such a 
'bureaucratic' model of thought, as rhetorical psychologists know, is "one-sided" 
and "incomplete" (Billig 1996: 158-9). Indeed, Chan (1996) is quite right to point 
out that 
101 
Police practices have the appearance of rationality but the 'cop code' is 
more the result of 'codification' by researchers and police officers than a 
set of rules which generate practice. (Chan 1996: 115) 
A more balanced and two-sided approach is to see rules as "objects of 
argument" (Billig 1996: 50). A great deal of research on the police and police 
cultures, although it does not conceptualise it in this way, takes as its starting 
point the idea that police officers 'argue' about rules; that is, they'bend', break or 
create them (Shearing et al., 1981; Punch et al., 1983; Punch 1985). To put it 
another way, police actions like other social actions are "... not rule-governed, 
but rule-orientated" (Edwards 1995: 587). Of course, it is not simply the case that 
police officers merely break or bend or disregard rules because they exist 
[although they may do]; rather, as writers on police subcultures stress, police 
officers break or bend the formal rules as they orient to alternate and informal 
sets of subcultural values and norms (McAra & McVie 2005). Punch suggests 
they do this because 
... the policeman [is] an actor faced with an impossible and ambiguous job, based on a set of legal recipes from training that do not work in 
practice. (Punch 1985: 4) 
Policing, as has been stressed before, is "more craft than science" (Bayley & 
Bittner 1984: 51), and the craft aspects of the police officer's trade (Skolnick 
1966) play a significant part in determining and shaping how policing is done 
There is an inescapable contradiction between a policeman's obligation to 
enforce the law and preserve order, and the necessity of acting within the 
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moral consensus of the community being policed. It is through the 
exercise of discretion that the police continually confront and adapt to this 
contradiction ... It [discretion] 
is a necessary element in adapting to the 
social and political forces which impinge upon the police, and in sustaining 
the legitimacy of police authority. (Brown 1988: 38) 
What Brown fails to add here, is that the police officer must also contend with the 
moral consensus of the sub-cultural or occupational community of which she or 
he is also a part. The predominantly informal, hands-on, practical and 
practicable craft knowledge that is called upon to address these contradictions is 
learned via a 'telling' or narrative process (Punch et al., 1981; Chatterton 1983; 
Holdaway 1983; Punch 1985; Shearing & Ericson 1991; McNulty 1994; Ford 
2003), and is usually achieved [in the early stages at least] through mentoring or 
tutoring. 
Of course, the police organisation is not unique in having an organisational 
culture or cultures2 "Doctors, janitors, lawyers, and industrial workers develop 
distinctive ways of perceiving and responding to their environment" (Skolnick 
1966: 42). The concept of police culture in its 'monolithic' incarnation (Reiner 
2000) refers, for the most part, to uniformed patrol officers of the lowest ranks. 
Although senior police officers also have their own organisational and sub- 
cultural cliques they are researched less often - Reuss-lanni & lanni's (1983) 
work on the conflicting subcultures of 'street cops' and 'management cops' and 
Reiner's (1991) research on chief constables being two major exceptions. What 
is clear is that the subcultures of the police are more numerous than theorists at 
2 Researchers now acknowledge that police culture is not singular, but comprises many 'sub-cultures' 
(Shapland & Vagg 1988). 
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first assumed (Shapland & Vagg 1988; Chan 1996; Foster 2003). For all the 
importance that theorists attach to them, police 'cultures' are criticised on the 
grounds that they are "poorly defined", of "little analytic value" and have become 
"a convenient label for a range of negative values, attitudes and practice norms 
among police officers" (Chan 1996: 110). Nevertheless, a range of studies have 
concluded that there is strong evidence to show that police cultures legitimise 
malfeasance and Machiavellian practice (Skolnick 1966; Westley 1970; Reiss 
1971; Rubinstein 1973; Manning 1977; Punch et al., 1981; Punch 1985; Hobbs 
1988; Chan et at., 2003 amongst others): by comparison, far less effort has been 
directed towards any positive aspects (Waddington 1999a; McNulty 1994; Chan 
1996). What all theorists agree upon is that police cultures operate out of public 
view. In some instances, they also operate out of earshot of other officers as well 
(Rubinstein 1973; Cain 1982; Chatterton 1983; Punch 1983,1985; Reiner 2000). 
Like most other organisational cultures, police cultures are 'members only' clubs. 
The occupational working culture of the uniformed patrol officer is distinct from 
that of the detective or the traffic officer. To the outside world, and even to the 
police themselves in times of crisis, police officers are all members of the wider 
police club - which may explain why police culture was originally considered to 
be 'monolithic' (Reiner 2000). However, within the police world the private 
occupational enclave of the detective for example, is not one that is readily 
accessible to the uniformed patrol officer; likewise, the dog handler will not be 
readily accepted into the traffic officer's working environment. Each enclave has 
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its own common sense and common knowledge. Undoubtedly, elitism plays its 
part in keeping these culture seperate, especially where uniformed patrol work is 
concerned: this, after all, is where all police officers begin their careers and unlike 
specialist departments, it is not a role attained on merit (Manning 1977). Indeed, 
many regard it as the most menial and least regarded of all police roles and do 
all they can to escape it (Chan et at., 2003; Reiner 2000). Police cultures may 
foster elitism, but they also function as a source of collective strength and identity 
(McNulty 1994) - above all, they operate as self-preservation 'societies' 
(Manning 1977). Each culture acts as 
... a source of direction and guidance- the "rules of thumb" of police work 
... that rank-and-file police officers can turn to as they go about their 
work. It derives its authority and legitimacy from the fact that it is perceived 
by these officers as the embodiment of the collective wisdom of 
generations of police officers. It is viewed like tradition ... (Shearing 1981: 30) 
If the nature of policing means that "the audit of workmanship" (Bittner 1983: 8) is 
always a public affair; the acquisition of informal craft skills, especially the 
techniques of self preservation (Manning 1977), are more private and take place 
within the comparative safety of the relevant police cultures (McNulty 1994). 
Such secrecy fuels the notion that what occurs in those private spaces, whether 
it is the police canteen or patrol car, is at best dubious, at worst illegal (Galliher 
1971; Cain 1973). Intriguing and tantalising though this idea might be, not all the 
private activities of the police are as necessarily conspiratorial or illegitimate 
(McNulty 1994; Waddington 1999). 
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McNulty's (1994) research is particularly helpful in explaining why. She studied 
how police officers collectively "generate" the common sense on which they 
draw. She suggests that this begins in basic training 
Instructors incorporated common sense assumptions of working police 
officers into many of their presentations and employed interactive 
scenarios, jokes, and "war stories" to reinforce these themes. As such, the 
information contained that ad hoc quality so representative of any 
common sense knowledge. (McNulty 1994: 282) 
Central to police common sense is the belief that police work is characterised by 
"situational uncertainty" (McNulty 1994: 283-4). In contrast, the acquisition of 
police common sense is, she suggests, achieved through adherence to 'routines' 
such as the booking in of prisoners, the morning 'tea' stop, or the informal post 
incident debrief Significantly, she observed that these routines usually take place 
away from public view and in periods of transition between events or incidents. 
How well the police officer assimilates this common sense knowledge is gauged 
by how she or he subsequently performs (McNulty 1994). In a similar vein, Ford 
(2003) studied the way that'war stories' and 'parables' are used by police 
instructors to introduce recruits into the ideology of the patrol officers culture. He 
found that through this process new recruits quickly adopted the cultural values 
of the police world 
By the end of field training, the adoption of a set of values and attitudes 
distinct from the value set that brought them to the profession is well 
under way. (Ford 2003: 86) 
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If Ford's study provides confirmation that the informal cultures and knowledge of 
the police have a powerful influence on those who operate within it, Ericson & 
Shearing's (1991) study, which pre-dates McNulty and Ford, and which is built 
around a similar theme, offers some comfort to police reformers. Ericson & 
Shearing put forward the idea that police cultures rely upon a "figurative logic that 
constitutes a way of being in the world" (Ericson & Shearing 1991: 487). They 
explain 
In their street talk police officers use stories to represent to each other the 
way things are, not as statements of fact but as cognitive devices used to 
gain practical insight into how to do the job of policing. (Ericson & 
Shearing 1991: 491) 
The narrative and conversational emphasis of this study reaffirms the 'telling' 
process that other researchers have also observed (Punch et al., 1981; 
Chatterton 1983; Holdaway 1983; Punch 1985; McNulty 1994; Ford 2003). It also 
underlines the fact that while police cultures may be influential in altering the 
values and beliefs of those in the police organisation, as Ford (2003) has shown, 
police officers are not, in the language of the ethnomethodologist, "cultural" or 
"psychological dopes" (Garfinkel 2007: 68). In other words, they are not passively 
bound by informal subcultural 'rules' as others have suggested (McAra & McVie 
2005). Instead, they can "accommodate or resist its influence" and often do 
(Chan 1996: 111) - see also Fielding (1988). What these studies tell us, is that 
just as convicts learn the 'rules' and the etiquette that constitute their'code' from 
those they mix with, the activities they engage in, and the things they talk about 
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(Weider 1974): so the police learn theirs in the same way (Chatterton 1983; 
McNulty 1994; Ford 2003). The mentoring or tutoring process then, as I 
mentioned before, is integral to the way in which police officers learn their trade 
(van Maanen 1973). Sacks' (1972) work on the "Police Assessment of Moral 
Character", gives an insight into how student officers or novices learn "how to 
see" (Sacks 1972: 285) like a police officer 
As he walks through his beat with a mature officer, persons who to him 
appear legit are cast in the light of the illicit activities in which the latter 
knows they are engaged. The novice is shown that he ought to see 
persons passing him in terms of the activities in which they are engaged .. 
. objects and places having routine uses are conceived in terms of favourite misuses. Garbage cans are places in which dead babies are 
thrown, schoolyards are places where molesters hang out, stores are 
places where shoplifters go, etc. (Sacks 1972: 285 & 292) 
The ideologies and the 'common-sense' of the patrol officer's culture are 
embedded within these ideas and this process (Chatterton 1983; McNulty 1994). 
Mission, action, cynicism, pessimism, isolation, stereotyping and suspicion are all 
learned in this way; although generally speaking, these features of a police 
officer's 'psychological make-up' are often attributed to biology (Rubinstein 1973; 
Muir 1977; Brown 1988; Waddington 1999) rather than social construction. 
Skolnick, for example, conceptualises them as part of a 'working personality' 
... certain outstanding elements in the police milieu, danger, authority, 
and efficiency ... combine to generate distinctive cognitive and behavioural responses in police: a "working personality". Such an analysis 
does not suggest that all police are alike in "working personality", but that 
there are distinctive cognitive tendencies in police as an occupational 
grouping ... 
Thus, the police, as a result of combined features of their 
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social situation, tend to develop ways of looking at the world distinctive to 
themselves, cognitive lenses through which to see situations and events. 
(Skolnick 1966: 42) 
As useful as the notion of a 'working personality' might be, the 'working 
personality' is predominantly descriptive; which makes it very good as far as 
'knowing that' is concerned, but analytically, it is less useful in assisting us in 
'knowing how' (Ryle 2000).. Furthermore, the psychological baggage that 
accompanies the concept of 'personality' roots it within the dualist psychological 
tradition of cognitivism. The focus on the individual that this promotes, tells us 
little about the workings of police ideology. 
3.7. The ideology of self preservation: 'covering your arse' 
Any reviewer of the literature on police cultures is quickly confronted by 
references to police 'deviance' (Cain 1973; Muir 1977; Brown 1988; Punch 1983; 
1985). Like many of the dualisms in police research the two seem inseparable. 
Deviance in the police takes many forms 
General police deviance can include brutality, discrimination, sexual 
harassment, intimidation, and illicit use of weapons. There are disciplinary 
and legal infringements related to citizens, suspects, and criminals where 
policemen, individually or in groups, opportunistically or systematically, 
abuse their authority in ways (not principally aimed at personal gain) which 
are externally considered to be illegitimate and improper. (Punch 1985: 12 
my emphasis) 
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The relatively orthodox nature of police research means that theorists invariably 
rely upon traditional socio-psychological concepts to explain these "seamy 
tactics" (Punch 1985: 203). These psychological concepts, by their nature, 
concentrate attention on the individual (Henriques et al., 1988) as the source of 
the deviance. The result is that debate on police cultures and on police deviance 
has acquired a certain circularity in the arguments made (Chan 1996). In 
focussing on individual psychology, these same texts are also guilty of making a 
number of uncritical assumptions about the Law and 'due process' (Packer 
1968). McBarnet explains 
In conventional sociological studies of criminal justice then, 'law' stands 
merely as a supposed standard from which the enforcers of law routinely 
deviate; legal procedures are simply assumed to incorporate civil rights. 
(McBarnet 1983: 5) 
In her incisive critique of the 'construction of justice' Doreen McBarnet (1983) 
approaches the 'Law' and the concept of 'justice' from a different angle; one that 
is germane to the workings of police culture and the notion of police deviance. 
Amongst the numerous conclusions she draws from her research are that the 
adversarial legal system [of which the police are part] and adversarial advocacy, 
construct people, behaviour, and 'reality' - the 'what really happened' bits - in 
particular ways. Adversarial advocacy she insists 
... helps solve the philosophical problem of reproducing reality quite 
simply by not even attempting it. Instead the search for truth is replaced by 
a contest between caricatures. (McBarnet 1983: 16 my emphasis) 
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Although the police, when they were formed, did not directly involve themselves 
in court processes other than to give evidence; over time, the adversarial court 
process has become an arena in which they do operate. Until relatively recently 
they were directly involved in the presentation of criminal cases - including 
advocacy (Emsley 1996). They only relinquished this function with the creation of 
the Crown Prosecution Service in 1986, but not before the legal language games 
of the advocate had been assimilated into the common sense knowledge and 
working practices of the police. If adversarial advocacy and the process of law 
rely upon and perpetuate caricatures and stereotypes (Taylor 2004), it can be no 
surprise therefore that the received wisdom of police cultures does likewise. But 
McBarnet's (1983) research leads her to make another claim that also has 
particular relevance to deviance and the 'working rules' of the police 
Police and court officials need not abuse the law to subvert the principles 
of justice: they need only use it. Deviation from the rhetoric of legality and 
justice is institutionalised in the law itself (McBarnet 1983: 156 my 
emphasis). 
Ericson (1981) also reached a similar conclusion. If these theorists are right, and 
there is no reason to suppose that either is wide of the mark, then it may be that 
police cultures are less malign than many theorists surmise. The idea that 
'deviance' may have as much to do with social, legal and institutional processes 
as it does with individual psychology moves deviance away from the 'rotten 
apple' theories which are still favoured and touted by senior police officers 
(Punch 1985) and some Independent Inquiries (Scarman 1981), to a 
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reassessment of the institutional shortcomings of the law itself. For the police on 
the other hand, Ericson and McBarnet's findings may come as less of a surprise. 
Given the police' proven record for ingenuity in circumventing rules and 
procedures (Shearing et al., 1981; Punch 1985), we can be sure that after 180 
years of acquired common sense knowledge, if the law permits deviance, then 
the working ethos of the police officer will already be attuned to it. It is here that 
the value of research which strives to 'know how' is useful in making explicit the 
way in which "seamy tactics" (Punch 1985: 203) are actually accomplished. 
Whilst police officers rarely discuss these things openly, police officers do 
... refer to dark areas of their work obliquely, 
through story-telling or 
humour ... but evidence 
indicates that they avoid open consideration of 
occupational hazards, pitfalls, and 'trade secrets'... (Punch 1985: 124) 
We have already seen from McNulty's (1994) work how the common sense 
knowledge of police officers is 'generated' and drawn upon in their private 
cultural spaces. But, as organisational theorists point out, police subcultures, like 
other organisational cultures, have many functions (Sackmann 1991; Hatch 
2006). 
Police research has recognised these organisational subcultures as a valuable 
resource for officers in providing guidance on occupational 'self-survival' 
(Manning 1977; Chan 1996). In police speak, this means the "avoidance of 
'trouble' from organisational or legal regulation" (Kemp et al., 1994: 88-89); 
otherwise known as "in the job" trouble (Chatterton 1983); and also to the 
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avoidance of'trouble' from without; from the people they police (Holdaway 1983; 
McNulty 1994; Chan et al., 2003; Ford 2003; Smith et al., 2005). Brown (1988) in 
his study of how police officers 'work the streets' describes one of the paradoxes 
of policing. Police officers he writes 
... are enmeshed in a system of rules designed to govern their behaviour, 
and subject to watchful supervisors .. . [the police officer] is both autonomous and controlled. This paradox is the root of many of the 
conflicts and moral dilemmas faced by street-level bureaucrats. (Brown 
1988: 29) 
Little wonder then, that the police have become "mainly concerned with 
protecting themselves from all criticism from whatever source" (Galliher 1971: 
314). The "punishment-centred bureaucracy" of the police organisation 
(Waddington 1999a: 301) and the public accountability that is all part of policing 
ensures that police officers quickly become adept at what they call 'covering their 
arse' (van Maanen 1973; Chatterton 1983; Chan et al., 2003; Chan 2007). As a 
philosophy, 'covering your arse' is central to everything a police officer does "it 
represents a sort of bureaucratic paranoia which is all but rampant in police 
circles" (van Maanen 1973: 52). Chan et al's (2003) work with new recruits to the 
Australian police show how an adherence to the 'cover your arse' philosophy is a 
recurrent theme. An experienced officer had this to say 
The problem of poor or weak management is complicated by a culture in 
which managers are afraid of making mistakes. As a result ... managers 
avoid making hard decisions for fear that if the decision goes wrong they 
would be subjected to disciplinary actions. This produces a 'cover your 
arse' approach to work. This means that at every decision point one has to 
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ensure that there is no room for any problems or recourse to occur. (Chan 
et al., 2003: 225) 
In addition to this, officers also complained that because managers and 
supervisors employ this self-survival policy, when members of the public made 
complaints, it always resulted in those officers being dealt with "... more harshly 
than criminal offenders" (Chan et al., 2003: 226). Reliance upon the 'cover your 
arse' maxim therefore encourages police officers to anticipate such complaints 
and prepare themselves for the managerial response; thus reaffirming the front 
line officer's belief that "management cops" are not "street cops" (Reuss-lanni & 
lanni 1983: 251). Perhaps as a response to the'situational uncertainties' of their 
occupation, many studies of the police (Banton 1964; Cain 1973; Manning 1977; 
Chatterton 1983; Holdaway 1983), have identified how some police officers use 
the relative autonomy they possess to seek "day-to-day compensations" 
(Manning 1977: 151) as some kind of justifiable recompense for all the 
dangerous and 'dirty work' (Westley 1970) that policing entails 
On a day-to-day basis, policemen attempt to line up "easy numbers, " jobs 
that allow them to take it easy, to be out of sight, to enjoy the comfort of 
the station, or to follow a regular nine-to-five schedule. (Manning 1977: 
151) 
Such ideologies are ingrained in the common sense knowledge of the police and 
for those theorists who are also active reformers (Chan 1996; Taylor 2004) this is 
a particular challenge. Chan meanwhile believes the key to understanding and 
therefore changing police cultures lies in dealing with the social and political 
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context of policing. Her approach to the perceived problem of police cultures is 
pragmatic and sociological. Drawing on Bourdieu's concept of field, "a social 
space of conflict and competition" (Chan 1996: 115) and habitus, a set of 
principles that "produce and reproduce the 'practices' of a class or a class 
faction" (Jary & Jary 2000: 257), she suggests that previous efforts to change the 
police organisational culture and subcultures have failed because reformers have 
only ever attempted to change the habitus of the police. Changes to the field she 
insists are an essential first step, as these "inevitably alter the way the game is 
played" (Chan 1996: 131). Analytically, her approach is insightful and makes a 
serious attempt at 'knowing how'; but, like most of the research on police 
cultures, it remains rooted in a non discursive, cognitively orientated, 
predominantly sociological outlook. 
3.8. Summary 
During this chapter, we have seen how research work on the police and policing 
is diverse in its subject matter. Even allowing for the selective nature of my 
review, there are few areas of police work or the police organisation that have not 
been explored. Predictably perhaps, I began with a brief look at police history. 
Many police histories are distinctive in that they may fall into one of two opposing 
genres. Early expositions [the so-called orthodox accounts] are renowned for 
being 'celebratory' and relatively uncritical (Reiner 2000) and for many years, 
these works constituted the 'received view' of police history. During the 1970s 
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another, predominantly Marxist view, emerged to challenge the orthodox 
histories. These 'revisionist' accounts were more critical than celebratory and 
injected police histories with a new dynamic. Valuable though the revisionists 
were in prompting a reassessment of police history, ultimately they proved to be 
as unbalanced and selective as those works they railed against. If police history 
is relatively unfashionable as far as police research is concerned, it remains a 
subject that would benefit from a further reassessment and greater critical 
analysis (Brogden 1987; Lentz & Chaires 2007): for as Lentz & Chaires suggest 
"the history of policing in the nineteenth century is still being written" (Lentz & 
Chaires 2007: 78). What then, is the relevance of police history to this thesis? 
Tempting, though it might be, to view the last 180 years of police history as only 
of passing interest to this thesis; it is a temptation that I felt it was important to 
resist. As our brief exploration of the literature shows, past events and 
experiences continue to have a tangible presence in the occupational lives of 
serving police officers. We should not forget that when a new recruit is inducted 
into the police fold, they are initiated into 180 years of tradition, experience, and 
accumulated wisdom: these things permeate every aspect of police practice as 
Manning explains 
The implicit model against which policemen judge "good" or "bad" police 
work is derived from an evocation of the work and cognitive style of the 
mythical "old copper, " who walked a beat in the old fixed-point system ... it was thought that he was not "bogged down in endless trivialities and 
paperwork" ... The old copper image is a base line for other conceptions 
of good police work ... " (Manning 1977: 144) 
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Furthermore, to overlook how the police and the business of policing has 
emerged and evolved would be unwise, as these are likely to provide clues as to 
how and why police officers are the way they are and they also provide us with 
some valuable evolutionary reference points. 
In sketching a history of the police, the researcher is irresistibly drawn into 
debate about the very business of policing, and the transition to the literature on 
this topic is relatively seamless. What is most evident from the research, is the 
way in which the police see 'crime-fighting' as their remit rather than crime 
prevention: more interesting still, is that the police organisation's collective 
perception of what they think they do is at odds with what they actually do 
(Banton 1964; Cain 1973; Manning 1977; Holdaway 1983; Waddington 1999; 
Reiner 2000; Wilson et al., 2001). The occupational dissonance this provokes for 
the police has encouraged some theorists to suggest that the police are 
collectively delusional (Waddington 1999). Others make the claim that the police 
are beset by an "institutional schizophrenia" (Punch 1985: 4) and certainly, 
throughout my exploration of the police literature, a strong tendency to dualism 
exists and in particular, what Sacks calls the "two-set class" (Sacks 1995: 47) is 
evident in everything that the police do: from the pragmatic ideology they rely 
upon to divide their workload into 'quality jobs' and 'rubbish work', to how they 
conceptualise people and events - guilty or not guilty, suspect or witness, 
criminal or civil and so on. 
117 
If dualism is a recurrent theme of the police and policing: so too is ambiguity. The 
business of policing has an elusive quality. It is much more than simply a 
repertoire of activities or functions that are duly enacted during the course of an 
unending series of "discrete episodes" (Waddington 1999: 18). Lots of other 
individuals and organisations are also involved in 'policing' (Zedner 2007), but 
they are unmistakably not the police. If policing has a defining characteristic, it is 
the exercise of authority (Waddington 1999), which is always implicitly backed by 
"the capacity to exercise coercive force" (Shon 2005: 842). Policing, law, and the 
police organisation may be dominated by legal rules and procedures and be 
reinforced by a military style discipline code, but time and again the literature on 
the police demonstrates that the operational autonomy of the police officer 
means that they are not slavishly bound by these rules (Punch et al., 1983; 
Punch 1985; Brown 1988). If the police officer 'orients' to any regulatory force, 
then it seems he or she is inclined to rely upon the informal wisdom and practices 
of the police subculture in which they operate (Shearing & Ericson 1991; McNulty 
1994; Ford 2003). If the essence of policing resides in the exercise of authority, it 
is also to be found in the numerous beliefs and customs and practices of informal 
police cultures. Having studied their early history and then mused on what it is 
that the police do, the third and final phase of this chapter concentrated on those 
customs and practices that police officers have developed to ensure their own 
'survival' as they go about their daily business. 
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Policing is a risky and 'dirty' occupation (Westley 1970; Holdaway 1983) replete 
with uncertainty and ambiguity (Skolnick 1966; McNulty 1994) yet with a constant 
pressure to deliver results and to get the job done (Brown 1988). In doing that, 
the police officer must guard against 'management cops' who have a different 
agenda to the 'street cop' (Reuss-lanni & lanni 1983) and also protect him or her 
self from members of the public who are also not to be trusted (Holdaway 1983; 
McNulty 1994). Moreover, the received wisdom has it that the law, as it is written, 
is ineffective out on the street; hence, the police officer's tendency to deviate 
from it and to make it work. Punch (1985) and others observe that these 
pressures ensure that 
Techniques have to be developed to create appearances, to construct 
feasible accounts, and to control information reaching superiors. (Punch 
1985: 2-3) 
As a result, police officers become well versed in the ideology of self preservation 
- what they call 'covering your arse'. Arse covering features in just about 
everything that police officers do (van Maanen 1973; Chan et al., 2003). 
Regardless of whether officers are engaged in legitimate or illegitimate activities, 
the 'cover your arse' philosophy is a fundamental principle of police common 
sense: so much so that all who join the police are indoctrinated with this maxim 
from the start (Chan et al., 2003). Secrecy, aside from being a constituent part of 
police subcultures generally, is a vital element in the ideology of self survival: 
although its use invites adverse comment. Whilst secrecy itself is not necessarily 
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indicative of malfeasance, it does nothing to discourage it either (Manning 1977). 
Maurice Punch (1983,1985), laments that 
... a review of the standard literature on the police and 
journalistic 
accounts does reveal graphically and indubitably that practical policing is 
characterised by deviant behaviour which is built into the routine way work 
is constructed and which performs functions in terms of cementing 
solidarity ... a battery of seamy tactics are resorted to by some policemen in some situations as legitimate techniques in getting their work done. 
(Punch 1985: 203) 
Whilst the widely held view that police cultures are entirely dubious holds fast 
within the literature, a less well aired view offers a partial challenge to that 
received wisdom. This alternate view posits that the law itself is sufficiently 
permissive and ambiguous to allow those who apply it, be they court officials, 
lawyers, magistrates, and police officers to subvert justice without transgressing 
the letter of law (Ericson 1981; McBarnet 1983). McBarnet (1983) confidently 
asserts that "deviation from the rhetoric of legality and justice is institutionalised 
in the law itself' (McBarnet 1983: 156). Whilst this in no way undermines the 
received view of police deviance, it certainly offers an opportunity to break free 
from some of the rather circular arguments that have held sway for some time. 
Appropriately enough, as this chapter closes and the first analysis beckons, I 
invite the reader to keep this notion of legal permissiveness uppermost in your 
thoughts as you study the analyses to come. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
"WHAT I DON'T WANT TO DO IS MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE" 
THE INFORMAL RESOLUTION OF CRIME 
"... The most peaceable way for you if you do take a thief is to let him 
show himself what he is, and steal out of your company. " 
Much ado About Nothing. Act 3: 3 
4.1. Introduction 
Diverse and unpredictable, routine and banal: uniformed policing is a fascinating 
mix of contradictions and extremes. In recent years, so-called 'reality' television 
has focused upon the "thief-taking" (Chan & Dixon 2007: 459), adrenalin charged 
aspects. For many police officers this form of law enforcement remains the 
epitome of uniformed police work (Chan et al., 2003). In practice, such work 
features sporadically in a police officer's daily life (Punch et al., 1983; Sykes & 
Brent 1983). The tasks that routinely fill the uniformed police officer's day and 
which feature in this research corpus will never be the stuff of reality television. 
Often unrewarding, occasionally irksome, and stifled by bureaucracy; most 
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uniformed police work is remarkably mundane (Banton 1964; Skolnick 1966; 
Manning 1977; Black 1981; Sykes & Brent 1983; Chan et al., 2003; Chan 2007). 
We saw in the last chapter how police officers 'manage' their time by 
differentiating between what they regard as 'quality' jobs, and those they dismiss 
as "rubbish work" (McConville et al., 1991: 33 & 99: Edwards 1996: 196). Officers 
have learned that the most notable consequence of establishing such a 
bifurcation is that it allows them to determine how they deal with the matter. If the 
use of discretion is a legitimate option available to all police officers; exercising it 
is more specific, in that it "clearly takes place within a particular environment or 
. cultural context" 
(Gelsthorpe & Padfield 2003). Discretion is not a default option; 
but, in certain situations when it is available to be used, it offers considerable 
scope for police officers in dealing with incidents and crimes. Brown (1988) 
describes it as "an inescapable element of police work, and it arises from two 
factors: the ever-present reality of scarce resources and the ambiguity of the law" 
(Brown 1988: 4) 
Actively enforcing the law is a labour intensive activity. It requires formal legal 
processes to be instigated and crimes recorded: this is a time consuming 
business. Arrest may be the most dramatic and draconian means of entering 
people into the criminal justice process, but it is also the most procedurally and 
bureaucratically convoluted. But, arrest is not the only method of instigating the 
prosecution process. In certain circumstances, those suspected of transgressing 
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the law may be dealt with summarily, as in the issue of fixed penalty notices for 
example, or through the roadside 'report for process or summons. ' Discretion on 
the other hand, offers police officers the opportunity to resolve crime or settle 
"disputes" (Kemp et al., 1992) informally, that is, matters may be dealt with 
without recourse to formal legal procedures. Utilising the implicit threat of 
prosecution, backed by the "capacity and authority to use coercive force ... 
" 
(Chan et al 2003: 33); admonishment, or the administering of 'advice', becomes 
the means to resolve the tasks at hand (Shon 2005). In these circumstances, 
crimes necessarily go unrecorded and some criminal behaviour may be 
overlooked. In recognition of this operational and prosecutorial trade-off, a tacit 
understanding or agreement between the police officer and the perpetrator(s) of 
the at issue deed takes place: the exercise of power occurs in such a way that 
although things are seen-to-be-done (Banton 1964; Kemp et al., 1992), the 
stigma of arrest and prosecution is avoided - an ideology of pragmatism if you 
like. 
The preceding chapters have provided a good general knowledge of the police, 
their activities, and the occupational and operational culture they work in. 
Analytically, this is important because: 
... an understanding of 
how police officers see the social world and their 
role in it - "cop culture" - is crucial to an analysis of what they do, and 
their broad political function. (Reiner 1992: 107) 
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Gaining a feel for the particular 'extra-verbal' or'extra-linguistic' (Volosinov 1976; 
Bakhtin 1986) environments and contexts in which discretion and informal 
resolution may be used offers insight into the 'ideological dilemmas' (Billig et at., 
1988) that confront police officers as they go about their business. These 
ideological dilemmas are fermented by a variety of legal, organisational, and sub- 
cultural pressures and practices: some of which are legitimate, others not 
(Manning 1977; Punch et al., 1983; Gelsthorpe & Padfield 2003; Chan 2007). 
Dilemmas of ideology also arise from wider social and moral pressures. Police 
officers are no less susceptible to these pressures than other members of 
society. Indeed, it may be that police officers succumb to them all the more, for 
as public servants in a liberal democracy, they are always accountable for their 
actions. 
The right to complain or object to what police officers do, and how they do it, is 
one that the public increasingly exercises. We saw in the last chapter how 
officers are only too aware of this (Chatterton 1983; Brown 1988; Reiner 2000) 
and in deciding whether to deal formally or informally with the task at hand, 
officers not only weigh the public, moral and ethical consequences of their 
actions against the occupational and disciplinary requirements, we saw how they 
do so by adhering to the mantra of "cover your arse" (Chan 2007: 339; Chan & 
Dixon 2007: 459) -this is the ideology of self-preservation (Manning 1977). All of 
these pressures and influences combine to 'frame' the way in which policing is 
done (Goffman 1974). Hawkins (2003) describes Goffman's concept of 'framing' 
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as "a structure of knowledge, experience, values and meanings that decision- 
makers employ in deciding" (Hawkins 2003: 190). Adherence to the philosophy of 
'covering your arse' ensures that officers remain attentive to their own discourse, 
whether it be talk or text; it also determines the sort of "speech genres" (Bakhtin 
1986) that police officers call upon in their interactions. 
4.2. Subversion, discourse and doing discretion 
Police officers, like all other members of society, are aware that their activities 
are 'observable' (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 119) and open to public scrutiny (Goffman 
1969). In learning how to 'cover their arse' the police therefore become adept at 
what Sacks (1995) terms 'subversion'. Edwards describes it thus 
It consists in the enlisting, by participants, of actions' visibility, such that 
actions will be taken for what they appear to be... (Edwards 1997: 98) 
'Subversion' is an activity that we all engage in, it "is a part of talk's normal 
operation ... and by no means restricted 
to lies and deceptions" (Edwards 1997: 
119). For those police officers who engage in activities that teeter on the cusp of 
illegitimacy [and/or legality], and even for those that do not, the potential 
consequences of failing to 'cover your arse' include disciplinary action, sacking or 
enforced resignation and at worst prosecution (Ericson 1981; Punch et at., 1983). 
Police officers therefore have a considerable stake in "inoculating" themselves 
from what they do or don't do (Edwards & Potter 1992: 158 & 164) and the 
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common sense knowledge of police cultures consistently reiterates that in doing 
policing and in 'covering your arse' (Chan 2007: 339; Chan & Dixon 2007: 459), 
certain activities should appear to be presumptively "correctly occurring" (Sacks 
1995 Vol 1: 253); even if what is seen to be occurring is not what is taking place. 
As Chatterton (1983) found, when it comes to police work, police officers are 
aware that one can 
... never be certain that the actions one took would be seen in retrospect 
as the most appropriate ones ... PCs claimed that a feature of their 
position was that "you are always in the shit - the only thing that varies is 
how far into it you are. " (Chatterton 1983: 201) 
Hence the sub-cultural emphasis on 'covering your arse' at every stage of the 
process: this is true regardless of whether officers are 'bending' the rules or not. 
The recognition that police officers routinely bend the legal rules or stretch 
operational procedures to the limit (Skolnick 1966; Manning 1977; Shearing et 
al., 1981; Sykes & Brent 1983; Reiner 2000) is certainly useful, but analytically it 
takes us only so far. As we know from Ryle, "knowing that" is different to 
"knowing how" (Ryle 2000: 26). Having referred to these two sorts of knowledge 
on more than one occasion, it is only right that I now make the distinction clear. 
'Knowing how' relates to understanding 
... the boy is not said to know how to play [chess], if all that he can do is 
recite the rules accurately. .. His knowledge how is exercised primarily in the moves that he makes, or concedes, and in the moves that he avoids 
or vetoes. (Ryle 2000: 41 original emphasis) 
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It is one of the central tenets of this thesis that by moving away from the "official 
doctrine" (Ryle 2000: 13) that is, the orthodox philosophical and scientific view 
which posits language as a 'representative' medium (Shotter 2002); and 
accepting instead, that language is a 'performative' (Austin 1961) "medium of 
social action" (Edwards 1997: 84 original emphasis); a fundamentally different 
view of policing becomes available. Liberated from an existence in a "non- 
discursive realm which discourse relates to" (Potter & Wetherell 1987: 181), 
police organisational practices and procedures may be understood or re- 
specified (Edwards & Potter 2005) as discursive practices - facets of a linguistic 
toolkit or "language game" (Wittgenstein 2001: 10) that is central to the craft of 
policing and to enforcing or subverting the law (Skolnick 1966; Manning 1977; 
Shearing et al., 1981; Chatterton 1983; Bayley & Bittner 1984; Chan et al., 2003). 
In spite of the attention that researchers [and television producers] have paid to 
uniformed police work, these 'knowing how' aspects have, with a few exceptions, 
evaded the scrutiny of more orthodox research. As Sykes & Brent suggest: 
Virtually no research exists on why one non-arrest alternative rather than 
another is chosen. (Sykes & Brent 1983: 76) 
Bayley & Bittner make a similar observation when they point out that "... little is 
known about the degree to which police exercise discretion" (Bayley & Bittner 
1984: 38). By concentrating our analytical gaze on the discourse of police officers 
as they deal with the banal tasks that occupy the majority of their time, we are 
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not distracted by the thrill of the chase associated with "thief-taking" (Chan & 
Dixon 2007: 459). The focus on banality allows us to see how police officers 
reconstruct the events and the context to allow them to employ discretion; this in 
turn allows us to gauge the extent of its use (Wortley 2003; Smith et al., 2006). 
The focus of this first analysis therefore, will be on how police officers do 
discretion in the informal resolution of crime or in dealing with 'disputes' (Kemp et 
al., 1992). 
The specific discretionary practices that are of interest to us here are ones which 
are well known to police officers. These are the giving of suitable advice and the 
that's civil device. Both can, in some circumstances, be considered to examples 
of a wider practice known as cuffing. The descriptive labels I use here are ones 
that the police themselves apply - for this is how they know and understand 
these practices. In doing policing, an officer is unlikely to complete a working day 
without doing discretion in one or other of these ways. The expediency of giving 
suitable advice is recognised as being useful in some situations (Copperfield 
2006), and so the police organisation regards it, for the most part, as a legitimate 
practice. That it is also effective in reducing workloads and cutting down on 
bureaucracy and paperwork (Banton 1964; Skolnick 1966; Black 1970; van 
Maanen 1973; Rubinstein 1973; Manning 1977; Reiner 2000; Chan 2007) is 
something that is not lost on police officers either. If expediency is justified in the 
giving of suitable advice, when its use is not deemed to be legitimate it will be 
regarded instead as an instance of the dubious and duplicitous practice of 
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cuffing. Generally frowned upon by the police, "cuffing" (Chatterton 1983; 
Shapland & Vagg 1988: 157; Edwards 1989: 109; Waddington 1999: 33), in its 
most extreme form is, to put it simply, the practice whereby "reported offences 
disappear up the officer's sleeve" (Davies, The Guardian 1 Oth July 2003): a 
broadly similar practice among American officers is known as "unfounding" 
(Rubinstein 1973: 145). In both instances, crimes are reformulated and 
redefined, so that they vanish. With no crime, there is no legal or occupational 
procedure to enact and no record or crime report will be made. For some officers, 
minimising the time spent on "rubbish work" (Edwards 1996) is justified by the 
claim that greater effort can be directed towards 'quality' jobs or'real' crime (van 
Maanen 1973; Paoline 2004). Of course for a small minority of police officers, 
cuffing offers the potential to minimise or avoid even the latter (Reiner 2000; 
Paoline 2004). Regardless of the extent to which police officers make use of the 
practice, and the degree to which they may justify it, cuffing remains accountably 
risky. But, before we turn our attention to the texts themselves, mention must be 
made of how my data was obtained and what it consists of. 
4.3. The method 
Data for this analysis consists of the "naturally occurring talk" (Edwards & Potter 
1992: 28) of uniformed police officers as they spoke with members of the general 
public during the course of their day to day police duties. I accompanied various 
police officers for all or part of their shifts and recorded their verbal encounters 
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using a small, high quality digital Dictaphone. Eight police officers [four male and 
four female] volunteered to take part in the project: seven were of the rank of 
constable and one had the rank of sergeant. Four of the officers had between ten 
to sixteen years service with the police, the remaining four had been police 
officers for two to three years. All were aware that I was [and still am] a serving 
police officer in addition to being an academic researcher. 
The four most experienced officers, including the sergeant, worked as 
'Neighbourhood Beat Managers' or NBMs: such officers were previously better 
known as 'Community Constables'. Each NBM has responsibility for his or her 
designated patrol area or'beat'. Crime prevention and the fostering of good and 
close relations with residents in the beat area is the primary role of the NBM; 
however, some crime investigation is also undertaken. The majority of NBMs 
patrol on foot; this is done to encourage personal contact with the public and 
allow them to 'manage' the beat area more effectively. The NBMs in this study all 
worked in a city environment. 
The remaining four officers, worked as uniformed 'response' or patrol officers. 
Patrolling in cars, the patrol officer responds to incidents and crimes as they are 
reported to the police. Crimes, traffic collisions, suspicious or sudden deaths, 
missing persons, public disorder, neighbour disputes, domestic incidents and so 
on, are all part of the patrol officer's remit. An emergency call will almost certainly 
result in a patrol officer being deployed. 
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When the patrol officer is not being deployed to any of these, they are expected 
to progress crime enquiries that are allocated to them, or to `self generate' work: 
this may consist of targeting drivers for traffic violations or drink driving, 
dispersing 'nuisance' youths or drunks, or seeking out 'known' or 'target' 
criminals. As McConville et al., (1991: 23) found, anyone "known to the police" or 
who has "previous" [convictions or criminal antecedence] is always more likely to 
come under greater police scrutiny - this is just as applicable to the work of the 
NBM as it is to the patrol officer. Unlike the NBM who usually works a limited 
range of shifts, patrol officers work a twenty-four hour rotating shift pattern; 
consequently the type of incidents and crime they deal with are often dictated by 
the time of day or night. All of the patrol officers I accompanied worked in or 
around busy semi-rural market towns. During my time with all eight police 
officers, over an eight week period, I recorded data at forty two separate 
encounters between the police and public. 
Many of the police/public interactions where I was present were 'non-crime' 
incidents in that they were not linked to specific crime investigations; a smaller 
number were crime related. These latter encounters ranged from the updating of 
'crime victims' to the taking of witness statements and the administering of 
suitable advice to a crime 'suspect'. Of course, the unpredictable nature of police 
work meant that it was often not possible to determine if a police/public 
encounter would or could be resolved informally. A police officer may stop the 
driver of a car for driving with a defective light having decided beforehand to deal 
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with the misdemeanour informally; however, if it emerges that the driver is under 
the influence of alcohol or is legally disqualified from driving, the officer's powers 
of discretion to deal with the matter informally would generally be curtailed. A 
small proportion of the incidents I recorded, especially those involving patrol 
officers, developed in this way and when it became clear that this was how it was 
evolving, I stopped recording the event. Since my analytical focus was on the 
'informal' resolution of crime, a considerable amount of data was either deleted at 
the scene of the encounter, or was necessarily excluded from the analysis on 
those grounds later on. Other crime related events, such as the taking of witness 
statements, though analytically interesting would also not qualify as an 'informal' 
resolution and were therefore excluded from the analysis. 
At, or near to the beginning of each encounter, the police officer involved 
explained my presence to the member of the public involved. I was identified as 
an academic researcher and wherever possible I introduced myself and 
explained briefly that I wished, with their permission, to record the event and why. 
On a few occasions the conversational flow between the officer and member of 
the public prevented me from making a personal introduction, but when the 
conversation and turn-taking allowed, this was completed at the earliest 
opportunity. The digital recording equipment was sufficiently sophisticated and 
sensitive that during each police/public encounter I was able to maintain a 
reasonable distance from the interlocutors such that my presence was not 
intrusive. No member of the public objected to my presence or my recording of 
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the event in which they were participating throughout the entire data collection 
process. One patrol officer withdrew from the study after several hours; but, she 
did consent to my use of the data collected prior to her withdrawal. 
Conversational exchanges between the officers involved and myself in between 
the police/public encounters were also digitally recorded and supplemented by 
brief written notes. All the participants in this research project gave their written 
consent and were fully apprised of the objectives of this research. The project's 
alternate epistemological emphasis on the non-cognitive and 'performative' 
nature of language was discussed with the participants in non technical terms. I 
explained to the police participants in particular that I wished to understand how 
they constructed their conversations; to examine the various arguments they 
used, and to explore the sort of rhetorical devices and figures of speech they 
employed and how these were relevant to and arose out of the specific and 
unique circumstances of each and every conversational encounter. From the 
replies of the participants it seems that generally they understood this to mean 
that my research was concerned with how police officers 'communicated' with the 
public: although all the police participants grasped the idea of a psychology 
occurring 'out of the head' in the dialogue between speakers. All participants 
were aware of their right to withdraw at any time and that their confidentiality and 
anonymity were guaranteed. Names and personal details have been changed 
and any place names and geographical locations substituted for fictitious ones. 
The British Psychological Society Code of Ethics and Conduct has been adhered 
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to throughout, as have the ethical guidelines of the Faculty of Science at the 
University of Plymouth. 
In addition to the digital recordings of the police/public encounters, I kept brief 
written notes of each event and these were usually completed when each 
encounter was over. These notes consisted of extra-verbal information such as 
the location, the demeanour of the participants, and any other situational or 
indexical observations that might make for a more detailed vignette. 
The collected data was then transcribed, by me, using the transcription 
conventions devised and used by conversation analysts (Jefferson 1985; 
Hutchby & Wooffitt 2007). The process of transcription is itself a form of analysis 
(Ochs 1979); however, both the data and the transcripts were then subjected to a 
process of analysis using the rhetorical, discursive and dialogical apparatus set 
out in my framework for analysis: there is, as Potter & Wetherell (1987: 175) say, 
"no method to discourse analysis" in the traditional sense. Throughout the 
analytical process, the admirable, though "implausibly naive" (Edwards 1997: 89) 
concept of `unmotivated looking' (Sacks 1995; Psathas 1995) was adhered to. 
Moreover, Harvey Sacks' dictum that "... what you want to do is pose the 
problem the data bears" (Sacks 1995: 471) also proved to be excellent advice 
during a process of analysis that was, at times, difficult and frustrating, and which 
lasted for more than eight months. 
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The extracts that appear in this chapter were arrived at through a process of 
elimination as the analysis developed. When interesting problems or lines of 
inquiry began to emerge and certainly when the particular discursive practices 
that feature in the analysis were pursued, the corpus of data was whittled down. 
With my analytical focus settled a small core of relevant data was identified and 
at this stage editorial considerations also became relevant - my analytical aims 
and the practical business of writing become interdependent and various 
presentational and analytical permutations needed to be explored. Different 
combinations of extracts coupled with alternate narrative approaches were 
attempted to see how my analytical goals might best be articulated until an 
effective mix was achieved. 
But before tackling the analysis itself, one further reflexive observation needs to 
be made concerning the format and the presentation of the data and the 
analysis. During my earlier discussions on the framework for analysis, 
considerable effort was devoted to discursive psychology's imperative that 
discourse is a topic of analysis, not a resource. The point made by Hammersley 
(2003) and others was that the discursive psychologist, in presenting his or her 
findings, is inclined to deviate from this methodological tenet: specifically, at 
those points where extracts or segments of text are prefaced by some contextual 
or extra-verbal scene setting. At these points, discourse appears to become a 
resource for the analyst rather than a topic. 
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I was obliged to concede that those shortcomings afflict this project also; in my 
defence, I suggested that the constraints of working within an orthodox academic 
format mean that that 'problem' is not easily resolved. However, in an effort to 
redress [at least partially] this unsatisfactory situation, it is important for the 
reader to be aware that in the descriptions and summaries that preface or segue 
extracts of text in this analysis, every effort has been made to construct them 
[through the use of paraphrase or indirect discourse] so that they exhibit, at the 
very least, the flavour of what the participant(s) understood them to mean, as 
they articulated that meaning to me in our prior conversations. Clearly, as 
discourse analysts we are the first to point out that all descriptions can be 
constructed differently and that I, as analyst, also have a stake (Edwards & 
Potter 1992) in how these sections of text are constructed. As I conceded earlier, 
letting the reader or critic know that I know that s/he knows may not be ideal, but 
it is better than overlooking it. On that note, it is with a mixture of relief and 
anticipation that we can at last move on to the analysis itself and consider the 
discretionary practice known as giving suitable advice. 
4.4. "we've got no proof. . ." Justifying discretion 
The act of giving of suitable advice should not be confused with the everyday 
conversational practice of offering 'advice'. The latter is a ubiquitous activity that 
extends beyond the police organisation and, for the most part, implies no 
sanction or rebuke. Suitable advice on the other hand, though it appears to be 
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just as innocuous, is imbued with an ideological complexity that belies the ease 
with which it can be used. This highly elastic discursive practice works as a 
means to an end, and an end to a means. Extracts 1 &2 give us some idea of 
how the concept may be invoked 
Extract 1: PC K and the malicious letter writer 
PO: yeh can I sort of leave it with to speak with your staff members 
M: yeh 'course 
PO: and make sure that nobody (. ) goes down 
M: yeh 
PO: and approaches Mr M 
M: yeh 
PO: at all 
M: yeh 
PO: when when they see him out in the street (. ) or whether they erm (. ) 
or if he comes (. ) you know obviously I dunno if he's been barred 
from the (. ) premises 
M: yeh yeh he 'avent been coming in the store as a= 
AM: we haven't seen 'im 
he haven't been coming into the store so= 
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PO: but to keep away from (. ) 
he's been warned (. ) er and given advice about (. ) giving giving out 
letters bh we've got no proof (. ) on that side 
AM: yeah 
PO: erm but he has been given um suitable advice 
Here, the police officer (PO) has called in on a local supermarket to update the 
store manager (M) and assistant manager (AM) about the progress of a police 
investigation. A disgruntled employee has been sending malicious letters to 
supermarket staff and generally harassing them after being dismissed from his 
job. The officer has gone to the store to inform the manager that the police have 
not been able to prosecute the man. Instead the matter has been dealt with 
informally - he has been warned to stay away from the store and given suitable 
advice about writing any more letters. 
Having checked with the Manager that staff members have been briefed on what 
they should and should not do if they encounter the ex-employee. PC K responds 
to the assistant manager's observation that the letter writer has not been seen at 
or near the store, by telling the assistant manager that the man concerned has 
been warned off " (. ) he's been warned (. ) er and given advice about () giving 
giving out letters bh we've got no proof (. ) on that side". The police officer 
explains and then justifies the informal action taken by the police in respect of the 
malicious letters by attributing blame to the evidential shortcomings of the case. 
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Without proof, a prosecution will not succeed and the police are limited in their 
response. This point of law frames his discourse and the rules of evidence and 
the rigor of legal procedure become an 'externalising device' (Edwards & Potter 
1992; Hutchby & Wooffitt 2007) that works to justify why the police have failed to 
prosecute the letter writer. This lack of evidence is presented as being beyond 
the police officer's control and by accounting for his actions in this way the officer 
tacitly rebuts any suggestion that he or the police organisation have failed to do 
their job properly or that they have deliberately chosen the easier informal option 
over the more elaborate and time consuming formal prosecution process. What 
appears at first hearing to be a simple communication of 'fact', is performatively, 
much more complex. Rhetorically, the evidential shortcomings of the case work 
as a prolepsis. In this particular context, the prolepsis is close to being a 
'disclaimer' (Hewitt & Stokes 1975) in that 
... disclaimers try to emphasise common ground... 
However, in the 
disclaimer there is more than an identification, or an attempt to manage 
the impression which the audience might form of the speaker. There is 
also the element of contradiction ... It is as if the speaker clears 
the way 
for the sort of anti-logoi which might otherwise invite the hisses and boos 
of a hostile audience. (Billig 1996: 269) 
With his qualifying "bh we've no proof (. ) on that side", the officer anticipates and 
acknowledges the expectations of those staff members who were offended by 
the letters and who reported the crime to the police so that the letter writer could 
be prosecuted. He prepares the discursive ground for complaints or objections 
that might be forthcoming from some or all of those employees involved. By 
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using legal procedure to account for the failure of the prosecution, the officer 
effectively 'covers his arse' (Chan 2007: 339; Chan & Dixon 2007: 459): as a 
'speech genre' (Bakhtin 1986) it is predominantly one of damage limitation and 
self-survival. 
But, PC K's discourse is even more sophisticated, for by constructing a 
"justification" rather than an "excuse" (Potter & Wetherell 1987: 75) informal 
resolution is presented as a better-than-nothing option. Prefaced by another 
qualifying 'but', the police officer reclaims some measure of legal authority and 
seen-to-be-doneness by announcing [more articulately this time] that, "erm but 
he has been given um suitable advice". The nefarious letter writer may have 
evaded prosecution but we are made to feel that he has not escaped censure 
entirely. 
Undoubtedly, PC K's second response benefits from the maxim-like quality that 
the phrase "suitable advice" possesses: the contrast with his prior utterance, 
"he's been warned (. ) er and given advice about (. ) giving giving out letters" could 
not be greater. Tucked away mid utterance and faltering in delivery, there is no 
maximal quality to his first utterance and it lacks rhetorical weight. Maxims, like 
slogans are very useful because 
[They] meet the requirements of a specific action. They are designed to 
secure attention through their rhythm and their concise and easily 
remembered form ... their function is essentially that of compelling our 
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attention to certain ideas, by means of the form in which they are 
expressed. (Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 2000: 167) 
Moreover, maxims "invest a speech with moral character" (Aristotle, Chapter II 
1359b). This one also benefits from an air of "officialese" (Fowler 1972: 411) that 
adds to its legitimacy. Together, these rhetorical characteristics assist in selling 
the informal action of the police to the letter writer's victims. 
What actually constitutes suitable advice is never elaborated upon or even 
discussed and the specifics of the advice, in this context, are subordinate to the 
act of administering it: indeed, the non-specific nature of the concept contributes 
to its utility. With the advice given, the matter is concluded. The maxim - like 
quality of the phrase, the structure of the officer's discourse, and the legal 
authority of the speaker combine to close off any further debate. We know from 
Billig's work that, "the use of witcraft cannot be seen merely as a mechanism for 
achieving persuasion ... its use 
is linked to the search for the last word" (Billig 
1996: 136). Within the particular context that PC K employs it, suitable advice 
has a powerful 'defensive importance'; rhetorically, it is designed to function as 
the last word on the matter (Billig 1996: 137). 
In extract 2, suitable advice is used in the same rhetorically defensive way. A 
resident explains to PC Y how youths on mopeds congregate outside one 
particular young person's house in the locality and create a nuisance. As the 
neighbourhood beat manager for the area, it is PC Y's responsibility to alleviate 
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and satisfy the concerns of her local residents. As a police officer she is expected 
to enforce the law: as the 'neighbourhood beat manager' for the area, they know 
it is her job to address local problems and disputes. 
Extract 2: PC Y and the `nuisance youths' 
Mr S: they they're just a bit overzealous with their bikes sometimes (. hh) 
but they do tend to charge down this road (. h) and (. h) I did actually 
ring um Haydon Court (the local police station) and I gave some= 
P0: =and you 
report on this because >I'm the local neighbourhood beat manager 
for this area (. ) and what I can do is get obviously patrol if I'm not 
on duty if I'm on duty myself then obviously I'll do it<= 
Ms D: yeh 
PO: come up and down and check the are::: a (. hh) and Fridays and 
Saturdays we tend to work 'til midnight anyway we work like a late 
shift but I can get you know (. ) high visibility patrol in the a:: rea to 
just check the area when they are on late (. h) and just give [them 
suitable words of advice rea:: Ily! ] 
Ms D: [one of em had a bad accident and he is in hospital and it's sort of 
touch and go whether he's actually going to survive 
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Like the previous extract, suitable advice is invoked as a discrete, seen-to-be- 
done activity that the police use in the enforcement of law and the maintenance 
of order. The sort of complaint that the residents make here is one that the police 
are well used to receiving. Primarily involving children and young people, the 
behaviour that the residents complain of is often described as 'anti-social' rather 
than criminal. Such behaviour can be problematic for the police who find their 
legal powers are limited. Discretion and informal resolutions are often the only 
means of dealing with those involved (Kemp et al., 1992). 
In extract 2, PC Y seems to acknowledge these difficulties by the way she 
constructs her response. She is specific in making it clear that the officers' 
actions in dealing with the problem youths will be limited. Her use of the 
discourse marker "just" (Schiffrin 1987) when she advises that the police will "just 
check the area" downplays the police role. She minimises further by specifying 
that any action the police officers take will be strictly verbal, the extent of their 
action will be to "just give them suitable words of advice rea:: Ilyl". The officer 
makes it clear that any resolution will not be attained by singling out particular 
individuals - they will all get 'advice'. Her use of the adjective "really" to conclude 
the utterance cleverly evokes a this-is-the-best-1-can-do feel. 
The use and positioning of "really" also serves another function in that it closes 
off debate on the topic of what the police will do. It bears all the hallmarks of a 
last word (Billig 1996: 137). In outlining exactly what the police can and will do, 
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the rhetorical weight of the statement is bolstered by the implicit authority of the 
officer [as it did in the last extract]. As a "specialist in crime" (Skolnick 1966: 197), 
police officers are not only confident in their professional expertise, they are 
aware that the social and legal power they possess works to dissuade overt 
challenges to that authority or judgement (Kemp et al., 1992). Other writers have 
observed that many police officers expect deference and respect from the 
general public; equally, they noted also that many people actively give it (Bittner 
1974; Shearing et al., 1981). Whilst Ms D concedes the last word to the police 
officer on the action the police will take, her reply is not entirely conciliatory. She 
has her say on the troublesome youths and recounts, via a series of extreme 
formulations, a particular incident involving one of the youths, "one of em had a 
bad accident and he is hospital and its sort of touch and go whether he's actually 
going to survive". . Speakers are 
inclined to employ extreme case formulations 
when "attributing cause", or to "invoke the rightness (or wrongness) of a state of 
affairs or action" (Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998: 211). Ms D's vivid and dramatic reply 
is at odds with the officer's rather low-key take on the problem and through its 
use, Mrs D lets it be known that she is not necessarily in agreement with PC Y. 
In both extracts, suitable advice is invoked as a better-than-nothing, seen-to-be- 
done, palliative rather than an example of cuffing. There is also a euphemistic 
quality about the concept. Located at the lower end of the police officer's arsenal 
of crime-control options, the recourse to coercive force that is latent within each 
and every encounter that police officers have with those they police (Banton 
1964; Bittner 1970) differentiates this 'advice' from the kind that friends or work 
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colleagues or other professionals might offer. As part of a 'speech genre' 
(Bakhtin 1986) it has the "taste" of the police profession and of the legal and 
social context in which it is being used (Bakhtin 1981: 293). The social and 
cultural forces that encourage Ms D to concede the last word to the police officer 
are integral to the concept of suitable advice. More that just specific or 
appropriate 'advice', it is close to being considered an admonishment; although 
we saw in the first extract how a demarcation was made between being 'warned' 
and being given 'advice'. Drew & Sorjonen (1997) in drawing on the work of 
Schegloff (1992) suggest that "through the details of their language use, 
participants orient to their respective institutional identities, roles and tasks" - 
their discourse is understood to be "procedurally relevant" (Drew & Sorjonen 197: 
111 emphasis in the original). In extracts 1&2, suitable advice is formulated as a 
means to an end - the end being the cessation of criminal activity or loutish 
behaviour. However, at some point in the process, suitable advice also becomes 
an end to that means: its use in this form, as we shall see in the next extracts, is 
less clinical. It also gives us the opportunity to see how suitable advice can be 
employed in the practice of cufng. 
4.5. ". .. the best way forward": Giving suitable advice 
Extracts 3&4, offer us the opportunity to see how suitable advice is 
administered. Extract 3 is a precursor to the act itself. Analytically, the discursive 
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preliminaries that are involved assist us in knowing how the practice is organised 
and located in the dialogue 
Analysis proceeds from the general observation that in talk participants 
display to each other, as they perform their own contributions, their 
understanding of the setting and context, and their grasp of the emergent 
activities. Members of society display what they know - their practical 
reasoning skills and competencies. It is possible to see, for example, how 
utterances are designed to do tasks while the replies or turns of other 
participants demonstrate how those utterances are intersubjectively 
understood and are taken up (Wetherell 1998: 391) 
The circumstances that have led the officer to giving suitable advice are 
complicated and riddled with uncertainty. In reformulating them again to assist 
the reader, I fully acknowledge that the indexicality and selectiveness of my gist 
assists my argument: every effort is made to 'capture' how the events in question 
were understood by the participants; but it is still my discourse and it could 
always have been constructed differently. With at least four competing or 
contrasting accounts of this event to choose from, my reformulation is based 
upon the account that PC Y gave to me. 
Mrs L is mother to a six year old boy and is suspected of threatening a ten year 
old girl called Natalie. The threat was made after Natalie and a group of 
teenagers, had assaulted the boy in a local park. The first assault was carried out 
by the teenagers who held him down, twisted one of his teeth, and drew on his 
face with an indelible marker pen. For whatever reason, he remained in the park 
and the second assault, this time by Natalie, took place shortly after the first. 
146 
She pushed the six year old from a swing. Immediately after this, Mrs L's son ran 
home in tears and told her of his ordeal. She went to the park to confront the 
bullies, but only Natalie remained and a confrontation took place during which 
some kind of threat was made by Mrs L. Having been threatened, Natalie 
returned home and told her mother who later complained to the school and the 
police about Mrs L's behaviour. An evidential difficulty for PC Y is that there 
were no witnesses to either assault or to Natalie being threatened. The officer 
has made it clear from the outset that she is not entirely convinced by Natalie's 
claims "... obviously she's she's [Natalie's] obviously not (. ) maybe told the same 
story to her mum as she has [to the school]. " Moreover, Natalie has since written 
a letter of apology to her victim which she has passed to the Head teacher of her 
school. In her discussions with the Head teacher about how to deal with the 
matter, the police officer articulates the view that "... I'm thinking what I don't 
want to do is obviously make the situation worse if if things uv gone quiet and 
Natalie's written a letter to apologise". 
True to her word, PC Y deals with the teenagers and Natalie by way of informal 
resolution. PC Y has also made it clear in earlier conversations that provided she 
can identify Mrs L as being the adult who threatened Natalie she will also deal 
with her by giving suitable advice. Having done some detective work to identify 
Mrs L and her son, the officer goes to speak with her. As we move to extract 3, 
the circumstances are that PC Y has just informed Mrs L that Natalie, and the 
group of teenagers who assaulted her son, have been dealt with by way of 
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"strong suitable advice". This news is not well received and the officer has now to 
determine if Mrs L was the adult who threatened Natalie. If she is, there remains 
the task of administering suitable advice and thus cuffing the job. 
Extract 3: PC Y The Playswing Trilogy- Natalie &Mrs L 
PO: (. )what(. ) the reas the other reason I'm he:: re is 'cos normally we 
we don't try we try to not get involved > because on a level like this 
because obviously once the police step in you know we we don't 
like to take it make it more serious than it really needs to be be and 
if the school can be involved and if its nipped in the bud at an early 
stage then that's the best way forward< hhh U: m (. ) what what's 
happened is h one of the children's mu: ms has made a complaint 
(. ) saying that her daughter was threatened 
MrsL: no I just went out to her 
PO: Oh ri ht well did you actually spoke (. ) to her did (. ) was this Natalie 
you're talking about 
MrsL: yeh 
PO: Oh right okay. h well what actually happen:: ed 
MrsL: I just said to her I said what happened! = 
PO: =right 
MrsL: um (. ) with uh the kids down the pa:: rk I said you're not so funny 
now you're on your own 
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PO: ri: ght 
PC Y's hesitant start is quickly followed by a self-repair, "(. ) what (. ) the reas the 
other reason I'm he:: re ... " that reveals the officer's discursive trajectory. Mrs L 
can be in little doubt that whatever topic is about to be broached, it is the 
principle reason for the police officer's presence. Recovering from her slip of the 
tongue, PC Y continues by building the rationale for her visit in the abstract - by 
reference to what would "normally" happen. Understated and provocative, she 
utilises the rhetorical power of lists, specifically the 'three-part list' (Edwards & 
Potter 1992: 163) and hierarchies (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 2000: 80). 
Although she stresses that the police "try to not get involved", quite what it is that 
the police try not to get involved with is not yet revealed. Whatever is at issue, 
she makes it clear that in 'normal' circumstances it would be positioned at the 
less extreme end of a hierarchy of seriousness. She hints too, at the benefits to 
be had from an [early] intervention by the school rather than the police "and if the 
school can be involved and if it's nipped in the bud at an early stage then that's 
the best way forward". Of course by arguing that in 'normal' circumstances the 
police wouldn't usually be involved, the officer, by her very presence, alerts Mrs L 
to this being something other than ordinary. The inference can only be that this is 
more serious and the whole episode begins to assume the status of a 'special' 
case (Billig 1996: 173). 
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Speaking as if she expects Mrs L to know what it is she is referring to, PC Y goes 
"fishing" for information (Hutchby & Wooffitt 2007: 126). We must not forget that 
although the officer suspects Mrs L of being the adult who threatened Natalie, 
she does not know for sure. If Mrs L is the perpetrator, then the utterance works 
to prime her for whatever is to come. Additionally, by justifying informal resolution 
as the "best way forward", the officer is engaged in covering her arse (Chan 
2007; Chan & Dixon 2007). Her use of the "idiomatic expressions" (Drew & Holt 
1989) "nipped in the bud" and "the best way forward" point to this being a 
defensive rhetorical strategy 
... because these expressions are largely figurative and 
formulaic they 
have a robustness that makes them hard to challenge with specific facts 
or information. That means they are well suited to inauspicious 
environments, where a speaker's version of events is not being well 
received. (Edwards & Potter 1992: 115) 
Unlike the police officer in extract 1, who justified the informal action of the police 
by externalising it on the grounds that there was no proof to allow a formal 
prosecution to take place; PC Y's suggestion that an informal resolution is the 
"best way forward" is altogether more subjective and arbitrary - as a result, the 
timbre of her argument is less convincing, and seems more akin to an "excuse" 
than a "justification" (Potter & Wetherell 1987: 75). 
Having constructed an intricate "my side" telling (Pomerantz 1980), PC Y 
completes it by cutting to the discursive chase, "hhh U: m (. ) what what's 
happened is h one of the children's mu: ms has made a complaint (. ) saying that 
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her daughter was threatened". Addressing or orienting to a "topic" (Sacks 1995, 
Vol 1: 535) in conversation is a highly organised part of the machinery of talk 
You probably won't start off the conversation with that; you'll allow it to be 
something that comes up in the course of conversation. And there are 
things which `come up' in conversation which you can figure the person 
was perfectly well going to tell you. (Sacks 1995, Vol 1: 535) 
PC Y's initial hesitation suggests that this topic is not easily broached. The 
vague, third person formulation is constructed in anticipation of a knowing 
response (Bakhtin 1986): a hypothesis that is confirmed by Mrs L's reply. Without 
any further prompting she takes the discursive bait "no I just went out to her". 
Conversation analysts call this interactional understanding the "next turn proof 
procedure" (Hutchby & Wooffitt 2007: 17. But, as Sacks explains this is an 
interactional machinery that is immensely subtle 
That others see that you understand an utterance is something they can 
show via a next utterance ... not only will a person eventually have a 
chance, say, to show that they also understood some utterance you 
showed you understood, but in doing that they will show that they 
understood that you understood. (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 719) 
The confirmation that Mrs L was the adult involved with Natalie manifests itself as 
a pronounced "change of state" marker (Heritage 1984) "Oh right". Clarifying that 
Mrs L did indeed speak with Natalie, "was this Natalie you're talking about" PC Y 
claims the rhetorical initiative as Mrs L now finds herself on the defensive in 
being asked to explain "Oh right okay h well what actually happen:: ed". Mrs L 
then goes on to offer her account of events to the officer who must now resolve 
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the matter by administering suitable advice. The ideological and occupational 
dilemma facing PC Y is that to properly 'cover her arse' (Chan 2003) she must 
ensure that hers is the "last word" (Billig 1996: 136); however, the last word must 
be had without disaffecting Mrs L to the point where she complains about the 
way the officer has dealt with the whole incident. In extract 4 PC Y goes about 
that task. 
Extract 4: PC Y Playswing trilogy-Mrs L 
PO: because I I'm a parent myself and I (. ) would be (. ) the same (. ) as 
you (. ) and I would be up in arms about it (. ) and would be wanting 
to get hold of the person who (. ) 
MrsL: um 
PO: tr (. ) or assaulted my child= 
MrsL: [>yes if I'd got hold of them I would have 
wanted to bloody have her YES but the law of the la:: nd! <] 
PO: [unintelligible so but you don't want to get yourself in trouble]= 
MrsL: no I'm not even going to go [down that ro: ad] 
PO: 
really= 
MrsL: no 
[you don't] want to go down that ro: ad 
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PO: >what you want to do is go through the right channels 
what what I would suggest next time is to try to avo: id confro: nting 
them yourse:: If< 
MrsL: unintelligible 
PO: and either (. ) go right to the police if I leave you my my card with my 
number on a: nd also inform the sch::: ool= 
MrsL: he's SIX and they were 
what - thirteen fourteen! 
PO: yeh they were all in their yeh yeh is to inform the school but I think it 
is impor:: tant that you do speak to Mr K (the Head) and let him 
kno:: w= 
MrsL: yeah 
The police officer begins with a disclaimer (Hewitt & Stokes 1975) that 
emphasises the common ground that exists between the two women (Billig 1996: 
269). PC Y is a parent and a mother too and these credentials allow her to 
legitimately draw on the sensus communis of parenthood to empathise with Mrs 
L. The focus on parenthood and commonality also directs attention away from 
PC Y's role as an officer of the law and keeps the encounter reasonably informal. 
Mrs L's reply suggests that she is still angry and upset; but, her reply also 
demonstrates that she is aware of the predicament she now finds herself in. She 
too faces a number of ideological dilemmas: how to express the depth of her 
anger, but at the same time making it clear that she was, and still is, aware of the 
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legal boundaries and sanctions that exist "[>yes if I'd got hold of them I would 
have wanted to bloody have her YES but the law of the la:: nd! <]". PC Y may be a 
parent and a mother, but Mrs L has not forgotten that she is also a police officer 
who could exercise her formal legal authority given the admission she has just 
made. In the giving and receiving of suitable advice the asymmetrical power 
relationship that exists between police officers and those they police is 
reproduced and 'frames' both the dialogue and the whole encounter (Banton 
1964; Bittner 1970; Shearing et al., 1981; Kemp et al., 1992; Chan et al 2003). 
Mrs L knows she must show deference. The tacit incentive for her to do so is that 
no visit to the police station will ensue and a criminal conviction will be avoided: 
whilst deference need only be brief, it must be "observable" (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 
190) and so her active participation is integral to the process. For PC Y, it is the 
symbolic value of the act that matters: the requisite point is being seen-to-be- 
made, the status quo is re-established and the "last word" is had by the police 
(Billig 1996: 136). 
Having set out her credentials as a parent PC Y qualifies her shared parental 
inclination to retaliation. Reasserting her authority as a police officer, she offers a 
disclaiming but, ". .. but you 
don't want to get yourself in trouble]=". Mrs L's 
acknowledgement that she does not want to get herself "in trouble" invites PC Y 
to administer suitable advice. When it comes, the advice consists of a cliched 
directive to "go through the right channels" followed by a smidgen of common- 
sense "tr: y to avo: id confro: nting them yourse:: If<". As a 'last word' (Billig 1996: 
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136) it is not a particularly sparkling or decisive example of witcraft and it is far 
from persuasive. Given the arbitrary and subjective feel that permeates PC Y's 
argument for informal resolution, it may be that the search for the last word in 
these circumstances serves an additional rhetorical purpose, 
One may not search for the last word to persuade the other, but to 
persuade oneself that one's own arguments have escaped unscathed by 
criticism. In this sense, the momentum of argumentation can be a process 
of self-persuasion, or perhaps self-protection ... (Billig 
1996: 138) 
Having been given suitable advice, Mrs L makes no further reference to the way 
in which the young people involved have been dealt with by the police, and she 
appears to concede the last word on that matter. However, she does not stay 
silent on the sense of injustice she feels toward the young people concerned 
"=he's SIX and they were what thirteen fourteen! ". Mrs L leaves the officer in no 
doubt that she is not persuaded by the outcome. PC Y meanwhile, works to 
retain the rhetorical high ground by doggedly steering the conversation away 
from that debate and back to the benefits to be had from a minimal police 
involvement and an informal resolution "yeh they were all in their yeh yeh is to 
inform the school but I think it is impor:: tant that you do speak to Mr K (the Head) 
and let him kno:: w=". 
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4.6. Making sense of suitable advice 
In this section we have looked at three ways in which the practice of suitable 
advice is used by police officers. Firstly, suitable advice is a device that police 
officers use to placate, persuade or reassure victims of crime or members of the 
public that something has or will be done. It is used in those situations where a 
formal prosecution does not take place. Reified as a pseudo-legal alternative to 
prosecution, it is used to satisfy the demands of a public who expect the police to 
enforce the law regardless of the evidential strengths or weaknesses of the case. 
Suitable advice also satisfies the demands of the police themselves, in that it 
offers an "observable" (Sacks 1995) seen-to-be-done palliative. 
As a device, it relies for its success on the asymmetrical power relationship that 
is recognised as existing between police and public and on the vagueness of the 
concept itself which allows it to be used in variety of ways. The implicit 
authoritativeness of police officers, coupled with their professional 'expertise' in 
dealing with crime, permits them to define and to close any debate on the 
matters at issue (Kemp et al., 1992): rhetorically, it is a device that assists the 
police in having the "last word" (Billig 1996). Whilst the "last word" (Billig 1996) is 
an important aspect of argumentation, for the police, its use has an additional 
significance in that it allows them to adhere to a philosophy that is central to their 
occupational and sub-cultural ethos. Embedded in the wider credo of "risk 
aversion" (Flanagan 2008: 50) it is an ideology of self-preservation; officers refer 
to it colloquially as the practice of "covering your arse" (Chan et al., 2003). 
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Thus, in extract 1, PC K justified the use of suitable advice on the grounds that a 
prosecution would not succeed. Having externalised the failure of the prosecution 
case to the rigors of due process, the officer formulates suitable advice as a 
better-than-nothing option. By constructing his discourse in this way, the 
recipients of the offensive letters may be placated and the investigation finalised. 
In the event that anyone challenges the police handling of the case or the 
outcome, PC K can rebut any suggestion that the police have done nothing by 
pointing to the fact that suitable advice was given and through the visibility of this 
practice he "covers his arse". If suitable advice is a means to a number of ends, 
its second use is as an end in itself. Once again, the woolly or non specific 
nature of what actually constitutes suitable advice together with its generally 
undefined legal status allows officers considerable flexibility in how they use it. 
In this second incarnation, the police use suitable advice as a direct exercise of 
power in dealing with people suspected of committing crime. In extract 4, PC Y 
administered suitable advice to a mother who had confronted a ten year old girl. 
The evidential specifics of the incident coupled with the highly emotive nature of 
events meant that the potential for one or other of those involved to be 
dissatisfied with an informal resolution was considerable. The police officer 
officer's decision to deal informally was, in terms of her accountably, quite risky. 
Indeed, her decision to resolve the matter through the use of suitable advice is a 
reasonably blatant example of the third use to which suitable advice may be put 
- that of cuffing. 
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In administering suitable advice the officer relies heavily on the tacit threat of 
coercion [that is a feature of the relationship between the police and the general 
public] to cajole the mother into actively participating in this exercise of power 
(Shearing et al., 1981; Kemp et at., 1992). For the errant mother, a few minutes 
of contrition spare her the ordeal of arrest and the possibility of a criminal record. 
For PC Y, and for the victims of the crime, some form of justice is seen to be 
done as the recipients of the advice are made to accept some responsibility for 
their actions. In successfully resolving the matter, PC Y's 'arse' is covered and 
the last word has been left with the police. 
Some theorists regard discretion as the "stuff of justice" (Gelsthorpe & Padfield 
2003: 1). As the extracts so far imply, discretion is important to the sort of street 
level diplomacy (Muir 1977) or `street level bureaucracy' (Lipsky 1983) that police 
engage in. Discretion is also useful as a tool that officers use to regulate their 
workload (Rubinstein 1973; Paoline 2004). The volume of work that uniformed 
officers are expected to deal with, and the accompanying bureaucracy that goes 
with it (Flanagan 2008) encourages them to differentiate between "quality" jobs 
and "rubbish work" (McConville et al., 1991: 33 & 99; Edwards 1996: 196). The 
latter are more likely to be dealt with informally. We have already seen the 
autonomy that officers have in dealing with and defining crimes. And, as Mrs L, 
the errant mother found, challenging the decisions that police officers make is 
socially and procedurally difficult. What is more, police officers themselves are 
fully aware of this social imbalance and make use of it (Ericson, 1982; Kemp et 
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al., 1992). So, when victims of crime are told by the police that a crime may not fit 
the legal criteria required to record it as a "crime", or as PC K did in the first set of 
extracts, that the malicious letter writer could not be prosecuted because "we've 
got no proof on that side"; not only will those involved, more often than not, defer 
to the expertise and authority of the police officer, the police will expect them to 
do so (Shearing et al., 1981; Kemp et al., 1992). 
Like everyone else, the police ". .. perform actions, and say things, 
for the kinds 
of actions they will be taken to be" (Edwards 1997: 99): and this fact is useful for 
those police officers whose work ethic is such that they choose to be selective in 
the jobs they deal with, or those others who seek to actively avoid recording or 
investigating crime (Reiner 1978; Paoline 2004). In police slang, such behaviour 
is known as cuffing (Chatterton 1983; Shapland & Hobbs 1987: McConville et al, 
1991; Davies, 2003): the practice whereby criminal offences are not recorded 
(Waddington 1999). In the previous extracts involving PC Y, Ms L and Natalie we 
saw how the officer took the decision to deal with the incidents informally. By 
exercising her discretion on the grounds that "... I'm thinking what I don't want to 
do is obviously make the situation worse if if things uv gone quiet and Natalie's 
written a letter to apologise", at least two physical assaults and an instance of 
threatening behaviour go unrecorded: whether or not the police officers actions 
were appropriate in the circumstances is another matter; as far as the police 
organisation is concerned, PC Y has cuffed the job and from a police disciplinary 
perspective, this is risky. 
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4.7. "... it's a civil dispute": Discretion, cuffing & subversion 
Whilst discretion is an invaluable part of the police officers craft, the potential for 
misuse or abuse is considerable. Gelsthorpe & Padfield (2003: 2) suggest that it 
provides police officers with "... the space to engage in discriminatory activities 
and to subvert policies they do not agree with. " For discursive psychologists, the 
concept of "subversion" (Sacks 1995) is much wider and has a somewhat 
different emphasis than Gelsthorpe & Padfield's usage: nevertheless, there are 
elements of commonality. For Sacks, 'subversion' in talk and social action is 
pervasive and is the norm (Edwards 1997). Sacks describes "subversion" in this 
way 
... I will call it, in principle, such things as people 'passing' under such 
rules, 'subversion'. When a woman walks away from a supermarket with 
the baby carriage filled with a baby that's not hers, that's the sort of thing 
I'm talking about with 'subversion. ' It's not seeable. (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 
254) 
The commonality lies in the issue of (in) visibility combined with the apparent 
seen-to-be-doneness of talk and social action whereby "presumptively correct 
descriptions and behaviour produced to fit those descriptions" may be applied to 
"illegitimate" as well as legitimate activities (Sacks 1995, Vol 1: 118-119). The 
power to exercise discretion, as we will see, and as Gelsthorpe & Padfield (2003) 
have already suggested, facilitates these aspects. Whilst cuffing is an activity that 
has been part of the police officer's craft for a long time, it is one that the police 
organisation generally frowns upon. Work avoidance practices or "easing 
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behaviour" (Punch et at., 1983: xii) are not unique to the police of course, but 
given the legal, and publicly accountable duty of police officers to investigate and 
deal with crime, added to the supposedly vocational nature of policing (Reiner 
2000; Waddington 1999), it is a practice that few outside of the police are aware 
of; or more importantly, would expect the police to engage in (Ericson 1982). 
When cufng, police officers undoubtedly rely upon this cultural presumption: the 
problem for police officers is that this discursive sleight-of-hand is one that others 
in the police organisation as exponents of the police officer's craft are also aware 
of (Shearing et al., 1981). 
We saw how PC Y justified her actions and police officers routinely defend 
cuffing on the grounds that it was "what people wanted" (Shapland & Vagg 1988: 
157). However, subjective or arbitrary justifications such as these are, as PC Y 
was aware, not as persuasive as some other externalising devices. In extracts 5, 
6&7, the police officers involved employ a method of cuffing that is used 
frequently; perhaps because it appears to be a particularly versatile means of 
refracting the critical gaze of other police officers as well as that of the public. As 
a consequence, it is also a robust method of 'covering your arse' (Chan et al., 
2003; Chan & Dixon 2007). I will refer to it as the that's civil device, and it 
requires that police officers recast events from the domain of the criminal law - 
the arena in which the police have jurisdiction, to that of the civil law, where they 
do not. Clearly, there will be a few circumstances when the events at issue may 
genuinely be regarded as a 'civil matter' [boundary disputes between neighbours 
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for example]: but even here, how the distinction is applied and the extent to 
which it is used, are matters that are open to creative interpretation by an officer 
who may want to cuff the job. 
In extract 5, Mr G, the estranged husband of Ms P has called the police and 
asked for an officer to come to the luxury flat that they jointly own. Intending to 
remove items of property and then reclaim the flat, he has called a locksmith to 
allow him to gain entry and then to change the locks to keep his wife out. Aware 
that his wife was also on route to the address he asked that the police come to 
the address to ensure that matters did not escalate to violence when his wife 
arrived. Police officers are often called to incidents like this and the orthodox 
police view is that their role is to ensure that no "breach of the peace" (English & 
Card 1996: 608) takes place. The conversation between PC B, the estranged 
wife Ms P and the errant husband Mr G, takes place shortly after Ms P arrives at 
the scene. 
Extract 5: PC B. Marital dispute between estranged partners 
Mr G: Pamela (. ) I'm quite happy to change that lock back it takes thirty 
seconds (. ) and I will do it instantly= 
Ms P: if you change that lock back then I want 
it changed and kept like that (. ) back 
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Mr G: fine then You change Ash Road locks tonight so that I can get in 
there! 
Ms P: FINE no probs 
Mr G: fine alright fine 'cos I'm on my way there 
Ms P: fine you go up (. ) there the locks aren't changed 
Mr G: (murmurs) (0.08) 
Ms P: can you write this down 
PO: sorry? ((officer turns around from looking out of the window)) 
Ms P: can you write this down (. ) that the locks have been changed (. ) in 
my property is there any way in a report that you can= 
PO: You've got (. ) to 
sort this out with your solicitor um as I said I'm just purely here (. ) to 
prevent (. ) the breach (. ) of the peace. 
Ms P: (unintelligible as locksmith uses a power tool) 
PO: and I'm not be here to write down any documents about what's 
been going on (. ) >your best advice is to contact your solicitor and 
let him know everything that's happening< (unintelligible)= 
Ms P: (unintelligible as locksmith uses a power tool) 
PO: it's a civil dispute! I'm basically here to stop any= 
Ms P: it's all in writing I've got no no worries 
it's all in writing 
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The extract begins with the estranged couple squabbling over the change of 
locks. Ms P then seeks to break free from the tit-for-tat argument by attempting to 
embroil PC B in the dispute as an official note-taker and witness "can you write 
this down (. )". The officer, who appears to be taken by surprise and perhaps 
even challenged by the request in replying "Sorry? ", sidesteps the question and 
offers a directive instead, "You've got () to sort this out with your solicitor. . ." 
By 
answering as she does [a simple no would have answered the question] the 
officer accomplishes a number of discursive tasks at once. Firstly, she puts the 
onus of responsibility for the events now taking place back onto Ms P and 
therefore away from herself. Second, by directing Ms P back to her divorce 
solicitor, the officer orients to the activities of divorce solicitors which are quite 
different to those of police officers. She reinforces this in the second half of her 
utterance as she sets out the particular terms under which she is present "I'm just 
purely () here to prevent (. ) the breach of the peace". Defining her role as "just 
purely" that of a peace-keeper, the officer makes it clear that any direct 
involvement will only occur if disorder ensues. Ms P's short reply is unintelligible, 
but the officer's frostier and even more specific response [which veers close to 
being an admonishment] suggests Ms P does not grasp what is being said. 
And I'm not here to write down any documents about what's been going 
on (. ) >your best advice is to contact your solicitor and let him know 
everything that's happening< 
The terse directive "your best advice ... ° lends weight to the observation that 
Ms 
P's request for the officer to make notes on the events unfolding was perceived 
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by PC B as a challenge to her authority or operational role, and it is 
unmistakeably different in what it does when compared to the sort of 'suitable' 
advice we have just been considering. Once again the noise of the locksmith's 
drill drowns out Ms P's reply; whatever it was, it prompts PC B to finally explain 
why her involvement is limited, "it's a civil dispute! .. " This clarification appears 
to resonate with Ms P who then backs away from her original request for the 
officer to act as a witness by defending her legal position "it's all in writing I've got 
no no worries it's all in writing. " 
Throughout, the police officer is at pains to define the terms under which she is 
present, for there is a sense, as Kemp et al., note "when the police arrive at an 
incident, the ownership of the dispute passes, in a very real sense, from the 
disputants to the police. " (1992: 17). As a public servant whose basic duties 
include 'keeping the peace', the officer may not have been able to refuse the 
initial request to be present; but she can, and does, put limits on the extent of her 
involvement. The that's civil device is an exceptionally powerful one in allowing 
her to do that, for in defining her specific role and the activities that are bound to 
it, PC B pre-emptively cuffs any legitimate complaints of criminal activity that 
either of the participants might make. She does this by placing the whole event 
into a legal realm that is apparently beyond her jurisdiction. Externalised in this 
way, the that's civil device is also highly effective in fulfilling the 'cover your arse' 
requirement too. 
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In extract 6, PC C uses the device slightly differently when she visits Ms J, a 
young woman who is involved in a long running and acrimonious dispute with her 
next door neighbour. The police officer, who is also the Neighbourhood Beat 
Manager for the area, has been involved with both sets of neighbours for some 
time. Although there is an uneasy truce at present, the dispute shows no signs of 
being resolved. 
Extract 6: PC C and the neighbour dispute 
PO: well hopefully when you d: o (. ) hit snags like (. ) to do with the porch 
and the window sill you (. ) can can speak to them about it really but 
if you do get any problems I mean obviously it's um (. ) 
circumstances like that become civil 
Ms J: yeh 
PO: and when it's over property but if there are problems (. ) that you 
think we can help with then (. ) that's my card and there's my phone 
number okay! 
The police officer's utterance, which comes at the end of a long conversation with 
Ms J, is a prolepsis that again takes the form of a `disclaimer' (Hewitt & Stokes 
1975). She begins by making it clear that although she expects the dispute to 
. continue "when you d: o (. ) hit snags" the recent improvement in relations which 
she and Ms J have worked at might allow a negotiated resolution without police 
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intervention. But, the common-ground that exists between them serves only as "a 
brief exordium to a critical assault" (Billig 1996: 269). The "critical assault" in this 
instance, is the disclosure that the police will be unable to help Ms J in any 
further dispute. The use of the that's civil device once again externalises matters 
by placing the dispute into a legal domain that is beyond the police officer's 
occupational remit. We saw in extracts 3&4 how PC Y's verbose conversational 
style faltered as she approached a contentious topic. Interestingly, PC C's 
previously eloquent discourse also begins to falter just prior to invoking the that's 
civil device "but if you do get any problems I mean obviously its um () 
circumstances like that become civil". The use of "obviously" assists PC C in 
retaining the rhetorical high ground by making the criminal/civil distinction 
unproblematic: positioning it within the realm of common-knowledge, she infers 
that anybody would recognise it as a civil matter and her utterance actively 
invites Ms J to agree with her or risk being seen as ignorant or foolish. 
I have already commented on the difficulty that members of the public have in 
challenging police officers and not surprisingly perhaps Ms J's response is to 
agree. However, PC C does not disbar the police from assisting Ms J entirely; to 
do that would be to cast aside reasonableness (Billig 1991) and appear unwilling 
or unhelpful which could well result in a complaint being made. Perhaps with one 
eye to her public accountability and to 'arse covering', she first reemphasises that 
it is the issue of property over which the police have no jurisdiction, before then 
making a very general offer of help "... but if there are problems (. ) that you think 
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we can help with. " Although the circumstances under which the police might 
assist Ms J are not set out, and responsibility for deciding what problems the 
police might be able to help her with is left entirely with Ms J, the offer of help 
ensures the encounter finishes on an upbeat note; although one cannot help but 
feel that the 'last word' (Billig 1996) has been spoken on the matter. As we move 
onto the final extract we will see how, in addition to managing a workload, cuffing 
may also be used to manage the presentation of self. 
In extract 7, PC K visits a junior school that is part of his neighbourhood beat. 
During the course of his conversation with the Head teacher (H), the Head 
directs the conversation onto parking problems outside of the school. These are 
being caused by a removal firm whose employees continually park the firm's 
vans outside the company office which is opposite the school entrance gates. 
Extract 7: PC K- traffic problems outside the local school 
H: but sometimes they park qu:: ite close to where we would where we 
would turn in (. ) which means that turning in here is therefore 
dangerous >1 mean they shouldn't be there at all< but if they're 
gunnu (. ) the further back (. ) they are the better because= 
PO: yeah well what I 
mean (. ) all I can say on that I mean (. ) if I see the vans there I 
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usually get em moved on (. ) I officially I can't move them on (. ) I 
haven't told them this but officially I can't move them on 
H: why 
PO: because it's double yellow lines 
H: so it's a what= 
PO: so it comes under= 
H: traffic wardens 
PO: no it comes under the city council 
H: oh does it oh right 
PO: they decriminalised it 
H: oh right 
PO: a couple of years back oh well= 
H: oh to be fa: ir (. ) they do move it right 
away 
PO: yeah 
H: what worries me is that (. h) we are gonna have a= 
PO: well (. ) I will speak with 
them anyway:: y 
As we join the conversation, the Head has already explained the parking 
problems in some detail prior to where the extract begins. The officer responds 
with a variation of the that's civil device. We have seen previously that just before 
the device is invoked or a contentious topic is broached that the "speech plan" 
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(Bakhtin 1986: 77) of the police officer involved appears momentarily disrupted. 
The same occurs here, and PC K falters just prior to invoking the device "yeah 
well what I mean (. ) all I can say on that (. ) I mean ... " 
The phrases "what I 
mean", "all I can say on that" and "I mean" though they signal a forthcoming re- 
statement (Schiffrin 1987) also suggest he is having difficulty in [re]formulating 
the utterance to come. When he recovers, the that's civil device is incorporated 
into a 'disclaimer' (Hewitt & Stokes 1975). 
Following the specific format that we recognise as being a characteristic of 
disclaimers: he begins by aligning himself with the Head teacher "if I see the 
vans there I usually get em moved on" before offering the customary 'but'. The 
contradiction that then follows is a qualified and tautological one "(. ) I officially I 
can't move them on I haven't told them this but officially I can't move them on". 
PC K, it seems, is acting outside of his 'official' legal remit in dealing with the 
offending vans. In 'admitting' this fact to the Head teacher, he lets it be known 
that he has concealed his impropriety to the offending van drivers "I haven't told 
them this". Entering the Head teacher into this confidence and making him party 
to the deceit, infers that the officer anticipates some consensus. By indicating 
that he is prepared to disregard the legal rules in assisting the school staff, the 
officer's actions become more than those of a diligent and conscientious 
neighbourhood beat manager, they are almost akin to a favour. In effect, PC K's 
utterance works as a form of "sin license", in that there are "occasions on which 
rules may legitimately be violated without questioning the status of those who 
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violate them. " (Hewitt & Stokes 1975: 5); furthermore his discourse is constructed 
to encourage dialogue, and the Head is prompted to enquire as to why the 
officer's actions are unofficial; this in turn creates an opportunity for the that's civil 
device to again "come up" (Sacks 1995, Vol 1: 535) in the conversation. This 
time, PC K is explicit in invoking the that's civil device, "they decriminalised it". 
What is interesting about the rhetorical work being accomplished here is that 
although the officer is correct in setting out the changed legal parameters for this 
specific misdemeanour, he is selective in how he [re] formulates the revised 
legislation and what he discloses. What the Head teacher is unlikely to know, 
because it is not common knowledge, is that PC K, as a police officer, does 
possess powers under Road Traffic legislation that do allow him to deal with 
vehicles that are dangerously parked or which cause an obstruction. In practice, 
he can act 'officially' to move them; but, through the management of 
"undisclosed" information (Goffman 1963a: 58) a quite different presentation of 
self is provided. 
Like the officers in the previous extracts, the that's civil device allows PC K to 
retain almost complete control over a situation that potentially lacks resolution 
and in which he could, as neighbourhood beat manager for the area, become 
embroiled. By doing policing in this way, he retains the option to enforce the law 
when he chooses, but at the same time he pre-emptively saves 'face' (Goffman 
1963b) with the school Head for those times when he is either unable or unwilling 
to act, or in other words, when he wishes to cuff it. His disclaimer is therefore, 
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also a prolepsis. Walklate (2001), in paraphrasing Lukes (1974) on the exercise 
of power and the police, notes that power also extends to "the ability to control 
agendas, information flow and self-perception. . ." (Walklate 2001: 146). 
Clearly there are similarities between this and the two previous extracts. On 
each occasion, the that's civil device is used to exclude criminal or potentially 
criminal activity from the police jurisdiction. By defining an event or incident as 
'civil' and thereby binding certain activities to it, any lack of action on the part of 
the police officer can be accounted for and be seen, as "correctly occurring" 
(Sacks 1995, Vol 1: 253). In this way officers cuff the job, manage their work load 
and 'cover their arse' at the same time. In this respect the that's civil device is 
very useful in facilitating 'subversion' (Sacks 1995). Furthermore, by externalising 
in this way, the police also manage the 'dilemma of stake' in which they are 
[potentially] caught - the dilemma of 'stake' being "how to produce accounts 
which attend to interests without being undermined as interested" (Edwards & 
Potter 1992: 158). Generally speaking, 'subversion' is "not seeable" (Sacks 1995, 
Vol 1: 254 ) and the responses of those members of the public involved in these 
incidents seem to suggest that they did indeed see the actions [or inactions] of 
the officers concerned as "presumptively correctly applied" (Sacks 1995, Vol 1: 
118) or if they did not, they were not prepared to challenge it for the reasons that 
we have already discussed (Ericson 1982). 
Of course, from the perspective of another exponent of the police officer's craft, 
the discourse and actions [including inactions] of the officers involved have a 
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greater degree of visibility and the presumption that they were correctly applied is 
contestable. Like the magician who watches a fellow magician performing a trick 
that she herself knows [and has performed], the sleight-of-hand is virtually 
impossible to conceal completely, and to one with 'insider knowledge' (Brown 
1996) the unseeable becomes seeable. Thus, in the first two extracts, the officers 
concerned made it clear that they were not able to deal with disputes over 
property: whilst that may be true to some degree, the laws relating to theft or 
criminal damage [amongst others] are predominantly concerned with issues of 
property so the demarcation being made by PC B and PC C is not as clear cut or 
extensive as both imply; whilst in the final extract, PC K tells the Head teacher 
that he cannot "officially" move the parked vehicles as that particular parking 
offence has been "decriminalised". Although in that respect the officer is correct, 
what is not disclosed to the Head teacher is that the officer retains other powers 
that mean he can legally request the vans to be moved. In each instance, the 
officer's cuff, to varying degrees, the jobs they have been called to deal with and 
in some cases the way in which they have recast events will have a marked 
effect on those they may be called to deal with in the future, if indeed they are 
called again. 
4.8. Summary 
This chapter has been concerned with how the police deal informally with crime 
and non crime incidents or'disputes' (Kemp et al., 1992). Whilst the lure of 'thief- 
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taking' (Chan & Dixon 2007) draws many a recruit into the police fold, the 
operational reality of policing can often be disappointing (Chan et al., 2003). A 
great deal of police work is mundane and has little to do with enacting the police 
imperative of detecting crime and securing prosecutions (McConville et al., 1991; 
Reiner 2000). One of the 'craft' (Skolnick 1966) aspects of policing is learning to 
manage what the police culture views as the more tedious aspects of police life. 
Since police officers have considerable autonomy in their working practices they 
have traditionally [but quite informally] been able to manage their workload. In 
doing this, the police culture itself makes an informal distinction between'real' 
police work (Stephens & Becker 1994), the so-called 'quality job' (McConville et 
al., 1991), and those jobs, which officers consider to be "time consuming, 
unresolvable and with no clear finality" (Edwards 1994: 133). The latter are 
defined as "rubbish work" (Edwards 1996: 196) and the police culture [and at 
times, the police organisation] has, over the years, encouraged officers to deal 
with 'rubbish work' through the exercise of discretion. 
Although the use of discretion is recognised as a legitimate, perhaps even 
essential feature of the police officer's craft (Gelsthorpe & Padfied 2003), the 
extent to which it is used has always been unclear: more importantly, how it is 
employed has evaded sustained critical analysis (Sykes & Brent 1983; Bayley & 
Bittner 1984). Yet, despite being a valuable and pervasive feature of the police 
officer's working ethos, officers also know that the use of discretion can be risky 
(Shearing et al., 1981; Chatterton 1983; Holdaway 1983). 
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As public servants and custodians of the law, police officers are expected to deal 
with crime and general misdemeanours and to be seen to deal with these things. 
Any failure to do so risks a complaint being made, which may have 
repercussions for an officer's career and the reputation of the police generally. 
Given that the police invariably deal with both 'victim' and perpetrator, to satisfy 
the competing demands of the criminal justice system is a difficult, if not 
impossible task (Reiner 2000). In response, the police have learned to adhere to 
an occupational ideology of self-preservation that is intended to guard them 
against complaints. Vulgarly but succinctly known as "covering your arse" (Chan 
et al., 2003; Chan & Dixon 2007), this ideology, 'frames' (Goffman 1974) how 
police officers do discretion. In studying the data, three particular discursive 
practices were examined. The first is the [mostly] legitimate practice of giving 
suitable advice, whilst the second is the discursive practice I have termed the 
that's civil device. Both can form part of the illegitimate practice known as cuffing 
(Shapland & Vagg 1988: 157; Edwards 1989: 109). 
One of the great advantages of suitable advice is that it is not contingent upon 
the rigour of 'due process' (Packer 1968), and the police recognise it is a useful 
palliative that has the added benefit of little or no bureaucracy. Its maxim-like 
qualities (Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 2000) lend it a pseudo-official air. More 
than simply 'advice', but recognised as different to a warning, suitable advice 
nevertheless has a euphemistically punitive quality which is reinforced by the 
lawful authority [which is backed by the implicit threat of coercive force] vested in 
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the police officer offering it (Bittner 1974; Reiner 2000). Moreover, suitable advice 
is versatile and sufficiently vague that it can be employed in different ways - in 
addition to its use as a as a punitive or draconian device it may also be utilised in 
a sagely or compassionate way. Thus it provides the police officer with a variety 
of discursive options when dealing crime suspects or those who are perceived to 
9 be wayward, recalcitrant or simply argumentative. It is equally useful in ensuring 
that the expectations of those who contact the police to report a crime or a 
dispute, and who expect the police to'do' something about it may also be 
satisfied or placated. This is especially so in those instances where the 
expectations of the public are not matched by the 'evidence' and where a 
dissatisfied crime victim may be prompted to make a complaint: as the analysis 
showed, in these cases suitable advice was presented as a 'better than nothing' 
or 'this is the best I can do' option. However, it is here that the use of discretion 
can be seen to facilitate subversion (Sacks 1995) for it is here that suitable 
advice can also be used as a method of cuffing. 
As highly visible public servants, officers are aware that they are under constant 
public scrutiny. Part of the police officers' craft is in learning to attend to that 
visibility and to their discourse - indeed, I have stressed that this is a crucial 
requirement of the 'cover their arse' philosophy (Ericson 1982; Chatterton 1983). 
Moreover, the power and importance of that which is visible or'seeable' (Sacks 
1995) though it is a social skill that we all learn and make use of, is one that the 
police actively cultivate through their role as "occupational specialists" (Sacks 
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1972: 282). After all, the operational methodology of the police relies upon ".. . 
inferring the probability of criminality from the appearances that persons present 
in public places. " (Sacks 1972: 282). What is more, in learning this, they also 
come to understand the power of invisibility or that which is 'not seeable' 
... given the orientation of the police, those routinely engaged 
in illegal 
activities will attempt to construct a front that their routine appearance in a 
territory will (or can) be treated as a normal appearance of the territory by 
its patrolmen (Sacks 1972: 288) 
Subversion trades on 'invisibility', and is contingent upon activities, and 
descriptions of those activities, appearing to be "presumptively correct" (Sacks 
1995, Vol 1: 118). Children, for example 
... learn from their parents' reactions which aspects of their own conduct 
are visible ... and, of course, how such evidence can be subverted 
for 
such readings. (Edwards 1995: 588) 
It is this realisation, coupled with the knowledge that not only does a police officer 
have the 'expertise' to define what crime is and what it is not, but that few people 
will be prepared to challenge many or any of the decisions he or she makes, that 
sets up an extraordinarily powerful situation and opens up discretion to a number 
of illegitimate uses, one of which is cuffing (Chatterton 1983; Shapland & Hobbs 
1987; Shapland & Vagg 1988; McConville et al., 1991). The analysis included 
one instance of suitable advice being used to cuff a multiple assault; but we also 
saw a second method of cuffing; this one involves the police officer re-defining or 
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recasting criminal or potentially criminal events and incidents into non criminal or 
'civil' matters - the so-called that's civil device. 
The effect of employing the that's civil device, is to put some or all aspects of the 
event beyond the jurisdiction of the police. The upshot of this is to limit or 
preclude any police action. Externalised in this way, officers 'inoculate' (Edwards 
& Potter 1992) themselves from any claim that they may have acted subjectively 
or, worse still, were neglectful of their professional duty. Having attended to the 
problem of 'arse covering', the other practical implications of the device are that 
officers were able to restrict their involvement in tasks that they were not initially 
able to refuse, as we saw with PC Y who dealt with a complex double assault 
and PC B who was called to prevent a breach of the peace between an 
estranged husband and wife. Alternatively, the that's civil device was also used 
to extricate officers from long running and potentially un-resolvable situations as 
happened with PC C and her neighbour dispute and PC K with his problem 
parking. In addition, the that's civil device, as we saw with PC C and most 
obviously with PC K, allows the police officer to actively attend to the 
management or presentation of self (Goffman 1974). 
Having seen how police officers might subvert the process of law or their 
organisational procedure as they do policing on the street, it is not unreasonable 
to ask whether this also extends to the formal prosecution process. Although 
other theorists are unequivocal in suggesting that it does (McBarnet 1983; 
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Edwards 1989; Shearing et al., 1981; McConville et al., 1991); as before, 
'knowing that' is quite different from 'knowing how' (Ryle 2000: 28). Not only is 
the medium of discourse different, in that it is predominantly written as opposed 
to spoken; the participants and the power relationship between them are also 
changed. It is to the construction of the prosecution case that we now direct our 
attention. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONSTRUCTING THE PROSECUTION CASE 
"You are thought here to be the most senseless and fit man for the 
constable of the watch, therefore bear you the lantern. " 
Much Ado about Nothing, Act 3: 3 
5.1. Introduction 
The glimpses of policing that the first study provided, revealed how the informal 
resolution of crime is intrinsic to the police officer's craft and the day to day 
business of policing (Bayley & Bittner 1984). We saw also, how the law, as it is 
used on the streets, commonly operates at a rudimentary level (Skolnick 1966; 
Bittner 1967; Sykes & Brent 1983; McConville et al 1991). Whilst the application 
and enforcement of the law is often as unsophisticated as it is discretionary, the 
interactional discursive machinery involved is complex. In diverting matters away 
from the formal prosecution process, the skills of 'witcraft' can be taxed to the 
limit. Cuffing a crime or administering suitable advice can be an accountably risky 
business (Chatterton 1983). Such practices may be operationally expedient in 
the doing of policing, but they run counter to the rhetoric of the police and the 
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criminal justice system: this is a rhetoric that promotes policing as an activity 
which operates 'by consent', that is impartial, and is fairly administered (Reiner 
2000; McConville et al 1991). Quite clearly, the law as it is found in books is 
different from the law in-action (Pound 1910; McBarnet 1983; Luban 1988; 
McConville et al 1991): the finer points of jurisprudence and 'due process' 
(Packer 1968) are of little interest to the majority of police officers as they enforce 
the law. Their concern is with practicalities - what the law permits them to do and, 
even more importantly, what it prohibits them from doing (Shearing et al., 1981; 
Punch et al., 1983) 
Whilst police officers spend a considerable amount of time diverting people away 
from the prosecution process, the fact remains that every day they do enter a 
large number of individuals into the criminal justice system. Any study that 
wishes to understand how policing is done, and which extols the virtue of a 
rhetorical approach to social psychology along the way, would be decidedly one- 
sided and analytically deficient if the formal legal process were overlooked. It is 
important that policing be examined [as far as practicable within the parameters 
of this thesis] in its entirety; for if, after having cast an alternate epistemological 
gaze over the practicalities of policing on the streets, these are seen to be at 
odds with the rhetoric of jurisprudence; then extending that same gaze over the 
next stage of the process, from arrest to the point where charges must be 
considered, might elicit similar discretionary and subversive practices. If this is 
the case, and I shall argue that it is, not only are orthodox views of policing 
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challenged still further, but the concept of adversarial 'justice' will again be called 
into question. 
5.2. Due Process: the rules of the legal language game 
For the police officer, one of the most attractive [and compelling] features of 
cuffing or offering suitable advice is that the formal and intensely bureaucratic 
legal process is minimised. Informal resolutions involve processes and 
procedures over which the police officer has, in most cases, almost complete 
control (Kemp et al., 1992). In contrast, when a person is arrested on suspicion 
of having committed a crime, 'due process' (Packer 1968) compels the police to 
adhere to a plethora of legal practices and procedures. Figure 1 offers a 
simplified overview of the decision-making processes that must be considered by 
the police. 
Successful prosecutions depend upon the police observing [or being seen to 
observe] these legal rules. Any breach or transgression is likely to lead to the 
case being discontinued, and as the formal legal process progresses, the finer 
points of jurisprudence play a greater part in the proceedings. When the 
investigation reaches the point where charges against the accused are ready to 
be considered, the police then relinquish control over the process to prosecution 
lawyers and advocates. In England and Wales, the recognised prosecuting 
agency is the Crown Prosecution Service [CPS]. 
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Decision-Making in the prosecution process 
Police Officer arriving at a crime scene may arrest 
or use discretion 
Officer uses discretion to 
resolve informally diverting 
away from prosecution 
If arrested, the suspect may be detained by Custody 
officer for interview. Post interview, the evidence 
must he reviewed 
An `accredited Gatekeeper' reviews the evidence via 
MG3 to see it'the 'Threshold test' is met 
Insufficient evidence to 
proceed: No further action 
(NFA) 
CPS prosecutor reviews the evidence via MG: and statements of evidence 
including discussion with the officer in the case. CPS may suggest 
charge(s), caution, hail for further enquiries or NF A 
Figure 1. 
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The point at which criminal charges need to be considered is a defining moment 
in any prosecution case. Those cases that are deemed to fall short of the 
required standard for a successful prosecution will be discontinued at this point. 
Some may be deferred for further police investigations and a later re-evaluation 
of 'the facts': others will meet the prosecution requirements and go ahead - 
frequently by way of laying charges against the accused. This phase of the 
process is the focus of this chapter, for it is here that the 'officer in the case', 
henceforth known as the OIC, argues the case for the prosecution to a Crown 
prosecutor who must then evaluate it. Those arguments are made in writing on 
the 'MG3 Report to Crown Prosecutors for Charging Decision' (ACPO Manual of 
Guidance 2004/5), hereafter known as the MG3. A now mandatory element of 
the prosecution or 'case' file, it provides the prosecutor with the only opportunity 
to assess what the suspect has to say on the matters at issue [except for any 
verbal exchanges the prosecutor may have with the OIC] and to weigh that 
information against the other evidence that is available. How the OIC argues 'the 
facts', and the significance for the direction in which the case may go, cannot be 
overstated. The ability to support or subvert the prosecution case is, above all, a 
rhetorical one. 
At this point, it would usually be appropriate to consider at least some of the 
existing literature; however, as I have already suggested, the contents of the 
prosecution file have, as far as I have been able to determine, never before been 
accessed or analysed as part of a social scientific or social psychological 
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endeavour. Some discursive work has been done with police/suspect interviews 
in Europe (Jönsson & Linell 1991; Komter 2002,2006) in the past, and there has 
also been discourse analytic work using data from tape-recorded police/suspect 
interviews in this country (Auburn et al., 1995; Edwards 2006; Haworth 2006; 
Stokoe & Edwards 2008). Scheffer's (2006) research involved a discursive or 
what he calls a 'trans-sequential' and 'trans-textual' analysis of a barrister's 
notebooks and notations in constructing a defence case for the Crown Court. 
But, whilst all of these studies have some overlaps with my research, the fact 
remains that there are no direct comparisons to be made. From an analytical 
perspective, the pioneering nature of this work adds additional excitement [and 
pressure] to this enterprise. However, before moving to the analysis, a word or 
two about method is required. 
Until now, the data that has been subjected to analysis in this thesis has 
consisted of the 'naturally occurring talk' (Edwards & Potter 1992: 28) of police 
officers as they go about the business of policing. But, written texts are an 
equally important part of that occupational environment also. Witness 
statements, updates on crime investigations, internal reports, and the creation of 
prosecution or'case' files are a fundamental, though less public facet of doing 
policing. 
Where the courtroom and the business that takes place within it are publicly 
accessible; the day to day business of the police station remains, for the most 
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part, shrouded from view (Shearing et al., 1981; Punch et al., 1983). There is no 
public gallery from which members of the general population can eavesdrop 
upon the investigative process. Even 'reality' television shows that feature the 
police as they go about their work rarely devote much time to the bureaucratic 
tasks that characterise criminal prosecutions. Snippets of police interviews with 
convicted criminals whose crimes have gained particular notoriety, occasionally 
provide the television public with glimpses of this hidden and less action-filled 
world, but the voyeuristic appeal they have is limited and provides only a brief 
respite from what is, generally speaking, a pedestrian and visually dull set of 
activities. It is in penetrating this closed world and gaining access to the 
prosecution or 'case' file that the researcher with 'insider' status (Brown 1996) is 
provided with some ethnographic advantages. 
The case file is where the dialogue between police and prosecutor may be found. 
In the same way that what is said between a client and legal advisor is subject to 
legal privilege and Public Interest Immunity [PII]; the exchanges between the 
police and prosecutor are also confidential and protected from disclosure. Access 
to the case file, makes this normally confidential dialogue available for scrutiny. 
As a serving police officer, prosecution case files are a necessary part of my 
occupational routine and my 'insider' status (Brown 1996) undeniably assisted 
my request to use them as data for this research project. That my employer 
would be so generous in the degree of access I was granted proved an 
unexpected bonus. All files that had completed their prosecutorial journey were 
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made available to me. Although many had completed that journey publicly, via 
the trial process; a majority of the files involved cases that had finished their 
journey within the confines of the police station, having been deemed to fall short 
of the required evidential standard for charging. With much of the legal process 
done away from the public gaze, the opportunity to access these files seemed to 
offer an opportunity to analyse data that has rarely, if ever, been scrutinised 
before. 
Case files are the heart of the prosecution process, and as predominantly written 
documents [although they may include visual images and spoken text], they are 
endowed with a certain status 
The creation of a written statement ... exploits one of the major things that written texts afford, which is the establishment of authoritative, 
textually fixed, and for-the-record versions (Edwards 1997: 129 my 
emphasis). 
The purpose of the case file is to construct, articulate and work up the 
prosecution's version of the events at issue and, in so doing, negate any specific 
defence(s) that the crime suspect [or his legal representative] has offered. The 
file contains 'the facts' of the case. This is not to say that there may not be other 
'facts' available that could also be relevant to the prosecution case, but if they are 
not included in this file, they cannot be used (McBarnet 1983; McConville et al 
1991). In most instances, the case file itself will be all that the prosecutor knows 
about the events and the participants, and it is from these 'facts' that the 
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prosecutor decides whether the case can be proved, 'beyond reasonable doubt' 
(Allen 1993: 12). Moreover, the prosecutor must also believe that there is a 
'realistic prospect of conviction' and that it would be in the 'public interest' for a 
prosecution to go ahead (Code for Prosecutors 2004). Common knowledge and 
the rhetoric of criminal justice may encourage the idea that the legal process is 
concerned with a search for 'the truth' and the pursuit of 'justice' (Luban 1988; 
Taylor 2004); but the workings of English adversarial law and more 
fundamentally, the mechanics of discourse mean that 
An incident and a case made out about the incident are not the same 
thing. Conceptions of reality are multifaceted and unbounded; cases are 
'the facts' as abstracted from this broad amorphous raw material. The 
good advocate grasps complex confused reality and constructs a simple 
clear-cut account of it. A case is thus very much an edited version. But it 
is not just edited into a minimal account -a microcosm of the incident - it 
is an account edited with vested interests in mind... The good advocate is 
not concerned with reproducing incidents but producing cases, not with 
truth but with persuasion. (McBarnet 1983: 17) 
As rhetoricians know, even if persuasion fails, the 'search for the last word' will 
ensure that the argumentative drive does not falter (Billig 1996: 136): we should 
remember too that, 'Every skill the advocate is taught is bent to winning cases. . 
.' (Luban 
1988: 76). Such a 'stake' (Edwards & Potter 1992: 110) will be 
instrumental in any evaluation of 'the facts' that a prosecutor makes. 
If the evidential content of each prosecution file is unique, the basic layout is the 
same. Every prosecution file is constructed around a set of forms known as the 
MG series (ACPO Manual of Guidance 2004/5). Numerically identifiable and 
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individually titled, each form serves a specific purpose: thus, an MG1 or'File 
Front sheet' records the personal details of the defendant(s); the type of incident 
being dealt with ['racist' or 'domestic violence' for example] and various other 
pieces of information such as occupational status and details of any legal 
representation. An MG5 is a 'Case Summary' which is intended to provide a 
'quick overview of the case' whilst an MG 6 is a 'case file information' form, a 
confidential 'memorandum between the police and CPS' (ACPO Manual of 
Guidance 2004/05 Section 3: 84). Each form has a distinct function and each is 
vital in its own way, although clearly some play a greater argumentative part in 
the prosecution process than others. The form that this analysis is centred on is 
the MG3 'Report to Crown Prosecutor for Charging Decision: Decision Log and 
Action Plan'. 
The MG3 is a relatively recent addition to the prosecution file, being introduced 
across England and Wales in 2006 as part of the `Statutory Charging Scheme'; 
this scheme requires CPS lawyers to decide what, if any, charges will be laid in a 
prosecution case. Prior to the introduction of this scheme, police would often 
proffer the charge or charges (McConville et al., 1991). Discussion with the CPS 
did take place in some cases - usually the more sensitive or complex ones - but 
consultation was not mandatory and the process was far less formalised with the 
result that charging lacked consistency. With the advent of the MG3 the OIC 
must now impart sufficient information to a prosecutor to allow a decision on 
charging to be made. Although there is no specified format for constructing MG3 
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texts, the brief guidance provided on the form itself, encourages the OIC to 
provide a "summary of the circumstances of the case. " It also invites listing any 
other information that might inform a charging decision such as the strengths and 
weaknesses of the case or "possible lines of defence" (ACPO Manual of 
Guidance 2004/05 Section 3: 47). As there is no facility for the prosecutor to 
actually hear the tape recorded interview with the suspect, the OIC must also 
provide a summary of the interview; in particular, any evidentially significant 
comments and admissions, including silences or a failure to account for any 
actions. 
Within a prosecutorial process that is characterised by a continual round of 
accounting and recounting, telling and re-telling, the MG3 offers the OIC an 
opportunity to present the Crown Prosecutor with a critical exposition of 'the 
facts' rather than another reformulated descriptive narrative. However, before the 
prosecutor can consider the case for the prosecution, the MG3, and the rest of 
'the facts' as they are constructed in witness statements, photographs, and other 
documentation etc, must first be reviewed by an intermediary -a so-called 
'gatekeeper'. 
A gatekeeper may be a police officer who is not connected to the investigation, 
and acknowledged as a gatekeeper by way of accreditation; or a civilian working 
for the police who is accredited in the same way. Gatekeepers are intended to 
act as a form of quality control and it is their task to decide if the case in question 
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meets basic evidential standards: the so-called 'Full Code Test' (Code for 
Prosecutors 2004). If it does, then the case passes to the on-duty prosecutor 
who will evaluate 'the facts' before making a charging decision. Should the case 
fall short of the required standard, the gatekeeper [or the prosecutor, depending 
upon who is evaluating it] can discontinue the case or suggest further actions, 
having first applied what is called the 'Threshold Test' (Code for Prosecutors 
2004) to bring the case up to the required evidential standard. Whatever decision 
is reached, both gatekeeper and prosecutor will endorse the MG3 with the 
decisions they make and the reasons for those decisions. 
5.3. Method 
During the course of this research project, 19 case files were read, these ranged 
from those crimes that the criminal justice system regard as 'minor' offences, to 
more 'serious' ones. Cases files involving 'serious' offences included: 'Attempted 
Murder'; 'Rape' [including incestuous rape on children]; 'Grievous Bodily Harm' 
and 'Possession of Drugs with intent to supply'. 'Minor' offences mostly involved 
'Common Assault' or low value 'Theft' and 'Criminal Damage'. Although 'serious' 
offences are prosecuted in Courts throughout England and Wales every day, 
'minor' ones occupy a far greater percentage of police and court time and are the 
staple fare of the criminal justice process (McBarnet 1983; McConville et al., 
1 The terms `serious' and `minor' are ones that the Criminal Justice system uses to define crimes according 
to their legal [and actuarial] severity. They can impact upon the evaluations made by police and prosecutors 
and they can also determine the mode of trial which dictates the likely sentence if guilt is established. I 
acknowledge the relative nature of these terms for those involved and use them with reservation. 
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1991). In relation to the police and the performance culture in which they operate, 
'minor' offences are useful in that 
... the constant supply of relatively low-level arrests satisfies the demands both of the organization and the occupational culture for a 
regular volume of relatively easy and trouble-free transactions to process, 
in the interests of "efficiency". (McConville et al., 1991: 206) 
This same ethos is also applicable to other elements of the criminal justice and 
court system - including the CPS (McBarnet 1983). 
As interesting as the more 'serious' cases may be, it is important to hold fast to 
the belief that greater insight may be gained from studying the commonplace or 
mundane events that come to the notice of the police - for these are the ones 
that are regularly overlooked or ignored. As this is a belief that has underpinned 
this project from the beginning it seemed entirely appropriate to direct the 
analytical focus towards the 'minor' offences. As with the first study, the corpus of 
data presented a number of incidents and events that would previously have 
been informally categorised by the police as 'rubbish work': specifically, 
heterosexual, 'domestic' assaults. As a 'Domestic Violence Officer' [DVO], the 
author is well aware of the cultural and evidential difficulties these cases provide 
for the police, the adversarial system of justice, and for victims and survivors of 
domestic abuse. Nowhere are legal commonplaces [many of which are simply 
gendered presumptions and gross stereotypes] more apparent, or their use more 
contentious (Taylor 2004). 
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The choice of case files was initially opportunistic. Ten cases were studied first 
and these were chosen after the author had invited detectives and uniformed 
colleagues to nominate prosecution cases they had been involved with. These 
officers were asked to reflect upon cases where they felt that 'justice' had been 
served well, or cases where they felt it had been served badly. As the files were 
read and re-read, it became apparent that cases involving 'domestic' violence 
and abuse were not only well represented in the corpus, but that a great many of 
these had been discontinued at the post interview, pre-charge stage. A further 9 
cases, all involving 'domestic' violence were then obtained -many of these were 
brought to the attention of the author by the officers involved with them, whilst a 
small number were cases where the author had direct knowledge of the 
investigation. 
To begin with, the case files were read and re-read several times in their entirety: 
this included witness statements and other evidence. Although the MG3 texts of 
the OIC were the specific texts of interest, as part of the analytical process it was 
important to read and examine original witness statements and summaries of 
police/suspect interviews to see the ways in which the at issue events were 
recounted. A comparison could then be made with the 'gists', 'upshots' and 
reformulations (Heritage & Watson 1979) produced by the OIC in the MG3. 
Examining all of the evidence in the case was also useful in evaluating the 
arguments put forward to gatekeepers and prosecutors and the decisions these 
people arrived at. Having gained a 'feel' for the data [and the prosecution 
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process itself], the MG3 texts of each case were then subjected to a detailed 
discursive and rhetorical analysis. 
Considerable space has already been devoted to explaining the occupational 
practices and legal procedures that police use as they investigate crime and 
interview those persons suspected of committing it. I have stressed throughout 
this thesis, that knowledge of the wider institutional and social context in which 
police officers operate, as well as the local or specific extra verbal context 
(Volosinov 1976: 99) within which their talk and text occurs, informs our 
understanding of the texts in question. Bakhtin makes a striking metaphorical 
point when he suggests that: 
All words have the "taste" of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a 
particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day 
and hour. Each words tastes of the context and contexts in which it has 
lived its socially charged life .... (Bakhtin 1981: 293-294) 
As we would expect, many discursive constructions and linguistic devices - the 
'interpretive repertoires' that police officers use (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984; Potter & 
Wetherell 1987) are present in the corpus data and these do show considerable 
rhetorical diversity. However, where wider 'speech genres' are concerned, the 
'thematic content', 'style', and compositional structure' (Bakhtin 1986), showed 
less variation and three distinct genres of speech were found to recur. Given the 
uniqueness of the events and happenings that form the basis of each 
prosecution case, together with the "could-have-been-otherwise" (Edwards 1997: 
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8) nature of accounts and descriptions, which encourages variability within the 
interpretive repertoires used (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984; Edwards & Potter 1992) 
such similarities are intriguing. There seemed to be considerable analytical merit 
in exploring these three genres as they appeared to be influential in determining 
or influencing the outcome of prosecution cases. 
5.4. Police talk: Three speech genres. 
The first and broadest of the three will be described as the genre of impartially. In 
the first study, we saw how the notion of 'impartiality' was embedded in the 
inferential and interactional discursive machinery of police officers, and how it 
could be accentuated or down-played as the conversational ebb and flow 
required. All of the MG3 texts and police witness statements in this second study 
are constructed around the genre of impartiality. In itself, this is perhaps not 
surprising: after all, common knowledge and legal ideology [including PACE] 
encourage the belief that the police are gatherers of 'facts', and that these 'facts' 
exist out there, awaiting discovery (McConville et al., 1991). Later on, 'the facts' 
are woven into witness statements and police reports whose "authoritative, 
textually fixed, and for-the-record" status (Edwards 1997: 129) lend credence to 
the idea that they are accurate factual accounts. A tacit feature of police reports 
and accounts is that the police are impartial in what they do (McConville et al., 
1991). As a discursive resource the genre of impartiality is a prerogative of the 
police. 
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Second, there is the genre of credibility. Evident in the first study, its appearance 
in the second study is much more extensive. Unlike impartiality, the genre of 
credibility is a discursive resource available to all the participants in the 
prosecution process. Even so, whilst its availability as a resource is unrestricted, 
not all the participants profit from its use to the same extent. Malleable, specious, 
and highly effective (Luban 1988; Taylor 2004), this is a genre that relies for its 
success upon a small number of legal stereotypes, some sweeping and highly 
gendered presumptions (Walklate 2001), and a variety of rhetorical [and 
oratorical] devices. Its effectiveness [particularly in the field of adversarial 
advocacy] is such that it not only perpetuates the stereotypes and presumptions 
it relies upon; its use serves to legitimise them as well. The relative ease with 
which credibility can be tarnished or inferences drawn is apparent from Keith 
Evans' advice in his 'Golden Rules of Advocacy' (1993) 
When you do reduce it [the evidence] to hard facts you will almost always 
find that those hard facts come in a surrounding package of uncertainty. If 
you explore that Perimeter of Uncertainty you will get a lot of Don't Know 
answers. The more Don't Knows you get, the less reliable the evidence 
feels ... The more 'I don't remembers' you get the more unreliable the 
evidence tends to seem. (Evans 1993: 99 original emphasis) 
The police officer, like the criminal advocate, makes use of the same legal 
language games. 
The final genre in this discursive trinity is that of the 'real victim'. 'Real victims' 
are distinct from 'crime' victims or'complainants'. The 'real victim' is not always 
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apparent at first as the assignment of `real victim' status tends to emerge during 
the interview process. As the sequential process of telling and retelling unfolds, 
so the at issue events and happenings that are at the hub of each prosecution 
case are formulated and re-formulated and the concept of the `real victim' 
evolves. The `real victim' genre is inextricably linked to the dialogical and turn 
taking processes of 'naturally occurring talk' (Edwards & Potter 1992: 28): but, its 
availability, as a discursive resource, is not universal. Only those perceived to be 
police 'suspects' may lay claim to the status of 'real victims', since its use is 
indexed to police/suspect interviews. However, since police officers are a feature 
of these interviews, and their occupational role obliges them to retell and 
reformulate the accounts of suspects, 'crime victims' and witnesses, it is a genre 
that they can and do make use of. Indeed, the genre of the 'real victim' cannot be 
accomplished without the assistance of the Officer in the Case. 
The genres of impartiality and credibility were present in all of the MG3 texts I 
analysed. The genre of the 'real victim' occurred in five; although as will become 
clear, there are specific circumstances under which this genre is used - four of 
these MG3 texts are included in chapter 5. Deciding what extracts to include in 
the thesis and which ones to leave out was no easy matter. The analysis chapter 
was written and rewritten many times in a variety of ways using different extracts 
and different combinations of extracts. My analytical and critical aims had to be 
weighed against more basic authorial and editorial considerations of clarity, 
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narrative flow, style, readability, and the length of the chapter. It was through this 
process that the chapter is as the reader now finds it. 
Of course, 'identifying' and labelling these genres from the discursive raw 
material provided by the participants is one thing; but as Potter & Wetherell 
(1987) point out, for an analysis we need to know the uses, functions, and 
problems that might be created by their use. It is to these matters that the rest of 
this chapter is devoted. 
5.5. "The police were called .... " A genre of impartiality 
Extracts 1-4 are the opening lines from four separate MG3s. As I discussed 
earlier, MG3 texts are gists that synthesise the "second stories" (Sacks 1995 Vol 
2: 25) of the crime victim, other witnesses' testimony [including other police 
officers], the suspect's interview with the OIC, and any other information or 
'evidence' [police computer logs for example] considered relevant to the 
prosecution case. A'second' story' as Sacks puts it "could perfectly well be a 
third or fourth. A fifth story is for our purposes a 'second'. .. Its production turns 
on it being 'second'" (Sacks 1995 Vol 2: 25). The OIC then distils these 'second 
stories' into a short narrative summary. 
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Extract 1: RvS MG3 of the OIC 
On Thursday 7th October 2005 at 1435 hrs the D/P [detained person] was 
arrested at Ramblers Cottage, Dennison, his home address which the D/P 
shares with the aggrieved. At the time of the arrest the D/P was heavily in 
drink and was reported to have been drinking heavily throughout the night. 
Extract 2: RvD MG3 of the OIC 
Police attended the Red Lion Pub in the early hours of 23/07/05 after a 
report of assault, on attendance they spoke with Monica B and James B 
who stated an altercation had taken place. Monica B claimed that her 
partner the D/P [detained person] had grabbed her by both arms with his 
hands and officers have witnessed this. James B claims that he has 
punched the D/P in self-defence after being set upon, he claims that the 
D/P has further punched him which has resulted in a small red mark to his 
right eye and slight swelling and he also has red marks to his arms which 
officers have witnessed ... 
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Extract 3: RvH MG3 of the OIC 
Police were called to Bramley Park after a call from A/P [aggrieved 
person] Ms L to say that she was being assaulted. 
Upon arrival H was seen to be standing over Ms L in the caravan. 
Mr H was arrested assault ABH as Ms L had a small cut to her finger ... 
Extract 4: RvN MG3 of the OIC 
The aggrieved, Ms T and the defendant N are in a relationship and have 
cohabited for the past 6 months. In the early hours of Saturday 19th 
August, officers were called to the couple's home address regarding an 
alleged incident that took place at their home at 2230 hours Friday 18th 
August... 
'Style', McCloskey tells us, 'is often an appeal to authority' (McCloskey 1998: 11), 
and the style of writing in these extracts is similar to the formal report writing of 
scientists. In scientific discourse, "recurrent stylistic, grammatical and lexical 
features" contribute to what has been called an 'empiricist repertoire' (Gilbert & 
Mulkay 1984: 55). This repertoire assists in constructing, amongst other things, 
an aura of 'objectivity' that distinguishes scientific texts from non scientific texts. 
'Empiricist' repertoires are characterised by an impersonal style whereby 
200 
... references to the authors' actions and judgements [are] kept to a 
minimum... it portrays scientists' actions and beliefs as following 
unproblematically and inescapably from the empirical characteristics of an 
impersonal natural world. (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984: 56). 
In these MG3 extracts, the police officer, like the scientist, "avoids being 
questioned for his reliability by disappearing into the third-person narrative" 
(McCloskey 1998: 10). She/he appears detached and distanced from the events 
described, "officers were called to the couple's home address ... [my 
emphasis]. Each extract includes precise factual information: times, dates, 
specific locations and some personal details of those involved, "On Thursday 7th 
October 2005 at 1435 hrs .. ." Observational accuracy and an almost pedantic 
attention to detail add a pseudo-scientific and clinical feel to the narrative. Events 
and actions seem to be chronologically ordered and reported as they happened, 
evoking a strong 'this-is-the-way-it-was' or as was feeling. A sense of inevitability 
pervades the events and actions described. The OIC, as author of the text, 
creates the impression of being a medium through which factual information, or 
'the facts' as they are commonly known in legal parlance, are relayed. A third 
person perspective not only accentuates the omniscient feel of the narrative so 
that we sense events and happenings take place, 'out there' (Potter & Wetherell 
1987; Woolgar 1988; Shotter 2002); it also embroils the reader in an "unequal 
dialogue" with "... observations and facts" (Mulkay 1985: 66). 
A dry, stilted and occasionally gauche style distinguishes these extracts and 
works to minimise any obvious rhetorical flourishes or overt subjective 
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judgements: extract 3 in particular, is brief and almost perfunctory. Such a style is 
inclined to pretentiousness and pomposity in the language and grammar used. 
Words like 'attended', 'assault', 'altercation', 'the aggrieved', and 'the defendant' 
are a well known and almost stereotypical part of police discourse; as are 
inferential prefaces like, 'alleged' and 'claimed'. These lexical and grammatical 
elements create a rhetorical style that teeters, at times, towards burlesque 
(Emsley 1991); even so, these are exactly the sort of words and utterances we 
expect police officers to use. In spite of the stylistic, grammatical and lexical 
similarities between police texts and scientific reports, the two genres have an 
unmistakably different 'taste' (Bahktin 1981). We know this to be the discourse or 
speech genre of police officers and not that of scientists, or artists or physicians 
or plumbers. (Bakhtin 1986; Drew & Sorjonen 1997). 
Common knowledge and legal rhetoric both stress that the police role is an 
'impartial' one (McConville et al., 1991; Reiner 2000; Gelsthorpe & Padfield 
2003). Where 'objectivity' is an accomplishment of science and scientists' talk; 
'impartiality' holds a similar position in the occupational discourse of the police. 
There may be overlaps and similarities, but the accomplishment of the scientist is 
different to that of the police officer as is the genre of speech being used. The 
construction and function of the MG3 texts, of which these extracts are a part, is 
to create the impression of neutrality and impartiality. Whilst the style of the text 
is a vital facet in this achievement, on its own it is insufficient to complete the task 
convincingly. In the 'pursuit' of neutrality or impartiality (Clayman' 1992: 169) 
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something else is required. In these texts, we find that 'footing' (Goffman 1981) is 
an effective and indispensable discursive accompaniment. The technique of 
'footing' is useful in that it has a double edged and paradoxical quality that allows 
the OIC to engage in some highly inferential and subjective discursive work 
whilst appearing not to. Extracts 1,2 &4 show some variability in the way that 
footing is used. 
Extract 1, sees the OIC 'foot' in a way that demonstrates that he is attentive to 
his own discursive accountability. He attributes an inferential and potentially 
contested 'fact' to an unidentified other 
At the time of the arrest the D/P was heavily in drink and was reported to 
have been drinking heavily throughout the night. (my emphasis) 
The first observation, that the arrested man was in a drunken state at the time of 
arrest, is entered into the narrative without issue; since the police officers 
involved in the arrest are 'professional' witnesses with direct experience of the 
arrested man, their occupational authority lends evidential weight to the 
assertion. However, the suggestion that he had been "drinking heavily throughout 
the night" is more contentious and speculative. It is sufficiently problematic for the 
OIC to shift his discursive footing and distance himself from the claim, so he 
qualifies its inclusion: hence, the detained person "was reported" to have been 
drinking heavily. The identity of the person who 'reported' this information is not 
revealed, nor who it was reported to. Through footing, the OIC signals his 
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acknowledgement that though this statement has some inferential and evidential 
weight, it is also open to debate. The way in which the officer foots is important 
too -'reported' has a certain blandness about it that counters any claims to 
partiality or investigative bias; lexical choice helps sustain the OIC's neutral or 
impartial stance. 
As Clayman's (1992) research into how professional news interviewers do 
neutrality in interview situations revealed, interviewers shift their discursive 
footing 'in hostile environments' (Clayman 1992: 178). Footing shifts tend to 
occur just prior to the making of "relatively controversial opinion statements" 
(Clayman 1992: 169). In extract 1 the footing shift takes place after the officer 
has proffered the uncontested statement that, "at the time of arrest the D/P was 
heavily in drink and was reported to have been drinking heavily ... " 
Clayman 
noted, how the "authoritativeness" of the person or persons being quoted was 
important in lending weight to the controversial claim or position being offered 
(Clayman 1992: 169): police officers are not only lawfully empowered, they are 
considered to be trustworthy and honest. Even though the data in this research 
are written rather than spoken, and the achievement of neutrality is rather less of 
a "joint achievement of interactants" (Clayman 1992: 194), many of Clayman's 
observations are pertinent. 
Extract 2, offers a variation in the footing technique. In this extract a number of 
controversial statements are attributed to specific people. Concerning the 
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incident, all the participants agree that an 'altercation' took place. The prefacing 
the OIC uses reflects this, as where Monica and James "stated an altercation 
took place" (my emphasis). Billig suggests that 
Phrases and single words carry definite implications of accusation and 
justification, so that a term which implies praise can be considered the 
contrary of one exuding blame. (Billig 1996: 237) 
The use of the verb 'stated' as a preface has an authoritative or definitive ring to 
it that lends credence to the statement that comes after it. One has no sense that 
any ambiguity is inferred in what is being reported - an element of consensus is 
implied. Contrastingly, when the OIC refers to the acts of violence that are at the 
heart of the prosecution case, she then shifts her discursive footing. Each act, as 
described by the two crime victims, is qualified with the verb 'claims' or'claimed': 
"Monica B claimed that her partner. . . "; "James B claims that he has punched 
the D/P in self-defence... " (my emphasis). Constructing her discourse in this 
way, the OIC is able to maintain her apparently neutral or impartial stance; but, 
unlike the previous extract, the chosen prefaces cannot be considered so bland. 
Our everyday conversational experiences teach us that a 'claim' has an element 
of uncertainty attached to it and given the authoritativeness of the police as 
'experts' in crime and criminal behaviour (Skolnick 1966), it is difficult not to feel 
some scepticism mounting. But, meaning does not reside in the word itself. In 
focussing attention on the use of specific words it is important to remind 
ourselves that "Who speaks and under what conditions he [sic] speaks ... [as 
this] determines the word's actual meaning" (Bakhtin 1981: 401). As 
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conversationalists we know that lexical choice is rarely random and that the 
'inference-making machine' is powerful (Sacks 1995). In this context, the OIC's 
cloak of 'impartiality' conceals some highly subjective and inferential discursive 
work. Rhetorically, the seeds of doubt that this inferential preface introduces, 
weaken the assertions that Monica and James make. Volosinov, reiterating and 
expanding on Billig's earlier comments on specific words and phrases makes the 
additional point that 
Any word used in actual speech possesses not only theme and meaning 
in the referential, or content sense of these words, but also value 
judgement. (Volosinov 1986: 103) 
Moving on, to extract 4, another and equally subtle variation of footing is 
employed that further exemplifies both Billig's and Volosinov's observations. 
In extract 4, the OIC reports how police are called to a residential address after a 
report of a 'domestic' assault: 
In the early hours of Saturday 19th August, officers were called to the 
couple's home address regarding an alleged incident. .. (my emphasis) 
Attributing this description of the incident to any one person or group in particular, 
including the OIC, is difficult. Since there are no quotation marks to separate it 
from the rest of the text, it is neither a direct quote, nor is it a description that is 
regarded as contentious in some way. Seamlessly woven into the fabric of the 
narrative gist, the tacit assumption must be that it is derived from the same 
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sources as the other factual information; that is, from those officers who visited 
the address. The assumed authoritativeness of the police further works up the as 
was quality of the statement. Of course, prefacing the incident with the 
fashionably cliched legal disclaimer `alleged', does more than just report matters. 
An 'incident' has a quite different rhetorical sense when prefaced with this 
adjective. Ontologically, the status of an "alleged incident" is questionable and an 
air of scepticism is introduced from the start. The reader cannot help but cast a 
mistrustful eye over the events in question and those participating in them: as the 
author of the text, the OIC is discursively accountable for it. The function and 
construction of this textual fragment is ironic: the inference-making machine 
works to undermine the factual status of the event in question, whilst the OIC is 
'inoculated' (Potter & Edwards 1992: 164) from any accusation that he has taken 
a stance. 
In these extracts, we have seen how police officers do impartiality through the 
use of a distinctive grammatical style that creates an 'empiricist' air. Similar to the 
way in which scientists construct their discourse when writing or articulating 
formal 'scientific' reports; it is a form of argument that relies upon the erroneous 
assumption that'facts speak for themselves' (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 
2000: 17). A particularly important discursive feature that is incorporated into this 
style and which allows the argument to 'develop' (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 
2000: 18) is the technique of 'footing' (Goffman 1981). The double-edged nature 
of this discursive tool is useful, in that it allows the OIC to engage in some 
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extensive inferential work whilst at the same time giving the appearance of 
working to exorcise or minimise any hint of subjectivity on her or his part. 
Although the contexts are quite different, like Clayman's (1992) news 
interviewers, the authors of the MG3 texts in this study 'manipulate' footing to 
"actively shape the course of the debate without entering it as a participant" 
(Clayman 1992: 177). 
In doing impartiality and in making effective use of the footing technique, much 
has been made of the 'authoritativeness' of those whose discourse is cited 
(Clayman 1992: 187). I suggested earlier, that as far as the authors of the MG3 
texts are concerned, the tacit authoritativeness that is a category entitlement of 
all police officers imbues their reported utterances and observations with a 
greater inferential power. As we move to consider the genre of credibility, the 
issue of authoritativeness remains important: the process of constructing or 
undermining the credibility of those involved in criminal prosecutions actively 
shapes the argument constructed by the OIC. 
5.6. "an unlikely explanation .. ." The genre of credibility 
'Credibility' is a highly malleable concept that features prominently in the witcraft 
of police and prosecutors. In spite of what police officers and barristers would 
have us believe, it is a highly debatable and fundamentally relative 
particularisation. Specious and tendentious, the rhetorical versatility of 'credibility' 
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helps facilitate the obsfuscatory and diversionary tactics that adversarial justice 
permits (Luban 1988; Taylor 2004). In an arena where 'the facts' and 'the truth' 
are consistently touted as the only discursive currency of any worth; 'credibility' 
offers the forensic orator and the police officer some respite from this rigour. 
Assigning people to categories to encourage prejudicial and often spurious 
" inferences to be entered into the argumentative fray has less to do with getting at 
'the facts' of the case, and more to do with winning it (Luban 1988). The genre of 
credibility is an obligatory facet of forensic oratory; not only do the rules of the 
legal language game allow it, such disputation is considered to be "good legal 
skill" (Taylor 2004: 23). In learning their craft, police officers also become fluent in 
this legal language game. 
'Inference-making', as we have already seen throughout this analysis and the 
previous one, is a discursive 'machine' that is well equipped to "deal with and 
categorize and make statements about an event it has not seen" (Sacks 1995: 
115-116): its power is no less potent when categorising and making statements 
about people 
The fact that some activities are bound to some categories is used ... 
it's 
not the case that deviant activities are especially problematic, but there 
are categories of persons who do deviant activities and you've got a 
solution to a deviant activity if you've got a member of a category which is 
known to do this. (Sacks 1995, Vol 1: 180) 
Throughout this and the previous analysis, category binding is routinely used. In 
the first extract of this section, two obvious and stereotypical categorisations are 
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employed. The creative way in which they are used shows how insidious the 
genre of credibility can be. 
Extract 5: RvH MG3 of the OIC 
Mr H was arrested assault ABH as Ms L had a small cut to her finger. 
During interview H denies assaulting Ms L he states that they both suffer 
from mental health problems and are both alcoholics. They had both been 
drinking that evening. 
He also states that Ms L is not taking her medicine and becoming 
increasingly paranoid and aggressive. 
Here, denial and explanation are woven into one to take the form of a rhetorical 
syllogism or enthymeme (Aristotle: 1354a) and the genre of impartiality is 
intertwined with a genre of credibility. 
As we saw in the previous extracts, when doing impartiality an OIC will 
continually shift his or her footing to maintain the illusion of detached neutrality. 
This text is sufficiently well crafted that the assignment of the categories 'mentally 
ill' and 'alcoholic' appear to be assigned solely by the suspect. An absence of 
any critical or reflexive comment by the OIC concerning the assertions that H 
makes, mark out the text as an active co-construction between the OIC and the 
suspect; in this extract, the doing of impartiality also involves doing credibility. 
210 
Thus, when the OIC writes, "H denies assaulting Ms L he states they both suffer 
from mental health problems and are both alcoholics"; or "He also states Ms L is 
not taking her medicine ... ° (my emphasis), he not only works to sustain 
neutrality through the use of inferential prefacing, he also constructs the 
credibility of those others involved. His use of the attributive verb 'states' does a 
great deal of rhetorical work in this respect: it not only marks off subsequent 
statements as being the discourse of someone other than the OIC [part of the 
genre of impartiality], it also lends inferential weight and authoritativeness to the 
suspect's statements [as part of the genre of credibility]. 'Stating', as I have 
already suggested can, in particular discursive contexts and as part of an 
utterance, be considered different to 'alleging' or 'claiming' and such words allow 
the speaker to perform different discursive tasks. However, lexical choice alone 
is not enough and specific words must be considered in relation to the other 
linguistic elements of the utterance if we are to elicit meaning. Again, we must 
always be attentive to the "concrete situation of its implementation" (Volosinov 
1986: 101) - which in this instance is as part of an official written summation of 
the evidence in a prosecution case file written by the investigating officer. My 
point here is that 
When selecting words we proceed from the planned whole of our 
utterance, and this whole that we have planned is always expressive. The 
utterance is what radiates its expression (rather, our expression) to the 
word we have selected, which is to say, invests the word with the 
expression of the whole ... The neutral meaning of the word applied to a 
particular actual reality under particular real conditions of speech 
communication creates a spark of expression. (Bakhtin 1986: 86) 
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Throughout this narrative, there is no sense that the police officer finds any of 
these statements controversial, as the use of "he states" suggests. H's account, 
as constructed by the OIC in this textually fixed prosecution document seems 
increasingly to be the basis on which the 'evidence' rests. The conventions of the 
speech genres which the officer is using ". .. prevent the individual author from 
appearing as a significant textual agent" (Mulkay 1985: 70): although in this and 
the other extracts so far we can see how the "textual voice" that is discernable 
"... tends to remain constant although the particular author changes" (Mulkay 
1985: 70). This is also true of what occurs within the text itself: even though the 
speaker changes [as acknowledged by the footing device] the 'textual voice' is 
always that of the OIC. In its various forms, inferential prefacing is a necessary 
element in the doing of credibility; but, inference-making is not confined to, or 
achieved by, prefacing alone. 
The uncritical inclusion of 'factual' statements also lends them credibility; by 
implication they are endorsed by the OIC which in turn, credits them with a "for- 
the-record' status" (Edwards 1997: 129). Furthermore, when the OIC writes that 
"they had both been drinking that evening", and "... Ms L is not taking her 
medicine and becoming increasingly paranoid and aggressive", directly after the 
disclosure that both are 'mentally ill' and 'alcoholics', the reader is invited to 
consider events in terms of cause and effect. A "symbolic connection" (Perelman 
& Olbrechts-Tyteca 2000: 331) between alcoholism, mental health, and the at 
issue events directly alludes to the credibility of those involved. Of course, 
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success with this argument relies upon the audience making an overwhelmingly 
pejorative connection between alcoholism, mental illness and violence. If 
common knowledge, stereotypical presumptions, and legal ideology all 
encourage the idea that violence is a category entitlement of those who are 
mentally ill, the text functions to reinforce those beliefs and hints at a `well what 
do you expect, this is the way we are' form of absolution. Together, H and the 
OIC [as author of the text] transform the event from a criminal assault into an 
everyday happening for an alcoholic and psychiatrically disturbed couple. In 
doing so, they offer an explanation (Sacks 1995 Vol 1). 
Harvey Sacks understood that in making sense of happenings and events: 
... one can choose among facts according to the presence or absence of 
an explanation. It's absolutely routinely used... Something proposed to 
have occurred can be treated as not so, by virtue of the fact that there's 
not an explanation for it. That's important in this society given that 
miracles are no longer usable. (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 124) 
Explanations reside in the 'infrastructure' of common knowledge or common 
sense. Such knowledge is, "entirely tacit and beyond the reach of argument" 
(Sacks 1995 Vol 1: xiii). This is a "knowing of the third kind"; that is, an 
"extraordinary form of non-representational, embodied or sensuous, practical- 
moral knowledge. . ." (Shotter 2002: 40). The upshot of which, is that when other 
explanations are offered that run counter to this 'knowing', it takes some 
considerable effort to overturn or disregard the maxims of common knowledge 
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that we adhere to (Billig 1991; 1996; McNulty 1994). In practical terms, this 
means that 
If an explanation is available, then it's that explanation that is the 
explanation, and formulates what it is that's happened (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 
412 emphasis in the original). 
The 'conversational reality' (Shotter 2002) is that the availability or non 
availability of an 'explanation' is an essential part of doing credibility. Here, the 
unorthodox and decidedly lateral masterstroke that makes this argument all the 
more powerful is that H debunks his own credibility as well as that of his partner. 
As a self confessed alcoholic with a mental 'illness' he seeks no exemption from 
being bound to this category by pleading a "special case" (Billig 1996: 173): 
indeed, his self assignation lends him a greater authority - he can argue with 
insider knowledge of what it means to be an alcoholic with a mental illness. The 
argumentative hierarchy (Perelman & Olbretch-Tyteca 2000: 80) that is more 
usually constructed in doing credibility is, instead, being demolished. 
Paradoxically, H works to invert the genre of credibility so that neither he, nor his 
partner, can be regarded as credible; yet, at the same time, he expects the 
audience to accept his word over hers. The difference between the two is that the 
explanation he offers appears to be the only explanation offered. In the MG3 text, 
Ms L's voice is absent. 
With categories come entitlements (Edwards & Potter 1992: 160). Credibility 
brings with it certain entitlements [and exclusions], just as a lack of credibility 
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brings with it a different set of entitlements and exclusions. Within the context of 
this argumentative situation [and the ideology of the law], these entitlements are 
more persuasive for H in pleading his innocence. It might be suggested that H 
offers no specific rebuttal or account of how Ms L sustained her injury because 
he does not need to. All that is required is for him to utilise the unspoken but 
observably negative and commonplace aspects of mental illness and alcoholism, 
which are "the explanation" (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 412 emphasis in the original). 
Moreover, the process of undermining or lauding the credibility of witnesses 
serves another discursive function. It misdirects the audience. Argument by 
diversion consists "in turning the discussion onto secondary points ... " 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 2000: 485). With the focus firmly directed towards 
the psychology and sobriety of the participants, attention is directed away from 
the specific detail of the at issue actions that prompted the call to the police. The 
'burden of proof that exists in criminal prosecutions is that a case must be 
proved "beyond reasonable doubt" (English & Card 1996: 148). Even if the focus 
of the interlocutors were to return to the specifics of the assault, the previous 
imputations are sufficient to ensure that a 'reasonable doubt' can never be 
dispelled. 
In contrast, the next set of extracts shows how the genre of credibility can be 
constructed differently. Extract 6 again involves a heterosexual domestic assault. 
The male suspect, R, is interviewed about two assaults on his former partner Ms 
M. 
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Extract 6: RvR. MG3 of the OIC 
He starts to shout abuse at her [Ms M]. She does not say she is frightened 
even though he has tried to strangle her previously. She turns over to put 
her ear-plugs in. He bites her finger; blood everywhere; she phones her 
ex-husband. This must be a truly frightening experience, yet she phones 
him back, tells him not to come and spends most of the night on the phone 
to her sister; not the police. She does not say she has not pursued this 
due to fear or threats made by him. It is presented in her statement as her 
decision. She does not go to the hospital until the afternoon. 
This MG3 is unusual by comparison with the majority of the texts in the corpus in 
that the OIC's voice can be discerned. One is aware that a critical, if 
overwhelming negative, examination of the evidence is being put forward. The 
genre of credibility consists of a series of factual statements, some of which are 
vivid in their descriptive force, that are constructed in the negative. The syntax 
used by the OIC is distinctive and draws the reader's attention to the 'untypical' 
responses of the crime victim all the more "She does not say she is frightened 
even though he has tried to strangle her previously". The use of a co-ordinate 
sentence and "even though" as a conjunction provokes a very clear inference 
that Ms M does not respond as common-sense suggests a victim of crime might. 
The use of litotes or deliberate understatement, "she does not say" and "she 
does not go", intensifies the incongruity. The OIC uses the coordinate sentence 
again when he writes, "This must be a truly frightening experience, yet she 
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phones him [her ex-husband] back. . ." 
(my emphasis). With each repetition, the 
crime victim's credibility is eroded. 
I have already suggested how the genre of credibility draws upon tacit, 
commonsensical 'explanations' to succeed. Here, the OIC actively draws 
attention to the fact that the commonsensical explanation is not available and 
without it, as Sacks suggested, the status of the at issue events is thrown into 
greater doubt and with it the credibility of Ms M. Indeed, the OIC formulates his 
discourse to accentuate this lack of explanation because he knows that in the 
context of a prosecution "the logoi of the prosecution and the anti-logoi of the 
defence will be appealing to the same common-sense of the audience" (Billig 
1996: 233). The recourse to a common knowledge in building or undermining 
credibility is used again in the next extract. Unusually in this corpus, Extract 7 is a 
domestic assault with a female suspect. The OIC is also female. 
Extract 7: RvP MG3 of the OIC 
Ms P agreed that there had been a verbal argument as she has filed for 
divorce. She went on to say she has been the victim of 10 years of 
domestic abuse from her husband D. She said that she did throw the box 
of china down the stairs but not at Mr D. Ms P is of slight frame and is no 
more than 5 feet in height. Mr D is 6 feet tall and of a very large frame. Ms 
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P claimed that she was fearful of her safety as she knows what her 
husband's temper can be like. 
The lexical and stylistic features that characteristically feature in the genre of 
credibility are again present. We see how the OIC formulates her discourse to 
allow the reader to draw specific inferences: she constructs the text in such a 
way as to prime her audience. Ms P agrees that a verbal argument took place 
and fully admits that, "she did throw the box of china down the stairs". Her 
admissions present Ms P as a cooperative and, by implication, an honest or 
truthful woman. She is assisting the police investigation, not hindering it. Unlike R 
v H, where the argumentative hierarchy between crime victim and suspect was 
levelled; here, Ms P's credibility is being worked-up. At the same time, her 
husband's claim, that she threw the box at him, is made to look increasingly like 
a malicious and petulant allegation with the revelation that she has filed for 
divorce and been a "victim of 10 years of domestic abuse". Not only do these 
inferences put Mr D in a different light, the focus shifts away from the specifics of 
the assault claim. Her credibility is further strengthened by the police officer's 
reflexive observation that, "Ms P is of a slight frame and is no more than 5 feet in 
height. Mr D is 6 feet tall and of a very large frame". Not only is the rhetorical 
contrast striking, the authoritativeness of the police officer lends discursive 
weight to this "observable" fact (Sacks 1995: 190). 
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Cause and effect encourage the audience to empathise with Ms P's plight as an 
'explanation' is procured. Presented with this array of additional 'facts', we sort 
among them and "add them up", as Socratic argument encourages (Sacks 1995 
Vol 1: 54): the effect is to recast Mr D as a wife-battering bully who responded 
badly to being told of the divorce. His physical advantages provide an implicit 
justification for any improper or illegal behaviour on the part of Ms P, and Mr D 
seems all the more spiteful and petty for reporting the assault to the police. 
The persuasive power of inference making, as it is used within the genre of 
credibility, is that it directs the audience to particular 'facts', events or utterances 
without obviously directing them (Perelman & Olbrehcts-Tyteca 2000). The 
process works because 
... in their incomplete, enthymemic structure, we offer 
initially 
unconnected premises that (most of) our audience will be able to connect 
up for us - and feel that it is they who have 'seen' the point! They 
themselves make the connection by drawing upon (perhaps in themselves 
inarticulable) topoi in the sensus communis already existing between them 
and us as speakers. (Shotter 2002: 56) 
Clearly, the genre of credibility has many overlaps with the genre of impartiality. 
Elements of each serve both and the boundaries, if indeed they may be called 
that, are fuzzy. Inferential prefacing, for example, is as important in the doing of 
impartiality as it is in doing credibility. Inferences, particularly adverse ones, are 
easily made but less easily rebutted. Stereotypical and gendered presumptions 
do their work and symbolic connections direct the audience to an explanation - 
to "the explanation" (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 412) - or the lack of one. Such 
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explanations and such 'knowing' are features of our conversational realities 
(Shotter 2002): invariably tacit, this is a knowledge that is beyond the realm of 
argumentation (Sacks 1995) - what Shotter calls, a "special third kind of 
knowledge" (Shotter 2002: 19) 
It is not a theoretical knowledge (a 'knowing-that' in Ryle's (1949) 
terminology) for it is knowledge-in-practice, nor is it merely knowledge or a 
craft or skill ('knowing-how'), for it is joint knowledge, knowledge-held-in- 
common with others. It is a third kind of knowledge, sui generic ... the kind of knowledge one has from within a situation, a group, social 
institution, or society; it is what we might call a 'knowing-from'. (Shotter 
2002: 19) 
In RvH, the category entitlements associated with membership of two socially 
marginalised groups: the 'mentally ill' and the 'alcoholic', defeat the prosecution 
case because 'the facts' of the suspect's defence fit with what we 'know' about 
people who are assigned to those social categories. Conversely, in RvR, the 
OIC formulates his discourse toward the lack of any 'explanation' and without it 
Ms M's credibility is made to seem questionable. Finally, in RvP, 'the facts' fail 
to fit with Mr D's explanation of events less well than they do the explanation 
proffered by the OIC, who invites us to draw on "knowledge-held-in common with 
others" (Shotter 2002: 19) about relationships in general and about'domestic' 
violence between men and women. Ironically, but not unusually [as other cases 
in the corpus show] the OIC in each case collaborates with the suspect by 
uncritically re-constructing and reformulating 'the facts' as they are offered by the 
suspect. As we move to consider the last of our triad of genres, that of the 'real 
victim', this is a phenomenon that we see developed all the more. 
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5.7. "He was very hurt and confused": The genre of the `real victim' 
We have seen how the genre of credibility relies for its success on the genre of 
impartiality, and that there are many discursive features common to both. When 
we consider the genre of the 'real victim', we see that it is built out of the other 
two. In extract 5H negated his own credibility and that of his partner by binding 
them both to particular social categories. Whilst they may both be 'victims' of 
alcohol addiction and unspecified 'mental' illnesses, in themselves, this is not 
sufficient for 'real victim' status to be conferred. In RvH that status is initiated 
through the attribution of blame "He also states that Ms L is not taking her 
medicine and becoming increasingly paranoid and aggressive". Ms L's inability or 
unwillingness to take her medicine and keep her aggression and paranoia under 
control puts the onus of blame on her. By implication, her status as a genuine 
'crime' victim is challenged, whilst his status, as the 'real victim', is clearly being 
hinted at. In the absence of any overtly critical or adverse comment by the OIC, 
this is an inference that dovetails neatly with "the explanation" (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 
412) that has been provided. 
In extract 7, a slightly different approach was taken, in that Ms P's credibility is 
linked, from the outset, to a 'real victim' status. Like RvH, 'real victim' status for 
Ms P depends, for its success, upon the authority of the police officer authoring 
the text. Our perception of police officers is as "occupational specialists on 
inferring the probability of criminality from the appearances persons present ... " 
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(Sacks 1972: 282). So, when the OIC offers up a vivid description of the physical 
differences in size between Ms P and her husband, together with an uncritical 
disclosure of domestic violence within the relationship, our common-sense 
perceptions of how this relationship might have been conducted are bolstered by 
our belief in the police officer's professional judgement. We trust in the OIC when 
she suggests that it is Ms P who is the 'real victim' in this case. As we move to 
consider the final cluster of extracts, we see that the genre of the 'real victim' can 
only succeed when it is endorsed by the police officer in the case. 
Extract 8 is from the second and concluding paragraph of an MG3 written by the 
OIC. Having interviewed G, the OIC reformulates G's account as it was given 
during the police interview. There are many similarities with RvH in the way that 
category binding is used to construct a genre of credibility which is then used as 
a springboard for introducing a 'real victim' genre. The circumstances of the case 
are that Ms A has been in a long relationship with G. According to the OIC, she 
describes him as a "dominant male who is very controlling and violent" and she 
explains in her witness statement that the domestic violence she has survived 
has made her depressed to the point where she is on sick leave from work. The 
details of the assault as she describes it are that he kicked her to the legs as they 
lay in bed; they had been arguing about his relationship with another woman. A 
day later, she flees the address with her children and reports the incident to the 
police who eventually arrest G on suspicion of assault. 
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Extract 8: RvG. MG3 of the OIC 
During interview the D [defendant] states that his wife is going through 
severe depression, he stated that their relationship was good but his wife 
is becoming more ill, he said that they have two children and were going 
to take them to Ibiza this Saturday and is now at a lose (sic) as to what to 
do, he claimed that his wife argued with him Thursday and she left with 
the children, he claimed that his daughter telephoned him on the Saturday 
as she wished to be with her friends. He said, that he drove up to 
Doncaster, picked up his daughter there were no angry words nor 
allegation of him assaulting her. He said that he was very hurt and 
confused when a police officer arrested him today. His plan of action with 
his wife is try and get her to visit her doctor again with a view [sic] as he 
feels this allegation could be part of her illness. 
The account that the OIC formulates from his interview with G is detailed, but 
does not address the specific acts of violence of which G is accused. Instead, the 
OIC provides a vivid narrative account of Ms A's mental 'illness' which is set in 
the context of what appears to be an otherwise happy family. G describes his 
relationship with Ms A as being 'good'. He reinforces this by describing how they 
have "two children and were going to take them to Ibiza this Saturday". The 
narrative constructs G as a caring father who is prepared to drive considerable 
distances to collect his daughter who calls him when she wants to be with her 
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friends. Domestic life, it seems, was going along contentedly until "his wife 
argued with him". G places the onus of blame for the argument on Ms A, after 
which she leaves with the children. 
The vignette constructed here presents the suspect's family life as otherwise 
'normal' and mundane; this works to make Ms A's behaviour seem all the more 
anomalous and extreme (Wooffitt 1992). The argument itself is glossed over: no 
detail is offered as to what it was about or what form it took, and the event 
[including the assault] is effectively minimised. G reiterates this in his account of 
what takes place when he collects their daughter to return her to her friends; the 
point is made that there were "no angry words nor any allegation of him 
assaulting her". Consequently, his later arrest for assault is given an unexpected 
quality that accentuates his claims to innocence. Rather than becoming angry or 
irate, as one might [stereotypically] expect a violent wife-beater would, his 
response is quite the opposite. Passive and tinged with pathos, he was very hurt 
and confused when a police officer arrested him today. . ." The genre of the 'real 
victim' is now actively invoked. Casting himself as a concerned husband who is 
now "at a lose (sic) as to what to do", the OIC concludes the text with a 
proclamation that acts as a "last word" (Billig 1996: 135) that further confirms G's 
status as a 'real victim' "His plan of action with his wife is try and get her to visit 
her doctor again with a view [sic] as he feels this allegation could be part of her 
illness. " Ms A's status as a mentally ill woman continues to be given an 
unchallenged, factual status and attributing blame directly to her'illness' rather 
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than to her, depersonalises matters. The gendered legal stereotype of the 'mad' 
or'bad' woman (Taylor 2004: 37), so common in adversarial advocacy, is again 
called upon to do its inferential work. G's 'plan of action' suggests that he bears 
no malice towards his wife and it reemphasises his caring nature [although 
ironically, it also suggests that Ms A's claim that he is a "controlling" man might 
also be accurate]. Nevertheless, these 'last words' (Billig 1996) resonate with a 
positive or hopeful timbre that diverts the reader away from the fact that the at 
issue events have not been examined or explained. In the absence of any critical 
or adverse comment, we are left in no doubt that the OIC is offering this account 
as the "for-the-record" version of events (Edwards 1997: 129) for the gatekeeper 
and prosecutor to consider. 
The combination of "the explanation" (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 412), together with 
knowledge of the "third kind" (Shotter 2002: 19), and the police officer's category 
status as an expert on crime, criminals and criminality (Skolnick 1966; Sacks 
1972), is intensely persuasive. It is crucial in undermining the credibility of 
witnesses and their accounts of what took place, and re-constructing the suspect 
as the 'real victim': this is so even in cases where more than one witness gives 
evidence against the suspect. Extract 9 is a case in point 
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Extract 9: RvD MG3 of the OIC 
The DIP [detained person] has a severely swollen right eye which is 
closed and is severely bruised, he also has scratches to his neck and 
face. In interview the D/P stated that James B has set upon him, resulting 
in these injuries. He states that he has not hit James B in any form and 
that James B is big and strong and was very violent towards him. He 
states he that he has not touched Monica B and states that she tried to 
restrain James B who grabbed her to the arms. Upon officers attendance 
the D/P was found in bed holding an ice pack to his right eye. 
D has been arrested for assaulting his partner Monica, and her adult son James. 
According to their statements, during the course of assaulting Monica, her son 
James has intervened to defend her. In doing so he has punched D and as a 
result, D has sustained the greater injuries. This extract is the second paragraph 
of a two paragraph account by the OIC - the first paragraph [Extract 2] 
summarised the incident from the witness statements of the two crime victims. 
Many of the rhetorical features that we would expect to find in the three genres 
we have been examining are present in this extract and I do not intend to reprise 
them. What is of interest here is how the genre of the 'real victim' is worked up in 
three very succinct parts: 'last words' again play a significant part in conferring 
6 real victim' status to the suspect. 
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The opening line of the paragraph begins the process of working-up D's'real 
victim' status by focusing on 'observables'; that is, the "observability of actions" 
(Sacks 1995, Vol 1: 120). The description that the OIC provides differs from the 
dry as was style of police writing that we have become accustomed to. The 
language used to describe D's injuries is more emotive. D's right eye is "severely 
swollen" and "severely bruised". The repetition may be inelegant and clumsy, but 
the point is still made. I made the point earlier that as conversationalists, and 
certainly as analysts, we are aware that 
Phrases and single words carry definite implications of accusation and 
justification ... The very use of one phrase rather than another will, 
then, 
indicate the seed, if not the flower, of an argumentative position. (Billig 
1996: 237) 
This account of D's injuries is more than a description; it is a prolepsis that paves 
the way for the 'real victim' genre to come. With attention drawn to 'observable 
facts', the three sentences that form the middle section of the paragraph switch 
attention to "the explanation" (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 412) that D offers during his 
police interview, and which the OIC reformulates in the MG3 text. D is direct in 
asserting that a miscarriage of justice has taken place and that he is the 'real 
victim', "the D/P stated that James B has set upon him, resulting in these injuries. 
He states that he has not hit James B in any form ... " As happened 
in RvP, the 
claim to 'real victim' status is reinforced by drawing attention to other 
'observables'. James B's physical stature and his aggressive disposition are 
emphasised in extremes, "James B is big and strong and was very violent 
227 
towards him". D appeals to common knowledge and our everyday experiences, 
which suggest that'victims' of violence usually finish with greater injuries than 
perpetrators; after all, is this not how we recognise them as 'victims'? 
Furthermore, common knowledge also has it that young men are more likely to 
use or threaten violence than other sections of society, especially young men 
who are protective of their mother. Like all of us, D [and the OIC] knows that 
... it is somehow extremely 
important that the inferences they [people] do 
make can be taken as correct, and thereby that those persons who 
produce activities which are described by these sequences so behave as 
to provide for the fact that these sequences do describe them. (Sacks 
1995, Vol 1 118) 
Perusing the 'facts' on offer, the explanation being put forward looks highly 
believable and very much like 'the explanation' (Sacks 1995 ): even when pitched 
against the testimony of two witnesses whose accounts dispute it. But, the case 
is by no means made and much relies upon the 'last words' (Billig 1996) of the 
OIC to sell this account to the prosecutor who will evaluate the case "Upon 
officers attendance the D/P was found in bed holding an ice pack to his right 
eye. " Other MG3s in the corpus without exception, report the arrest of the 
suspect in an unfussy and matter-of-fact way. Here, the matter of D's arrest is 
only alluded to and instead, the OIC describes D's behaviour and demeanour 
when the police arrive. Constructed as a cameo, D is presented as a sad and 
pitiful figure who has clearly elicited the sympathy of the OIC. Through this 
appeal to pathos, the OIC encourages us to question whether D's behaviour is 
more observably akin to that of a victim rather than a perpetrator. The last words 
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loosely sum up the argumentative position that the OIC has inclined to 
throughout the paragraph and there is little to be said in reply. The inferential 
value of these last words outweighs any strict evidential potential and from the 
preceding detail in the paragraph, it seems that the OIC is engaged in "begging 
the question" because she is "postulating what [she] wishes to prove" (Perelman 
& Olbrecht-Tyteca 2000: 112). 
'Last words' (Billig 1996), are a feature of all the MG3 texts in the corpus, as the 
OIC in each case strives to convince those who must evaluate the evidence and 
the arguments being advanced that charges should or shouldn't be brought. 
These may be the last words of the OIC, but they are not the last words on the 
case itself: those of course, are reserved for the prosecutor. However, in those 
texts where the 'real victim' genre is employed, the 'last words' of the OIC are 
significant in that they go beyond being a professional assessment or a decisive 
summation. In RvD, we see how the last words function as petitio principii - to 
"beg the question" (Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 2000: 112). The same charge 
may also be levelled at the last words of the OIC in RvG: but in the latter 
instance, when the OIC concludes the MG3 text with ". .. his [the suspect's] plan 
of action with his wife is try and get her to visit her doctor again with a view as he 
feels this allegation could be part of her illness", something more is being done. 
In RvG the last words work as both a "formulation", because it "characterizes 
states of affairs already described or negotiated (in whole or in part) in the 
preceding talk" (Heritage & Watson 1979: 126) and as an "upshot" (Heritage & 
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Watson 1979: 134) because consequences are set out (Edwards 1997). The 
upshot strives to convince us that some 'good' has come from this event and the 
subsequent police action: the 'real victim', G, has been identified along with the 
true culprit - Ms A's 'depression'. 
We find similar arguments encapsulated in the last lines and the'last words' 
(Billig 1996: 131) of two earlier cases where the 'real victim' genre is employed. 
Extract 10 is the last line of RvP, whilst extract 11 rounds off RvH. 
Extract 10: RvP MG3 of the OIC 
Ms P denied any allegation of assault against her husband and now feels 
she has the courage to make a statement to the police after the years of 
domestic violence that she has endured. 
Extract 11: RvH MG3 of the OIC 
He [H] believes the relationship is over and is prepared to move back to 
Elmbury to dissolve the relationship. 
In Extract 10 the last words of the OIC formulate her professional, "for-the- 
record" (Edwards 1997: 129) judgement on the case. She then offers a similarly 
upbeat conclusion as the OIC did in RvG. Reiterating Ms P's denial of assault, 
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the police officer reformulates Ms P's experience of arrest and interview by the 
police as an upshot when she proclaims, "Ms P now feels she has the courage to 
make a statement to the police... " 'Real victim' status for Ms P not only 
redefines the incident, it heralds it as an epiphany. Ms P's arrest is transformed 
into a potential miscarriage of justice that has been narrowly averted. The 
gravitas this imparts to her experience and the entire proceedings heightens the 
finality of the statement. 
The last words in Extract 11 also have a conciliatory and resigned finality about 
them, although it is less dramatic. These, like the last words in RvG, bristle with 
a sense of 'male authority' (Dobash et al., 2000: 27), 'He believes the relationship 
is over and is prepared to move back to Elmbury to dissolve the relationship. ' (my 
emphasis). H's gesture appears magnanimous and reasoned in the 
circumstances and by emphasising that'He believes' the relationship to be 
finished, and that he is the one 'prepared' to move away, both H and the OIC 
allude to reticence on the part of the crime victim to do likewise. Since her wishes 
and views are never articulated by the OIC, the inference-making machine is at 
liberty to do its work. Once again, the last words recast events and 
consequences positively: controversy is being avoided. With the relationship 
'over' and H 'prepared' to move away, the implication is that a solution has been 
found without the need for a prosecution and that a 'happy' or'amicable' ending 
is likely. Rhetorically, these last lines, and those others where the genre of the 
'real victim' is used, are similar to the 'punch-line' of a joke (Billig 1996: 137). 
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Admittedly, the element of surprise that characterises the punch-line of most 
jokes is lacking; but, rather like the end words of a novel, each has a finality that 
confounds an obvious retort and puts an end to dialogue. 
5.8. Summary 
The genre of the 'real victim' is a sophisticated witcraft that is common in cases 
involving 'domestic' violence, although it is not confined to them alone. Just as 
the genre of impartiality is a necessary facet in the genre of credibility, so the 
genre of the 'real victim' is developed out of the other two. If impartiality is the 
discursive mortar that bonds the lexical elements together; credibility provides 
the foundations upon which 'real victim' status is built. In the cases that feature in 
this analysis, 'real victim' genres occur in those where there is some consensus 
between the participants over the events in question: the argumentative thrust is 
not one of outright denial. Claims that punches were thrown, or injuries caused 
are not at issue. What is in dispute are the categories to which those involved 
have been assigned; like us, the participants know that "some activities are 
bound to some categories" (Sacks 1995, Vol 1: 180) and the 'real victim' genre 
works to reformulate the original accounts made to the police and to alter the 
categories into which the participants have been placed. 
Whilst'real victim' status is usually, but not exclusively, proposed by the suspect 
during the course of the police interview, it cannot be successfully achieved by 
232 
them alone. In addition to the presence of the genre of impartiality and credibility, 
the genre of the 'real victim' can only succeed if a number of other discursive 
elements are also present. Firstly, 'real victims' require the active assistance of 
the police officer dealing with the case, for this genre is a joint production that 
only the police officer's assumed authoritativeness can pull off. Secondly, a 'real 
victim' requires that a common-sense, and more often than not, tacit 
"explanation" to which the 'facts' can be fitted, is available (Sacks Vol 1 1995: 
124). Regardless of rhetorical flair and dialectical skill, we are all, it seems, 
"constrained" in the versions of the world or of events that we can offer, by what 
an audience will accept as "reasonable" (Sacks 1995 Vol 2: 419). 
Throughout this analysis, we've seen how the wider sensus communis (Billig 
1991: 21) dictates that 'real victims' will look and act like victims; that bullies are 
bigger than those they bully; men are always more violent than women; and the 
mentally ill or the chronically alcoholic can never be relied upon to tell the truth or 
report events accurately. The persuasive power of this, and the other two genres, 
lies not in dialectic, but in an "enthymemic" (Shotter 2002: 56) textual 
construction. As conversationalists, we know that an audience is more effectively 
persuaded if they reach, what they believe, to be their own conclusions 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 2000; Shotter 2002). And equally, whilst most 
conversationalists are not overtly aware of it, the dialogical process is such that, 
"a presented description is dealt with by its recipient as something to use to 
decide whether a correct story is being told" (Sacks 1995, Vol 2: 235). The fine 
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art of witcraft, of course, lies in presenting a description that directs an audience 
to the conclusions you want them to come to; success in that, is buoyed by the 
third and final discursive element that characterises the 'real victim' genre: that of 
the "last word" (Billig 1996: 135). 
Last words in 'real victim' cases differ from the last words in those where it does 
not feature. The analysis suggests that the 'last words' in 'real victim' genres 
fulfil a variety of discursive functions, not least of which is to persuade the 
gatekeeper and Crown Prosecutor by closing off debate or minimising 
controversy. But, as we saw in the first analysis, the 'last word' also functions to 
"justify one's own arguments", and as a means of "self-persuasion" (Billig 1996, 
138). Having committed to arguing the 'real victim' status of the suspect, in the 
face of contradictory accounts from the witnesses and participants [including 
other police officers], we should not be surprised [as we found in the last chapter] 
that the OIC "covers their arse" (Chan 2007: 339; Chan & Dixon 2007: 459). 
Ensuring that it is they who have the last word on the subject allows them to do 
just that - although theirs is not the last word in the process. Significantly, in most 
of those cases where the genre of the 'real victim' was used, the OIC and the 
suspect were successful in inverting the original accounts and perceptions of 
those involved and the prosecutor discontinued the case. 
Given the overlaps and interconnectedness of the three genres in this analysis, it 
is no surprise that collaboration and collusion between the OIC and the suspect, 
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and a dependence upon common knowledge are also obligatory elements in the 
doing of impartiality and credibility. 
The genre of impartiality is contingent upon an acceptance that police officers are 
neutral and even-handed in their investigation (Gelsthorpe & Padfield 2003). The 
pseudo-scientific style of writing that characterises MG3 texts perpetuates the 
belief that police officers discover and then report 'the facts' (McConville et al 
1991) for others to evaluate and judge and that they have no other stake 
(Edwards & Potter 1992: 158) in the prosecution process aside from that. 
Similarly, the genre of credibility relies upon the public-at-large accepting police 
officers as specialists in recognising criminals and understanding criminality 
(Skolnick 1966; Sacks 1972). 
In the doing of impartiality and in doing credibility, a surprisingly limited gamut of 
linguistic devices is routinely used. Discursive 'footing' is extensively relied upon 
to distance or align officers from specific and contentious statements. Like all of 
us, the police also make considerable use of seemingly innocuous but highly 
inferential prefaces to cast doubt on the veracity of events or assertions or to 
endorse them: however, unlike other conversationalists, in this context, the 
'expertise' of the police in assessing 'moral character (Sacks 1972), injects a 
legal and moral authority into the process that accentuates the rhetorical force of 
any observations they make or judgements they pass. Very subtly, the direction 
and focus of the prosecution case can, and is, manipulated (Clayman 1992). Just 
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as suspects can be transformed into 'real victims'; so witnesses can be 
discredited and testimonies can be endorsed or undermined. The attention and 
emphasis placed on "observable" (Sacks 1995, Vol 1: 120) actions, diverts 
attention away from those which are "not seeable" or are not heard (Sacks 1995, 
Vol 1: 254). 
The analytical data presented here, suggests that police officers "subvert" (Sacks 
1995, Vol 1: 254) the prosecution case as often as they support it. The 
prosecutorial process is highly subjective rather than analytically rigorous. 
Witcraft, more than investigative prowess or an outright dependence upon 'the 
facts' determines the fate of the case and those involved; all of which returns us 
to those ideological dilemmas which prompted this thesis in the first place. In the 
final chapter, I shall attempt to piece together the argumentative threads and 
analytical insights that this research has provided, and to draw some 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION 
"If you meet a thief you may suspect him, by virtue of your office, to be no 
true man; and for such kind of men, the less you meddle or make with 
them why, the more is for your honesty" 
Much Ado about Nothing, Act3: 3 
6.1. Introduction 
Over the course of the last five chapters some of the less visible working 
practices of the British police officer have been placed under an intense 
analytical spotlight. A number of these practices have previously featured in the 
established police research; but, there are others which have not been subjected 
to the analytical scrutiny of the social scientist before. They have remained, for 
want of a better phrase, 'trade secrets'; some, it is fair to say, also qualify as 
'dark' secrets in that they are "incompatible with the image of self... " that police 
officers strive to present (Goffman 1969: 141). These practices, which have 
previously been viewed as ontologically external to language have, in this thesis, 
been 're-specified' (Edwards & Potter 2005) and are now understood as 
discursive practices. Having reached the final chapter, my task is now to bring 
together all the information and analyses and to mull over and discuss my 
findings so that I can then offer some conclusions. Before I do, it is appropriate, 
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after five years of study, to reprise what I originally set out to do in this thesis. 
Having done that, the main findings from the analyses must also be discussed 
and positioned against the existing literature. Difficulties and additional dilemmas 
that arose during the research will need to be considered before finally, by way of 
a conclusion, I turn my attention to the implications that this research has for the 
police in terms of their working practices and future training. For myself and other 
interested academics and observers, there is also the question of what further 
research is possible. 
6.2. What the thesis set out to do 
This thesis was a response to the increasing number of 'ideological dilemmas' 
(Billig et al., 1988) that have confronted me throughout my police career. If 
alleviating them has been difficult; resolving them has proved impossible. Yet, 
early on in my police career things seemed so different: the dilemmas were fewer 
and the apparent resolutions easier to find. The stock of common knowledge that 
circulated within the sub-cultural milieu in which I worked reassured me that I 
was mistaken in seeing 'dilemmas' of any kind. But with my entry into academe 
and my subsequent academic enlightenment, those dilemmas of ideology that 
the occupational culture of the police had assured me were illusory returned; this 
time in greater numbers. With my intellect broadened and an array of different 
ideologies and world-views to call upon, the common sense knowledge of the 
police was no longer so convincing and my dilemmas became more difficult to 
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tolerate. Conversations and debates with colleagues confirmed to me that mine 
was an isolated voice: relatively few of them were prepared to doubt the 
accumulated wisdom of police common-sense. Presented with the very tangible 
problem of what to do, I opted to research and write this thesis. I wanted to know 
how (Ryle 2000) it is that policing is done as well as why, so that I could better 
understand those dilemmas that troubled me then and still trouble me now. In 
addition to analysing them, I also wanted to bring them into a more public and 
critical forum; for they are not simply dilemmas that affect the police, they involve 
the public and have implications for the process of law. Making the debate a 
public one has the further advantage in that the voices and opinions of police 
officers are less likely to be stifled as they would be if the debate remained within 
the confines of the police organisation. 
In choosing a more public forum for debate, I am acutely aware of the power my 
'insider' status (Brown 1996) has in acting as a provocation. Police officers may 
remain blase about 'outsiders' who debate issues that many police officers do not 
see as problematic. A similar response is not uncommon when senior officers 
invite debate on police practices; for the claim is always made [as we have seen] 
that 'management cops' are not 'street cops' (Reuss-lanni & lanni 1983). By 
comparison, my credibility as a 'street-cop', and therefore someone who can say 
he 'knows' how difficult and often unrewarding the lot of the police officer can be, 
makes it more difficult for the rank-and-file to dismiss my arguments in the same 
way -I share a greater commonality with my audience. Whilst my 'disloyalty' will 
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invite their ire (McConville et al., 1991), it is also likely to promote a lively and 
hopefully constructive debate. Yet, if understanding the ideological significance of 
the texts that constitute the analyses means that "it is necessary to go beyond 
the texts themselves" (Billig et al., 1988: 38); then to initiate change, it is also 
important that any debate steps outside of the received 'logic' of police ideology; 
which is why it has been necessary to ensure that at least some of the ideologies 
that the police adhere to are made explicit so we can move on from them. 
Although my personal dilemmas of ideology were what initiated this research, 
they have not been allowed to dictate the direction in which the research has 
gone. Like Sacks (1995) my academic concern has always with "studying, rather 
than presuming ... " (Edwards 1995: 593): 
in the end, one can only". .. pose 
those problems that the data bears" (Sacks 1995: 471). Fortunately, some of 
those dilemmas that initiated my academic journey do form part of the analysis, 
more exciting maybe are those dilemmas of ideology that I had not expected to 
find. My intellectual journey, though it has often been arduous, has never been 
dull, and the findings, as we shall see, have proved fruitful. 
6.3. The findings: Subversion and making the invisible visible 
The first analysis took as its data the 'naturally occurring talk' of police officers in 
discursive interaction with various members of the public. These interactions 
were specifically those where the police dealt informally with events and other 
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sundry `disputes' they knew to be criminal or those which included behaviour 
which had the potential to be classified as criminal (Kemp et at., 1992). In 
informally resolving crimes and disputes, officers necessarily employ a very 
public discourse and our analytical interest was, from the outset, to understand 
the different ways in which police officers do discretion. The second analysis in 
contrast, has a quite different extra-verbal context. Here, officers operating within 
the non-public areas of the police station go about the formal prosecution 
process. Crime suspects are arrested and interviewed and the prosecution file is 
constructed. Though the police investigate and construct the prosecution case, 
the decision to charge someone must be made by a public prosecutor. The 
process by which the police elicit a charging decision was the specific focus of 
the second analysis and it is one that requires a police officer to precis the 
accounts of witnesses and suspects into a "for-the-record" (Edwards 1997: 129) 
account of what happened; the prosecutor then considers this, along with the 
evidence, in making a charging decision. 
Compared to the first analysis, this is a discourse that is written in a strictly 
confidential [and essentially private] context; directed, as it is, to a Crown 
Prosecutor and not to any member of the public. The analytical interest here was 
in how police do prosecution in 'domestic' violence cases. The two analysis 
chapters, though they both take as their subject matter the sort of event that 
police ideology disdainfully refers to as 'rubbish work' are, in most other respects, 
quite different from one another. Yet, surprisingly, the findings display a great 
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many similarities. Consistency may be what the traditionalist or orthodox 
researcher strives to find; but it is not what the dissident researcher looks for 
(Potter & Wetherell 1987). 
Unlike traditional social psychology, the discursive and rhetorical psychologist 
seeks out variability in discourse (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984; Edwards 1997). Not 
only is it regarded as "analytically useful" (Potter & Wetherell 1987: 67), it is "an 
expected feature of conversation and social texts ... " (Potter & 
Wetherell 1987: 
38). In my analyses although the rhetorical strategies and discursive repertoires 
that the police participants employed within the various genres of speech 
employed did show variability, the type of speech genres used were less diverse. 
In both the first and second analysis the so-called 'facts of the case' were, on 
each occasion, quite different; while the 'extra-verbal' (Volosinov 1986) or local 
argumentative context (Suchman 1987) as we know, is always unique (Bakhtin 
1981): yet the speech genres that the officer in each case used were, with minor 
variations, the same. Indeed, the discursive and rhetorical work accomplished in 
the second analysis was almost formulaic. Given the "could-have-been- 
otherwise" nature of descriptions (Edwards 1997: 8), and the moment to moment 
"in situ, collaborative work" (Suchman 1987: 180) required in face to face 
discursive interaction or even in written work with no addressee physically 
present, this is no mean accomplishment. 
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Furthermore, in both sets of analyses the discursive and rhetorical machinery 
used by the police officers involved had the "designed visibility" (Edwards 1997: 
99) of `due process' (Packer 1968) being enacted; or, to put it another way the 
legal procedures and actions of the police officers involved were throughout, 
seen to be "presumptively correctly applied" (Sacks 1995 Vol. 1: 118). However, 
when the discourse of the police officers involved was subjected to close and 
prolonged analytical scrutiny, it was difficult not to conclude that the formal legal 
process, rather than being supported, was in fact, being subverted (Sacks 1995). 
Of course where subversion is concerned, the analytical difficulty for the 
researcher is that by its very nature, when it is accomplished successfully, it is 
neither 'seeable' nor'hearable' (Sacks 1995). Without going beyond the text to 
take account of the extra-verbal situation, and the ideologies that guide the police 
officer through his or her working life (Billig et al., 1988), the subversive act is 
likely to remain invisible. Indeed, I argued in Chapter 4 that it was because 
members of the public have little or no awareness of the ideologies that influence 
and act upon police officers, and which, as we have seen, sometimes run 
counter to the general expectations and ideas about the police, that officers are 
able to subvert the principles of justice or the formal prosecution process. Whilst 
we all do subversion in our daily conversational lives (Edwards 1997) this is a 
language game that the public would not assume to be taking place in their 
dealings with the police. 
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In Chapter 3, Ericson (1981) and McBarnet (1983) alerted us to the possibility 
that legal and procedural incongruities on the part of the police were not always 
characterised by obviously 'deviant' or illegitimate behaviour. They made the 
claim that law and the processes of law are sufficiently permissive that the police 
"need not abuse the law to subvert the principles of justice; they need only use it" 
(McBarnet 1983: 156); however, the form of analysis they used was not equipped 
to make visible the discursive machinery by which the police might achieve this. 
The findings of this study on the other hand, do just that as they reveal the 
linguistic devices and rhetorical strategies that police officers employ. These may 
be legitimately situated within the broad rubric of practices that the police call 
cuffing; although not all of them would qualify as cuffing in the pejorative sense 
that police officers understand the practice. For them, cuffing is usually reserved 
for those occasions when subversion has not been accomplished and jobs are 
seen to be being avoided. 
More unexpectedly perhaps, the findings of the second study reveal the 
pervasive nature of cuffing. It is not only confined to those incidents that occur 
out on the street away from the intrusive gaze of other police officers or criminal 
justice practitioners, as previous research has suggested (Muir 1977; Brown 
1988): police officers we now know, also cuff jobs that have already advanced 
into the formal prosecution process. The consistency with which the formal 
prosecution cases within my relatively small data set were undermined was 
unsettling; all the more so because it was achieved through the use of a very 
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limited number of narrative 'genres' (Bakhtin 1986) which gave these reports a 
formulaic quality - police officers it seems, have learned how to 'write-off 
prosecution cases just as they will have also learned how to 'work them up'. 
McConville et al (1991: 202) in their wide-ranging exposition of the criminal 
justice system reviewed a number of [in] famous miscarriages of justice noting 
that "once the police had decided on the guilt of the suspect, they constructed the 
case to ensure a conviction". What the findings of the second analysis 
demonstrate, is that the same applies to cases where the police decide upon the 
suspect's innocence: this was most apparent in those cases where the jointly 
constructed narrative of the 'real victim' was invoked. The advantage that this 
research has over McConville et al (1991) is, once again, in the methodology; 
which demonstrates empirically how this rhetorical work is accomplished. 
Of course, for the rhetorical and discursive psychologist there is nothing 
surprising in this, the findings reiterate how the decision to subvert or support the 
formal prosecution process has less to do with 'the facts' of each case and more 
to do with the 'witcraft' (Billig 1996) employed to construct those 'facts'. But, for 
the orthodox psychologist and other non-discursive practitioners [including police 
officers] my findings will be more disconcerting since they challenge the 
foundations upon which orthodox disciplines [including jurisprudence] and other 
world views rest [as discussed in Chapter 2]. The socially constructed nature of 
the prosecution case is something that McConville et al (1991) sought to make 
nearly twenty years ago. Yet, it seems that this is not something that the police or 
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the rhetoric of criminal justice either acknowledges or much less accepts. 
Irrespective of whether you are a dissident or a traditionalist, the findings prompt 
the question as to why it is that police officers undermine or subvert prosecution 
cases in this way. 
6.4. The findings: counter themes of police ideology 
The lack of variability in the discourse of the police officers who participated in 
this study, as I have already remarked, is a significant point of interest. From a 
rhetorical perspective we understand that 
... every occasion of 
human communication is embedded in, and makes 
use of, an unarticulated background of experiences and circumstances. 
(Suchman 1987: 180) 
Achieving such consistency amongst so much diversity suggests that when 
sidestepping the formal prosecution process and seeking informal resolutions, or 
in undermining formal prosecutions, those ideologies that are embedded within 
the common-sense knowledge of the police occupational milieu exert a strong 
influence. It may be too strong to claim that ideology 'hails' (Althusser 1971) the 
police officer as she or he does policing, but the fact that different police officers 
achieved the same ends through very similar means, points to the guiding hand 
of an ideology or ideologies at work. 
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The analytical advantage we have here is that throughout this exegesis police 
officers (Graef 1989; Copperfield 2006) and theorists (Cain 1973; van Maanen 
1973; Manning 1977; Punch et al., 1981; Shearing et al., 1983; Holdaway 1983; 
Brown 1988; McNulty 1994; Chan et al., 2003; Ford 2005; Smith et al., 2006; 
Chan 2007) have articulated the occupational or sub-cultural ideologies they 
adhere to or that guide them in their work. Of these, we have seen how the 
ideology of self-preservation (Manning 1977) or'covering your arse' (Chan et al., 
2003) and the ideology of pragmatism (Chatterton 1983; Kemp et al., 1992) - 
where police officers prioritise their workload according to whether incidents may 
be classified as 'rubbish work' or'quality jobs' - are always at the forefront of 
what the police do (McConville et al., 1991). 
In the first analysis, where various informal resolutions were studied, the lack of 
variability in the discourse of the officers involved was useful in drawing attention 
to the ideologies of pragmatism and self-preservation. PC B's encounter is a 
case in point. Called to prevent a breach of the peace between estranged 
partners who were both at the marital home, this is exactly the sort of dispute that 
police officers regard as 'rubbish work' because it has the potential to be time- 
consuming and requires some element of 'social work' to referee the potentially 
quarrelsome couple: this is not the sort of job where the skills of the thief-taker or 
the investigative sleuth are likely to be required. In resolving the 'I don't want to 
get involved but I can't refuse' dilemma of ideology confronting her, we saw PC B 
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use the that's civil device to limit her involvement in a seemingly unchallengeable 
and apparently legally-determined way. 
In contrast, PC Y's efforts to cuff a number of assaults involving several children 
and an irate mother were less successful and consequently more visible. 
Suitable advice, though it can be a legitimate and useful palliative in some 
dilemmatic situations, was not convincingly employed in this one. If the ideology 
of pragmatism is central to how police officers do policing, the ideology of self- 
preservation is essential in ensuring that it is done skilfully and invisibly so that 
the practice may be perpetuated. As PC Y found, to successfully cuff a job, the 
two ideologies must work in tandem: she also found that discretion in using 
discretion is important. 
PC Y's experience is a reminder that if cuffing is not achieved skilfully it becomes 
'seeable' (Sacks 1995) and in time it will become difficult to sustain. We saw in 
chapter 1 how this has happened in cases of 'domestic' violence. The ideological 
practices that the police have relied upon over years in dealing with 'domestic' 
violence [and which define it as 'rubbish work'] are now baulked by procedural 
directives. Discretion is no longer an option available to officers, who are instead 
compelled to deal with incidents of 'domestic' violence formally - as they would 
for any other crime. Despite these changes in procedure however, 'domestic' 
violence has not lost its informal status as 'rubbish work'. The removal of 
discretion, though it is intended to inject some consistency into how domestic 
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crime is dealt with, and, at the same time alleviate what has long been 
recognised as an ideologically dilemmatic situation for the police; seems instead, 
to have made the situation more difficult. From behind his shroud of anonymity, 
PC Copperfield offers a candid and illuminating opinion 
Domestic violence is something everyone can agree on: there should be 
less of it ... Weighing 
heavily on my mind, though, is the belief that 
people have a right to privacy and that if they both want to argue loudly it 
is really no concern of mine (unless they are my neighbours). Some 
people's domestic arrangements are a complete mystery to me, but I don't 
feel that gives us the right to start bashing their doors in if I feel like it ... 
'The thing with all this, ' said one of my colleagues, a female officer with 10 
years under her belt, 'is that people assume this is all about stopping 
domestic violence. It's actually about covering senior ranks arses in the 
face of media and political pressure. ' (Copperfield 2006: 96 & 98) 
Putting aside the relative merits or otherwise of these officers arguments [for that 
is another debate], the ideological positions that are fairly evident here are ones 
we have become familiar with throughout this thesis as they are a constant 
theme in the existing literature. More importantly, the findings of the second 
analysis reiterate them. What this tells us is that the ideological prejudice towards 
prosecuting 'domestic' violence, particularly that involving heterosexual male on 
female violence, has not been altered by the policy changes made. The power of 
this ideology still convinces PC Copperfield and the officers in this study that this 
sort of crime should really not be dealt with in the formal court arena or, in most 
cases by the police. Officers may no longer be able to cuff domestic assaults at 
the scene, but they can and still do cuff them at the post interview/pre-charge 
stage. 
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The irony here is that officers can now do so more invisibly than before, and with 
the additional benefit of knowing that any decision to discontinue will not be seen 
as theirs alone; it will be a decision achieved by consensus. Ultimately, the 
responsibility for it lies with a prosecutor, not a police officer. As far as 'arse 
covering' is concerned it could not be better; this is especially so given the 
discourse of the police officers constructing the MG3 reports. Theirs is a 
discourse that resonates with a powerfully self-fulfilling and prophetic vision of 
'domestic' violence: it is a discourse that is especially unforgiving towards the 
women involved. Like sexual violence, 'domestic' violence has a recognisably 
'gendered structure' (Dobash et al., 2000) "with the vast majority of victims being 
female and the overwhelming majority of offenders being male" (Taylor 2004: 3). 
Unfortunately, the stereotypical premise on which the ideology of 'domestic' 
violence as 'rubbish work' is based, often conflicts with many other ideological 
assumptions that police officers rely - the duty to protect 'life and limb' or 
'vulnerable persons' are just two examples. This may be one reason why 
'domestic' violence can be so inherently dilemmatic for the police. 
In chapter 1,1 discussed at length how the operational methodology of the police 
relies upon gross categorisations and legal and cultural stereotypes (Sacks 1972; 
McBarnet 1983; McNulty 1994; Taylor 2004). Among the many things that this 
methodology does, is to encourage the idea that 'domestic' violence cases are 
unlikely to proceed very far within the criminal justice process. This encourages 
officers to approach 'domestics' with an expectation that they will fail for one 
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reason or another and this undoubtedly features in the decision making 
processes of police officers (Edwards 1996). 
Whilst such 'pragmatism' might explain why officers once cuffed 'domestics' at 
the scene, it does not explain convincingly why police officers undermine them 
once they are entered into the formal prosecution process. Pragmatism will still 
have some bearing in the decision-making processes [a charge or charges 
requires a more complete file to be compiled]; but, other ideologies are also at 
work. Other theorists have argued persuasively that police and the courts 
routinely use gendered stereotypes, caricatures and "masculinist theories" 
(Taylor 2004: 3) to discredit women in crimes of violence, including 'domestic' 
violence and rape (Stanko 1982; Edwards 1994,1996; Lees 1999). The evidence 
from the MG3 reports is that this continues to happen. 
6.5. Women, children, the mentally ill: Unequal in the eves of the law? 
In the second analysis the 'mad or bad' woman of legal and criminological myth 
(Pollak 1950; McBarnet 1983; Edwards 1994,1996; Lees 1999; Walklate 2001; 
Taylor 2004) was a constant feature of the genre of credibility and was worked 
up through frequent references to alcohol consumption, undisclosed mental 
illness, drug abuse and 'eccentric' or'bizarre' behaviour. To a much lesser 
degree, commonplace male stereotypes were occasionally drawn upon to 
discredit; significantly, this occurred in the one domestic violence assault where 
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the suspect was a woman [R v P]. But, more often than not, when male 
stereotypes were used, they were done so ironically, to absolve or lessen the 
blame of the men involved. In RvD the police officer and suspect co-constructed 
a 'real victim' narrative that discredited the adult son of the female 'survivor' by 
constructing him as a 'younger-stronger-bigger-more aggressive' male - the only 
'evidence' for this assertion was the testimony of the suspect which was 
accepted uncritically by the police officer in the case. This narrative was also 
interwoven with a 'mother/son collusion' narrative -a commonplace in legal myth- 
making (Taylor 2004) - to further undermine the credibility of both mother and 
son. 
Police officers and critics may protest that evaluating the evidence in prosecution 
cases will always be a matter of professional opinion, and that many of the 
decisions made could be argued and debated ad infinitum; but that in the end, 
the principle of English law, that an accused is innocent until proven guilty tips 
the balance. As a rhetorician [and as a police officer] I would not disagree with 
this point of view. However, that argument misses the point. The findings of this 
research are not concerned with whether 'right' or'wrong' decisions have been 
made in the prosecution process; they are instead concerned with how the texts 
and the 'evidence' is constructed and what that construction does. 
It was clear that all the MG3 texts were constructed in an overwhelming negative 
or non-supportive way as far as upholding the original complaint was concerned. 
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Stereotypes and caricatures were relied upon and often worked up. Alcohol 
consumption and sobriety, whilst it was invariably used to cast doubt on the 
veracity of women's evidence, was more usually constructed as a 'mitigating' 
factor where men had been drinking. Inferential prefaces abounded and were 
almost always employed to the detriment of the complainant or witnesses 
supporting the complaint; whilst at the same time, claims and rebuttals from 
those suspected of the crime were, more often than not, uncritically accepted as 
`fact'. Whether or not the tendency of officers to preface criminal actions or 
events with the verbs 'allege' or 'claim' is indicative of a habit or custom of police 
culture or of society generally is not certain. But the fact is, that the presence of 
such prefacing in the data invariably appeared in utterances relating to what 
those who made the complaint had to say, thereby sowing the seeds of 
argumentative doubt (Billig 1996) about what they said at a very early stage. 
Given that the police, as I have maintained throughout, are always attentive to 
their own discourse, it would be surprising if this aspect of their discourse was 
any different. 
Similarly, the 'real victim' narrative which, I argue, is a co-construction between 
the police officer in the case and the crime suspect, also appeared to have a 
gendered edge to it. That it was used successfully by the one female crime 
suspect [the officer in that case was also a woman] suggests that it should not be 
considered gender specific. Nevertheless, it was certainly a feature of some of 
the domestic violence cases in this study and 'domestic' violence is understood 
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to be a gendered crime (Edwards 1994,1996; Taylor 2004). Although it is not 
possible to offer a general view on the prosecution process without first having 
studied more cases and incidents involving so-called 'quality jobs', or examining 
case files with male 'survivors', I can say that in this research, individuals who 
were female, children [see PC Y's comments in chapter 4 on page 146], alcohol 
dependent, or'mentally' ill were not served well. Having gained access to the 
previously private discourse between police and prosecutor, it is difficult not to 
draw the conclusion that the police, as agents of the criminal justice system are 
discriminatory in whose accounts they believe and how they enforce the law. The 
implication of this is that there are certain groups of people who are unlikely to 
gain access to justice because of their gender, age, psychiatric competence, or 
their substance dependency amongst other things. 
As is the way with prejudice now, there are no overtly discriminatory remarks to 
be found within the texts as this would be seen to be unreasonable or bigoted 
(Billig 1991); instead, the rhetorical work is achieved by the use of an 
"enthymemic" textual construction (Shotter 2002: 56) that relies heavily on 
common-sense knowledge and 'explanations' (Sacks 1995), general stereotypes 
and male myths about women. Interestingly, my findings mirror those of Taylor 
(2004) whose sociological analysis of trial transcripts in intrafamilial sexual abuse 
cases found that 
254 
... it was not unusual to find different defence barristers in different trials 
putting almost identical questions to complainants, as well as set patterns 
in the way a particular defence barrister approached trials involving 
intrafamilial sexual abuse. (Taylor 2004: 37) 
Of all the findings to emerge from this thesis, this is the most troubling and 
unpalatable because it suggests that these "seamy tactics" (Punch 1985: 203) 
are systemic to the police and the criminal justice system. However, there are 
limitations to my research that mean we should be cautious about the extent of 
any generalisations that might be made. 
6.6. Limitations of research 
This research took as its focus those events and crimes that police ideology 
dismisses as 'rubbish work'. Throughout, we have seen how the ideologies that 
determine what qualifies as 'rubbish work' are instrumental to how cases are 
constructed and dealt with. Some aspects of the findings have disturbing 
implications for the way in which 'justice', as it applies to particular social groups 
is implemented. With hindsight, it is unfortunate that my research did not allow 
me to consider that other aspect of the police officer's working life, the so-called 
'quality job' to see how police officers construct those cases and the individuals 
involved. As a rhetorician, I find myself compelled to argue that this is a research 
project that must now be carried out, for the present study, as insightful as it is, 
only provides a partial and therefore one-sided glimpse of how the police do 
policing. The glimpse that we have at present is, to be honest, not especially 
255 
complimentary and clearly has implications for police practice. The danger here 
is that the reader may assume that a police officer's life is preoccupied with 
impropriety and dubious 'rhetorical motives' (Billig 1996) and this is certainly not 
the case. 
Furthermore, as useful as my analysis has been in explicating the "social mind" 
and the cultural ideologies of the police officer through the "practical operations 
of speech" (Billig 1996: 20), it is less helpful in explaining why these ideologies 
are so impervious to change. 'Language games', as we know, are not 
unchanging (Wittgenstein 1972), but for some reason those that surround the 
prosecution of 'domestic' violence seem to be particularly obdurate. 
That criticism aside, methodologically speaking, the tripartite framework of 
analysis I set out in chapter 2 has generally been successful in allowing me to 
study both the micro-conversational detail of police officer's talk or text, whilst at 
the same time, enabling me to tease out the wider sub-cultural and ideological 
threads that permeate police discourse. The inherent reflexivity of my 
methodology has also ensured that my 'presence' in the research is visible. This 
is not to suggest that my tripartite framework of analysis is perfected; the point 
was made in Chapter 2 that it should be considered 'work-in-progress' and this 
remains the case. Issues around discourse as both a topic and a resource 
remain unresolved; whilst the development of the use of 'speech genres' (Bakhtin 
1986) and 'interpretive repertoires' (Potter & Wetherell 1987) requires further 
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work to unlock the combined analytical potential I believe they possess. In both 
respects, I anticipate that in the process of reworking and revising parts of the 
thesis for publication in academic journals, the input and ideas of reviewers and 
other academic peers will be integral to the evolution of my analytical framework. 
But whilst my status as a researcher and as a police officer has facilitated many 
aspects of this research project, it has not been without its difficulties. If my 
dilemmas of ideology were the prompt for this thesis, detaching myself from them 
[if such a thing is indeed possible] as part of the research process and of 
'unmotivated looking' (Psathas 1995) proved to be difficult. Having been a police 
officer for nearly seventeen years, the common-sense knowledge of the police is 
ever present in that aspect of my working life. I may like to think that I no longer 
draw on this 'common' sense uncritically, or that it does not extend into other 
areas of my life, but this would be as fanciful as suggesting that scientists can be 
empirically objective when they need to be or that they can stop being scientists 
when the mood takes them. 
Thus, the sceptic will point out that in spite of my frequent third person references 
to'police officers', which give the illusion that I am detached or distanced from 
those I observe, the fact remains that I am both an academic researcher and a 
police officer. Whilst I may prefer to categorise myself in that order, this does not 
necessarily mean that I can draw upon or disregard the ideologies of each 
occupational activity in such an ordered and discrete fashion. As much as I would 
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like to think I interpret my data from the standpoint of a well read dissident 
researcher; I must concede that it will also be interpreted through the eyes of a 
dissident police officer. 
This also raises a further point about my 'insider status' (Taylor 2001). Although it 
has undoubted advantages for this research, there is one other drawback 
besides those discussed in chapter 1. Of concern to me is that police officers as 
researchers have not always been viewed favourably by academics. A justified 
criticism in the past has been that some police officer/researchers have 
demonstrated a tendency to produce 'forgone conclusions' research (Weatheritt 
1986); that is, their research has been concerned with "the seeking out of 
information to support some preferred option ... [or] to legitimate some activity" 
(Brown 1996: 180). From the outset, I have been attentive to this sort of criticism. 
The critic, of course, will point out that my findings are as disquieting as the 
dilemmas that prompted them: the inference being that this project fits into the 
'forgone conclusion' mould. In refuting this claim, I do so on the grounds that my 
data is available for scrutiny and that my analytical method is not only inherently 
rigorous, but has been rigorously applied. 
6.7. Implications for practice 
What then, are the implications of this research for police practice? The exercise 
of discretion and the considerable autonomy of the police constable have always 
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been areas of contention when questions of accountability and 'controlling' the 
police are raised (Punch et at., 1983; Reiner 2000; Gelsthorpe & Padfield 2003). 
The practical difficulties in making changes to what police officers do and how 
they do it is apparent in that little has changed over the last forty years despite 
continued criticism and comment about the use and misuse of their powers. 
Discretion remains a valuable resource on which the police can call and 
attempting to curtail or eradicate it would be as undesirable as it would be 
impracticable. 
Law enforcement is not an exact science and we have seen how, in going about 
their work, police officers have to balance a whole set of competing demands. 
Not only must they satisfy the wants of the public, they must, at the same time, 
satisfy the requirements of the police organisation. The public expectation that 
the police are seen to 'do something' is a strong, if unrealistic one (Bittner 1974), 
and police officers have learned how to tread a fine line between keeping the 
public happy whilst managing the impossibility of prosecuting every crime 
reported to them. Hence cuffing in its various forms becomes something of an 
occupational inevitability: indeed, in certain circumstances, an informal resolution 
may even be what the public actually want - this is certainly the case in many 
'domestic' violence situations (Hoyle & Sanders 2000) as it is in other cases 
(Shapland & Vagg 1988). 
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But, as the second part of this thesis has shown, eradicating the more excessive 
and objectionable forms of cuffing cannot be achieved by altering working 
practices or by imposing greater levels of supervision. Greater supervision, 
though it is an obvious option to consider, infers an inherent lack of trust in the 
rank-and-file officer to do his or her work diligently. Because the punishment- 
centred culture of the police organisation (Waddington 1999) is still strong, 
increased supervision can be counter-productive as officers devote even more 
effort to concealing what they do for fear of organisational reprisals. The move to 
a more mature and trusting organisational ethos must therefore be one of the first 
steps to initiating change. 
Assuming that efforts are made to eradicate the pervasive 'blame culture' of the 
police, a more radical option for the informal resolution of crime may be to 
consider greater dialogue with the public, and for officers to 'negotiate' informal 
outcomes as part of a process of 'consultation'. We saw time and again in the 
first analysis, that police officers rely upon their presumed 'expertise', backed up 
by their tacit authority, to impose outcomes on the public. The implicit threat of 
coercion or the use of force (Bittner 1974) has for a long time been a significant, 
and acknowledged feature of the way police do policing. Negotiating an outcome 
on the other hand, though it is not unheard of, is not something that police would 
routinely consider. Achieving it would require an ideological shift on the part of 
the police in that genuine 'consultation' and 'negotiation' requires the participants 
to adopt a more equal footing as they make their case. Equally, it would also 
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require an ideological shift on the part of the public and the justice system in 
thinking about how 'justice' might be dispensed differently. 
If the ideology of pragmatism has been shown to be a persuasive factor in the 
police use of informal resolutions, in any revised process, the public must also be 
persuaded that an informal resolution has benefits for them too. Unlike Mrs L in 
the first analysis who was effectively coerced into accepting an informal 
resolution to the assault on her son, the public must feel able to resist the 
informal process if they consider it inappropriate or unacceptable, without fear of 
retribution. The ideology of pragmatism can be an effective two-way process. 
In contrast, the second analysis, though it was also concerned with cuffing raises 
some different issues - especially in how the MG3 report was constructed and 
utilised. In its present format, the MG3 [as far as 'domestic' violence cases are 
concerned] appears to have become a 'shortcut' for decision-makers. The MG3 
account constructed by the police officer was seen to exercise a prejudicial 
influence on the decision making process, its status seems to have become that 
of the for-the-record account. Officers have shown considerable discursive 
sophistication and rhetorical dexterity in constructing reports to achieve what can 
only be described as a preferred 'reading'. The problem therefore, is not that 
police officers are unable to construct arguments to make their case; rather, that 
a more critical scrutiny of the arguments being made is carried out by decision- 
makers. It is essential that the evidence in each case is evaluated, not the 
officer's summarised account of the evidence. 
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I am aware that a move to greater'face-to-face' discussion between police and 
prosecutor when seeking a charging decision in 'complex' cases has already 
begun, but this brings with it other dangers whereby 'off the record' arguments 
may still continue along traditional ideological lines, even if they are not recorded 
in that way -'covering your arse' is an ideology that applies to prosecutors as 
much as it does to police officers. More transparency in how prosecution 
decisions are reached and how evidence is evaluated might offer some hope, as 
would including victims and 'survivors' more fully in the process. At the moment, 
the prosecutorial machinery rumbles on with the victim or'survivor' in the case 
being, for the most part, an isolated and disempowered onlooker (Hague et al., 
2003). If gendered stereotypes and discriminatory views are to be challenged, we 
need to make them "matters of controversy" (Billig 1996: 251): inviting victims 
and 'survivors' to participate in a more sustained dialogical process would do just 
that and make prejudice more difficult to sustain:. 
Altering these aspects of the prosecution process will require significant changes 
in the way that police exercise their powers as well as how adversarial justice 
and its practitioners function. The greatest difficulty in addressing some of the 
issues that this thesis has raised is how to transform the ideological views of 
police and prosecutors. This more radical endeavour will not, as we have already 
found, be achieved by tinkering with police practices and procedures alone. 
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6.8. Future research 
If, as I said earlier, there is a need for further research into the rhetorical and 
discursive skills of police officers; then there is also a need for similar discursive 
work to be carried out into other areas of the criminal justice system. I have made 
the point throughout this thesis that the police do not operate in occupational or 
rhetorical isolation and as my research and that of others shows, the police make 
use of the language games and legal myths of the adversarial advocate on a 
daily basis. Changing the ideologies of police sub-cultures also means changing 
those of the legal advocate, as each informs the other. But, like the police, before 
we can do that, we must first try to understand what informs their discourse. 
This thesis provides a useful spring-board for such research in that it has already 
introduced us to some of the legal language games and occupational ideologies 
that circulate between police and prosecutor. It also demonstrates the usefulness 
of exploring and researching the less formal or the less public 'conversational 
realities' (Shotter 2002). Where the legal advocate is concerned, those 
conversations that occur outside of the court setting, between solicitors and 
barristers for example, with police officers or witnesses, and even with judges or 
magistrates, offer us insights into the advocate's world. Understanding what 
these language games do and how they impact upon the discourse in the court 
itself, are likely to be as informative as those we were privy to in the first analysis. 
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If the overlaps with police discourse and speech genres provide us with some 
continuity; the differences and variability in the discourse of the advocate will be 
what generates the analytical interest. Are 'real victim' genres, for example, likely 
to be more prominent in the advocate's world and do they go beyond 'domestic' 
violence cases? They will almost certainly be more elaborately worked up, as will 
genres of credibility, which were instrumental in generating a 'preferred' reading 
of the MG3 texts. What differences are there in how lawyers do credibility when 
compared to the police? Given the current concerns about poor conviction rates 
for'domestic' violence and heterosexual rape, further research into these topic 
areas seems entirely appropriate. 
The problem for the would-be researcher will be that lawyers, like the police, 
work in an occupational culture that is notoriously resistant to change, and 
equally difficult to penetrate. The nature of their work means that they are highly 
skilled at deflecting scrutiny from without: 'witcraft' (Billig 1996) is, after all, their 
stock-in-trade. The researchers who take on this task will not find it an easy one, 
and as with this study, it will most likely require the assistance of 'insiders'. Until 
the critical spotlight is directed upon those who enact the legal end-game, there 
will be no incentive for them or anyone else to reflect upon or change what they 
do and how they do it. The problem as McConville et al remind us is that for the 
state, existing modes of law enforcement work" (1991: 208 original emphasis) 
and this empowers many in the legal profession to resist change. 
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6.9. Conclusion 
This research has shown that police officers are rhetorically sophisticated in the 
'witcraft' (Billig 1996) they use, whether it is spoken or written. It has also 
reaffirmed how the ideologies that permeate the sub-cultural enclaves in which 
they work shape their discourse from within (Bakthin 1981,1986; Volosinov 
1986,1987). Throughout my police career, it has been my experience that the 
vast majority of my colleagues are honest and dedicated professionals who work 
hard for those members of the public they serve. The degree to which each 
resists or adheres to the received wisdom of their occupational cultures varies 
with each individual. Police life, like ordinary life is "filled with the sounds of 
chatter, as people philosophize and argue, comparing critically 'opinion' with 
'opinion'" (Billig 1991: 12). But as with all of us, the workings of ideology and of 
cultural and social norms can and do act upon them in unseen and unannounced 
ways. Only when we are exposed to competing views or have to confront the 
same dilemmas again and again are they likely to become visible. 
If I hoped this thesis might resolve some of my dilemmas, then I was probably 
being optimistic, as in that respect I have not been successful. What it has done, 
is allow me to articulate and to understand my dilemmas. More importantly still, 
by understanding those dilemmas, I have am able to offer some alternative ways 
of dealing with them. As Wittgenstein wrote "When the aspect changes parts of 
the picture go together which before did not" (Wittgenstein 2001: 177). My hope 
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is that this research changes the aspect enough so that at least some parts of 
the picture may now go together better than before. 
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APPENDICES 
Transcription Conventions 
The transcription symbols used in this research were devised and developed by 
Gail Jefferson (1985). 
hh 'h' indicates an outbreath; more h's longer outbreath. 
. hh Dot before the 'h' signifies inbreath 
(. ) Dot enclosed by bracket signifies a pause of less than 
two tenths of a second. 
= Latching utterances. 
[] Overlapping speech 
Signifies that preceding sound or letter is stretched. 
>< Talk between these signs is noticeably quicker. 
°° Talk between these signs is noticeably quieter. 
CAPS Talk in capitals is noticeably louder. 
Talk Underline indicates speaker emphasis. 
? Rising inflection, not necessarily an question. 
(best guess) Best guess at an unclear utterance. 
! Animated or emphatic tone. 
(0.5) Pause/silence in tenths of a second. 
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